Author Topic: The Ontological argument and it's implication for the Doctrine of The Trinity  (Read 340 times)


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 Does the Ontological argument refute the Doctrine of the Trinity? I would love to hear a trinitarians respons to his question and see if my conclusion holds water or if I have missed something? Made some categorical error? Anyway here goes my reasoning:

As I understand it, the Ontological argument is based on the premise that "God" is by definition the greatest conceivable being, having such "great making" properties like that of being a "necessarily existent being", since it's better to be that than a "contingently existent being".

Now, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, God's is also "triune", that is, "tri-personal". This makes being "triune" an essential property of "God", it's not arbitrary but one of his "great making" properties.

My question then is this: How can being "tri-personal" (or having "three sets of rational faculties, each sufficient for personhood" as William Lane Craig puts it) be a "great making" property? Is it maximally great to be "tri-personal"? Why three? Why not four? Or a million? Three seems like an odd or arbitrary number to be THE "sets of rational faculties" that are maximally great.

So unless I have missed something, there are therefore only two viable options here, either:

1. Having more "sets of rational faculties" is better than having just one (obviously having one is better than not having any at all).
2. Having one singular rational faculty that encompasses all maximally great making properties is the maximally great and a property of the greatest conceivable being.

If option 1 is true, then a "triune" God is better than a unitarian God, but, a "quadrune(?)" God (having four sets of rational faculties) would better than being "triune". But if this is true, then it would mean that the very greatest conceivable being would have, not three, or four, or five, but an infinite set of rational faculties! Because having more is better, and infinity is the greatest conceivable sets of rational faculties that a being can have. This is still logically consistent since it is very easy to conceive of such a being.

But if option 2 is true, God has to be a unitarian God. I think that this is the most rational and logically consistent option of the two. Having more persons that are maximally great would inevitably "dilute" the sense of "maximal greatness" because all the properties would be shared by other persons making none unique, and it is better to be unique than generic. So having one singular unique person that encompasses all of it and is alone the greatest is easy to grasp and logically consistent.

So is it not so then, that the Ontological argument necessitates either a Unitarian
God, or an "Infinitarian" God, but is completely inconsistent with the concept of a "triune" God?

(keep in mind that I have heard the argument that since God has always been "loving" there must be at least more persons than one to love each other, but this is a different argument and not relevant here. And I do not agree with the arbitrarily defined version of "love" that is postulated and can find it nowhere in scripture)

I would love to have a response to this.

Thank you