Reasons for Joy; In Gentleness, and Respect.

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Messages - JTega6

Eternity / Re: The reality of hell
« on: December 06, 2018, 06:44:50 pm »
It seems as if your argument goes like this:

If a punishment is just, then its severity matches the wrong-doing committed.
Humans’ wrong-doing, sin, is finite.
God’s punishment for humans’ sin, spending eternity in hell, is infinite
If an infinite punishment is more severe than a finite wrong-doing, then God’s punishment for humans does not match the severity of humans’ wrong-doing.
An infinite punishment is much more severe than a finite wrong-doing.
Therefore, God’s punishment for humans does not match the severity of humans’ wrong-doing. (MP 4,5)
Therefore, God’s punishment for humans is unjust. (MT 1,6)

   I would direct an objection to premise 2 in this argument. The problem with this argument is that the first two premises of it support the belief that the only factor that decides the severity of human sin is the actual sin, but this is not true. Just as in every other scenario where someone commits a crime, the actual action that a person commits is not the only factor in the severity of the crime. Who a crime was committed against also plays a role in the severity of the crime. For instance, under United States law being found guilty for threatening someone would result in a five year prison sentence. On the other hand, if someone is found guilty for threatening a United States judge or federal law enforcement officer that is a ten year jail sentence, double even that if one is found guilty of threatening the president. In each of these scenarios the crime is the same, threatening another human being, yet the punishments are different. This is because who one commits a crime against changes the severity of the crime.
   Qualities factor into the severity of a wrong-doing. In the case of the sins that humans commit, if they were just against other humans, then they would be finite, as humans possess finite qualities. Instead though, each sin that a human commits is not only against his fellow man but also God. God is an infinitely good being, therefore any act that is committed against God is not the same severity as an act committed against man. If committing the same act against the president is four times as severe as committing an act against a regular person, and this is because the president is more important, powerful, etc. than the average person, and God is infinitely more important, powerful, good, etc. than the president it would stand to reason that a sin against God is an infinitely severe sin. Therefore, since the punishment one experiences when committing a sin should match the severity of the wrong committed, a just punishment for humans would be an infinite punishment.

Omniscience / Re: The Feasibility of Omniscience
« on: October 31, 2018, 09:09:51 pm »

Your argument goes something like this:

If there are infinities, then there cannot be a single greatest possible being.
There are infinities.
Therefore, there cannot be a single greatest possible being.

My main objection would be to premise 1. I do not think that the presence of infinities makes the existence of a greatest possible being impossible. I think that the main point that the argument goes wrong is with the analogy. In your analogy you use the example of the natural set of numbers being infinite to show that there is no greatest possible number and use that narrative to show how there cannot be a greatest possible being. I think that where you are misguided is thinking that God resembles the greatest possible number, instead he would actually be the natural set of numbers. God’s attributes contains infinities just as the natural set of numbers does but God in himself exists just as the natural set of numbers does. His goodness, wisdom and power might be infinite as the number line increases but that does not mean he does not exist as a greatest possible being. If you were to try to imagine a being with an extra element of goodness or power than God, all you really did was just imagine God again except more thoroughly this time. Just as if you added another number to the natural set of numbers, it wouldn't disqualify the concept of the number line you previously had as the natural set of numbers, it just expounded on it. In this way it does not follow that the presence of infinities leads to the nonexistence of God, instead the existence of infinities makes it harder on us to fully grasp God’s true nature. Our inability to fully understand God does not show that God is logically impossible, if a greatest possible being did exist then it would follow that lesser beings would have a hard time fully comprehending the greatest possible being as he would be greater than they would be able to grasp.

Moral Argument / Re: Only a morally perfect being exists?
« on: October 31, 2018, 09:08:05 pm »
It seems as if your argument here is:

If being a morally perfect being does not rely on having other God-like qualities (omniscience, timeless, space-less, etc.), then the moral argument does not prove God’s existence as there can be another being who is not God, Bob, who can function as the objective moral standard.
Being a morally perfect being does not rely on having other God-like qualities (omniscience, timeless, space-less, etc.).
Therefore, the moral argument does not prove God’s existence as there can be another being who is not God, Bob, who can function as the objective moral standard.

My main objection to this argument would be to premise 2. It would be impossible to be morally perfect without having all of the other God-like qualities, omniscience, timeless, space-less, etc. I will use an anecdote to illuminate why that assertion is correct. Say that a servant was tasked with going out into a humongous garden to see if there is any snakes. He goes out to search the garden but is blindfolded so has no knowledge of how large the garden actually is. He is not able to justifiably claim therefore that there are no snakes in the garden as he simply could be missing an area where a snake is. This example is useful for coming to a conclusion in this argument because it is analogous to how God and humans function differently in regards to the full moral space of our actions. To be an objective moral standard one has to be a literal perfect example in regards to moral action. There cannot be any slip up in regards to moral action but one cannot know for sure that they have not done any immoral action unless they are able to search the entirety of moral space to see the implications of their actions. We as humans, not being omniscient, are not able to search all of moral space to see the implications of certain actions just as the blindfolded servant is not able to search the whole of a humongous field. On the other hand, God, being omniscient, would be able to justifiably conclude whether or not there is snakes in the garden, or immoral implications to actions, because he isn't blindfolded and is able to see the entirety of the garden. Therefore, in order to be an objective moral standard one has to possess the rest of the qualities that make up God, omniscience, timeless, space-less, etc., in order to be certain their actions are truly morally perfect.

Belief without Warrant / Re: Belief a CHOICE?
« on: October 31, 2018, 09:06:36 pm »
I believe that where you are misguided is that you are equating believing things to be absolutely certain about them. Your example of Leprechauns is a hard one to demonstrate your faulty reasoning in because it is a very all-or-nothing scenario. The proof for the existence of leprechauns is so far outweighed by the proof against their existence that is hard to have any sort of psychological battle for belief in that subject. I think a scenario that would better fit this predicament, if we are sticking with the fantastical, would be aliens. The way you are describing your view on people choosing their beliefs is that it is basically a switch that they flip and after that they are fully invested in the belief for or against something. I think this is the complete wrong way of viewing it. When people say they chose their beliefs it is because they see two different plausible scenarios and, because both are possible, they weigh the odds and evidence for each and then choose the one they feel is true or beneficial and then stake a claim in that belief. So, for example, with aliens there is very good evidence for both sides of the argument for and against the existence of aliens. On the against viewpoint there has never been a reliable sighting of an alien, if they exist they are not common knowledge or in the public eye, and the majority of the planets that we have discovered have not been inhabited. On the other hand the argument for the existence of aliens can be very persuasive when one considers the vastness of the universe and the odds that we would be the only life to develop in such a large space. In this case as there are legitimate points to be made for both sides one might approach it by going through the arguments and reasonings for each, considering the implications for both, and seeing which side makes more sense for them. Then, at the end of their considerations, they will  choose one side or the other and place their beliefs with that side. In this way, the subject will choose his/her beliefs and maintain them but they are not “convinced without a doubt” that their belief is right. Believing in something is not synonymous with having cartesian certainty in that thing. If anyone claims that they can have cartesian certainty in a belief in leprechauns, God, or even their friends then I think they should reevaluate their beliefs. In conclusion, the transition from lack of belief to belief isn’t instantaneous and it is not beyond doubts. Belief is gained by weighing options and choosing the one you think is truth.

Omniscience / Re: Fate
« on: September 30, 2018, 09:52:18 pm »

If I am not mistaken your argument goes something like this:

1.  If God is omniscient, then he knows the fate of every atom.
2. If fate exists, then free will does not exist.
3. God is omniscient.
4. Therefore, there is no freewill.

My main objection with this argument is to premise 1. Where I think this argument is wrong is in its claim that omniscience implies fate. I think it is wrong to assert that knowledge of something implies control of that thing. Allow me to give a counterexample. Many theologians believe that God exists outside of time. If we allow for this to be true for a moment and view God to be seen as a sort of fourth dimensional entity, then obviously all of time would be available for God to view. In this hypothetical, God would be able to recount what every atom would do in the future but in no way does that imply that God has any impact on the action of those atoms. In the same way if I was able to know the next day’s worth of events that was about to happen to my friend Diego in Brazil from where I set on my plane ride to Kansas City, would that imply that I am able to have any power on the course of those events. The only real ability I would have would be to disrupt those events by putting myself into them where I wouldn't have been. So maybe perhaps I know that he was about to watch a Brazilian television show for the next thirty minutes and then move on to his other tasks for the day. Having the knowledge of what was about to happen I could try to call him and have him talk to me on the phone instead of watching television, therefore disrupting the series of events that were supposed to take place. Furthermore, even if I did know what Diego was going to do for the next thirty minutes and I tried to alter it with a phone call, that would not imply that I had any power over whether or not he picked up that call. This would be a product of his freewill despite my knowledge of his

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