jasondulle wrote: I can't say I quite understand your response either, so we're even. What I was talking about is the complaints I have heard defenders of the OA make against Anselm's version of it, namely, that he equivocates between the concept of a greatest conceivable being and an actual greatest conceivable being. He makes the assumption that just because the concept exists in one's mind that therefore it exists in reality. But that does not follow. WLC's version of the OA, for example, avoids this difficulty because it doesn't begin with the concept of a greatest conceivable being, but rather the modal possibility of the real (as opposed to mental) existence of such a being.
Yes, it seemed Anselm's only suffered from the idea that if it can be thought to exist, it does (at least it was the basis), whereas modal logic and possible world semantics have clarified. I wouldn't say Anselm was way off base; in fact, I'd say he was ahead of his time. His argument needed tweaking; a reason conceptualization should result in reality. The modal logic gave the needed clarification.