I think you are asking interesting questions, but it somehow seems to me they have probably been addresses one way or another on the prevailing theistic literature (even though I don't know the answers). Please correct me if I'm wrong.
Anyway, for me the Thomistic view about the relationship between Substance and Forms (or properties) sounds to be both compatible with God's being simple and more intuitive in general than the neo-Platonic views like those of Frege or Plantinga. But nevertheless I'm bothered how one is about to answer Plantinga's objection (appears on his "Warrant and Proper Function") according to which proposition must be abstract entities (or at least exist outside human minds) to which he give an argument like the following: At the times before the human race became to exist it was true that "there is no human being" and therefore the proposition that no human being exists had some property (of being true) but nothing can have a property when it doesn't exist.
To be honest, I haven't yet read Plantinga's or Frege's views on their neo-Plantonism. I'm not a universal realist of any sorts, but a conceptualist. I would agree with you that to claim that a nonexistant entity has existant properties would be absurd. My arguments above against Thomism are entirely my own and it my be true that they have been explored by other writers without my knowledge. I'd love to have a debate with a Thomist where we can discuss them.
Tripp wrote: Consider, for example, God's omnipotence. The word literally means "omni-pontentiality" and itself implies potentiality in God's being.
Tripp wrote: I don't know much about the thread but I just wanted to say that the word Omnipotence means all powerful (Omni, meaning all, and potens, meaning powerful)Hmmm. I thought it meant omni-potent, as in potency.But as you well noted, it does mean all-powerful.But then what does it mean exactly to be "powerful"?
But then wouldn't ablity mean "capable of doing?"
Why do you think that is an important difference?
Ah I think I understand what your saying, are you saying that the definition 'all -pontentiality' is still a valid definition? In a sense it is, but it is only part of the meaning of omnipotence. Also, the defintion dosen't include the part 'all His Holy will'. Wow! I need to look more into omnipotence! :-)
God wouldn't neccesarily have to be complex because of His infinity. I don't believe neccesarily in the Thomist doctrine of simplicity, but God need not be that complex. For example, William Alston argued a long while back that God's omniscience does not constitute an actual infinite in that He knows an actually infinite number of propositions, but a potential infinite only. God posseses all of His knowledge in one single intuition and what we as human beings do is break up parts of God's knowledge up into propositions for our finite minds. A process that if one could continue to do forever.
CATO wrote: "God wouldn't neccesarily have to be complex because of His infinity"Why do you think not?
I didn't say this original quote, but, it's simply because God's infinity is a qualitative infinity, rather than a quantitative infinity. God is one unified thing that has a finite number of infinite qualities.