During Craig’s Cambridge debate Aref Ahmed responded to the ontological argument by asking why “necessary existence” should be thought of as a great making-property. Ahmed asked if a piece of Mozart’s music would be any greater if it existed necessarily rather than contingently. It would seem not, which leads one to believe that necessary existence is not a great-making property. And yet, it still seems to be the case that some entity that must exist is greater than an entity that only just-so-happens to exist. These two intuitions compete against one another. How would you sort between these two intuitions?
jasondulle wrote: It is not possible for music to exist necessarily, and I would venture to say that Aref knows that. He was simply trying to illustrate that the greatness of the music does not increase simply because it is necessary. And if its necessary existence cannot make the music any greater than if it has contingent existence, then necessary existence is not a great making property, and the ontological argument fails.
I actually posted this topic under the ontological argument as well. If I don't get much response there either, I will post it under the general tab.
emailestthoume wrote:Quote from: jasondulleIt is not possible for music to exist necessarily, and I would venture to say that Aref knows that. He was simply trying to illustrate that the greatness of the music does not increase simply because it is necessary. And if its necessary existence cannot make the music any greater than if it has contingent existence, then necessary existence is not a great making property, and the ontological argument fails.
I actually posted this topic under the ontological argument as well. If I don't get much response there either, I will post it under the general tab.If you cannot apply necessary existence to music--if it is impossible for music to necessarily exist--then it seems to me no evidence that it is not a great making property if applied to music, as it cannot even be applied to music.Likewise, the number 7 cannot have the property of being in pain, but that doesn't mean pain isn't an undesirable property or anything else. And even if it were possible somehow for music to necessarily exist, it seems to me that it would make the music have some sort of greatness. Even if one couldn't hear the necessary existence of music, there would seem to me to be something really special about the fact that this music had existed necessarily (perhaps by a necessity of its own nature).