I meant that Platonic properties transcend their instances, and that it seems that you either end up falling to the third man argument or saying that self-instancing properties are "in" themselves pace Platonism.
Luke wrote: I'm not sure I understand what "transcend" means in this case. I think of exemplification as simply the relation that holds between a property and its instance when the property is true of that thing. Since propertyhood is a property, it is an instance of itself and so exemplifies itself. I don't see the problem.A big difference between us, I guess, is that I hold an abundant view of universals. But even on a sparse view, don't you have to believe in modal properties? And if so, wouldn't being possibly instantiated be possibly instantiated and so exemplify itself?
Luke wrote: I don't understand the Aristotelian notion of potentiality that you appeal to.
Luke wrote: I don't understand the Aristotelian notion of potentiality that you appeal to.I don't understand the Aristotelian notion of constitution that you appeal to. Constitution is a relation that, if it is instantiated by anything, is instantiated by material objects. For a property to be an instance of itself is just for it to be true of itself. For a concrete particular to be an instance of a property is just for the property to be true of the particular. The ball is an instance of redness because it is true of the ball that it is red, not because redness is some kind of "constituent" (whatever that means) of the ball. So, I guess I am saying that you are mischaracterizing Platonism, since there is no notion of constitution in the Platonist account.
There's a lot you said in your last post that I don't understand. Particularly, I don't understand your claims in the second paragraph. As for the third paragraph, I don't understand truthmaking. Do you intend the "because" literally, as in causally? I doubt it. Could you explain more? I of course agree that the ball's exemplifying redness entails that the proposition "the ball is red" is true, but you can't merely mean that, right?
Thinking it over, I may have inadvertantly derailed the discussion by saying that redness is true of the ball. All I meant by that was that one can truly say of the ball that it is red.
Luke wrote: There's a lot you said in your last post that I don't understand. Particularly, I don't understand your claims in the second paragraph. As for the third paragraph, I don't understand truthmaking. Do you intend the "because" literally, as in causally? I doubt it. Could you explain more? I of course agree that the ball's exemplifying redness entails that the proposition "the ball is red" is true, but you can't merely mean that, right?
Luke wrote: That helps some, but I'm still not sure I really understand. I have a hard enough time understanding composition in the material case (one of the reasons I'm a compositional nihilist).What does it mean for something to "make" a contingently true proposition true? "Make" isn't supposed to mean "cause," right?I realize I might sound like someone who's just trying to make life hard for you by constantly asking for definitions, but I genuinely don't understand a lot of what people say about universals. I've been deeply influenced by van Inwagen, who's famous for claiming he doesn't understand all sorts of stuff. He's often mocked for this, but when I think hard about a lot of the stuff he claims he doesn't understand, I realize that what I thought I understood I really didn't (Aristotelian theories of universals being one of these issues). van Inwagen has claimed that the goal of the metaphysician should be to aspire to assert falsehoods, since they more often than not fail to even do that.
Joey wrote: Demurph, could you please explain a bit further how is it that the property of redness is a real universal whilst supervenient concepts like beauty aren't? You said "predicates only match up to universals when the predicate is associated with a causal power or moderately strong resemblance".
Joey wrote: Also, just to clarify, on Aristotelian realism universals are "in" particulars whilst on Platonism they're "related" to particulars? I realize this topic is probably treated in many standard texts, but for my sake (and for others reading), could you please highlight salient differences between the two, and explain the concept of universals "in" something further?
Luke wrote: Well, since I don't really understand truth-making, I have trouble seeing the problem for Platonism. Consider the proposition "x is red" where x is a name for a rubber ball. Suppose further that the ball exists and stands in the exemplification relation to redness. What more is required to get a truthmaker?I don't see any necessary correlation between Aristotelianism and ontological parsimony. Aristotelians qua Aristotelians are not committed to a sparse theory of properties, and Platonists qua Platonists are not committed to an abundant theory. The debate between sparse and abundant theorists is independent of issues of "constitution."
Luke wrote: Aristotelianism does a better job (allegedly) of explaining natural kinds only if there are natural kinds. Why think there are such things (I presume you mean things like rocks and rivers as opposed to the collection of things on my desk)?
Luke wrote: What do you mean by "intrinsic natures"? If you mean essences, then I don't see the slightest Aristotelianism has over Platonism.
Luke wrote: I don't see any connection between Platonism and reducing God to the demiurge. Nothing in Platonism rules out creation ex nihilo.I would think Aristotelianism is more theologically objectionable than Platonism. Aristotelians have to say that God is literally a composite of various parts (universals at least, and if one isn't a bundle theorist, then also bare or thin particulars). Platonists, on the other hand, are "blob theorists" about substances, to use Armstrong's wonderful term. Substances are metaphysical simples. Universals are no parts of substances, and there is no notion of "dependence" on universals, whatever that might mean. Yes, Platonists believe in uninstantiated universals, and abundant Platonists believe in an infinite number of properties, relations and propositions (and maybe also states of affairs). But these are spaceless, causally impotent entities. I don't see anything theologically problematic about them. It's not like they do anything, so that God isn't sovereign over everything that happens.