

CHAPTER FOUR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (II)

42. State the three steps of the teleological argument from fine-tuning. (161)
43. What is fine-tuning? (158)
44. What should you say to someone who says, “If the constants and quantities had different values than they do, then other forms of life might well have evolved. (159)
45. Why is it irrelevant to claim that in universes governed by different laws life might well exist even though the constants and quantities would have different values than they do. (159-160)
46. What are the explanatory options for fine-tuning? (160-161)
47. Why is the hypothesis of physical necessity implausible? (161-169)
48. How should you respond to someone who says that “just as in a lottery someone has to win, no matter how improbable, some universe must exist, no matter how improbable”? (164-165)
49. What’s wrong with saying that “the fine-tuning doesn’t require an explanation because if the universe weren’t fine-tuned, we wouldn’t be here to be surprised about it”? (165-166)
50. What’s the problem with saying that there exists a World Ensemble of randomly ordered universes and our world just happens to be one member of the ensemble? (166-170)
51. What two things does Dawkins overlook in his “Who designed the designer” hypothesis? (171-172)
52. Give from memory the three steps of the moral argument. (172)
53. Distinguish moral values from duties. (172-173)
54. What does it mean to say that moral values and duties are objective? (173)
55. If naturalism is true, why does it seem that moral values and duties do not exist? (173-175)
56. Explain the distinction between moral ontology and moral epistemology and the significance of this distinction for a moral argument for the existence of God. (176)
57. Why is it premature for the naturalist simply to take human flourishing as his explanatory stopping point? (177)
58. What three objections might be brought against Atheistic Moral Platonism? (178-179)

59. Construct an argument for scepticism about our five senses parallel to an argument for scepticism about our moral sense.
60. How should you respond to someone who says that our moral sense is the delusory result of socio-biological influences? (179-180)
61. Respond to the Euthyphro Dilemma. (181-182)
62. Why is it not arbitrary and implausible to take God as one's explanatory stopping point? (182)
63. State from memory the six steps of Plantinga's ontological argument. (184-185)
64. Explain the difference between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Why is this important? (185)
65. What intuitive warrant is there for the first premiss of the ontological argument? (185)
66. How do the usual parodies of the argument fail? (185-186)
67. How can we defend our intuition that a maximally great being exists in the face of the intuitive possibility that a quasi-maximally great being exists? (186-187)
68. What *a posteriori* warrant might we offer for the first premiss of the ontological argument? (187-188)
69. What response can be offered to the objection that the ontological argument is question-begging? (188-189)