I was reading up on this a little, and it seems, just to be clear, that the proposition "I have lots of water, but I am out of H2O" is broadly logically impossible, whereas if we tease out H2O's referent to create the non-synonymous (but logically equivalent) proposition, "I have lots of water, but I am out of water," this is strictly logically impossible.
The concept of a married bachelor is like the concept of a round square, but where do we get our definition of bachelor from? Do we get it from a dictionary? If so, have we seen all the dictionaries which define the word bachelor, to see if they all agree? The name of a word is distinguishable to it's definition, otherwise the only way to define the word bachelor would be to use it. A word named, is logically prior to a word defined, and a word can only be defined empirically. There are therefore no analytic propositions.
The concept of a married bachelor is like the concept of a round square,
but where do we get our definition of bachelor from? Do we get it from a dictionary?
If so, have we seen all the dictionaries which define the word bachelor, to see if they all agree? The name of a word is distinguishable to it's definition, otherwise the only way to define the word bachelor would be to use it. A word named, is logically prior to a word defined, and a word can only be defined empirically. There are therefore no analytic propositions.
Even if we do, the lexicographers got it from observing people using "bachelor" as a label for unmarried men. They get it from use.
As far as round-squares go, it is self-contradictory to deny that an entity with being has no meaning.
Given that it is a self-contradictory idea (concept),
"The word 'dog' has meaning" but I can't say "That dog has meaning".
I cannot understand "self-contradictory idea (concept)". Since we cannot think of anything which a contradictory sentence could refer to, how could we justify saying that we are having any idea or concept at all?
I think I am correct to assume that you and he use "things with being" synonymously with "existent things". Correct me if I'm wrong.
troyjs wrote: "The word 'dog' has meaning" but I can't say "That dog has meaning". What is the difference between the word 'dog', and the phrase 'that dog'?
Why does one have meaning, while the other doesn't?
there is no essential difference between the word 'dog', and the phrase 'that dog'.
The definition of a being, is equivalent to all propositions which describe it.
Do you mean by 'having an idea of', to have a visual representation of?
Technically, I would use the word 'existence' in the same or similar way to Aristotle. Essence, is being, and Existence is non-being.
...2 seemingly contradictory views that everything is one and nothing changes, and that everything is many and everything is always changing.,/quote]
we end up saying, a 'being is not a being', or 'an entity which is, isn't'.
For example. What is a Pegasus? It is a horse with wings, and can fly. Can non-existing entities fly? Of course not, since non-being, can not do anything. Does Pegasus exist?To say that the word 'pegasus' is meaningless, is to deny the meaningfulness of possible-world semantics, and all counterfactual statements.
You missed my point. You thought I was contrasting the word "dog" and the phrase "that dog". No indeed! I was contrasting a dog with "dog":
Everything is made of electrons and it's true that the electrons don't change themselves. But they do change their locations. So the electrons don't change but their locations do. So I agree they only seem to be contradictory but they are not.
I agree fully that the name "Pegasus" is meaningful, for Pegasus can certainly be imagined as being sensed. Can God be imagined as being sensed? Do you think so?
troyjs wrote: I understand you want to differentiate between word and object, but the problem with this is that the only objects we know are in our minds, for if they were not in our minds, then we would not know them.
But given this fact, it is impossible to distinguish the word or concept, from the thing itself. They are precisely the same thing, except one is a priori, while the other is a posteriori.
The word 'dog', if it is a word, is more that the three letters we come to know a posteriori.
It has meaning and a referrent
-- this referrent is supposedly external to our minds. But it is not. The referrent is the thing known, ie. the idea.
When an arrow is in flight, it must traverse an infinite number of points -- But this impossible.
I am not a Logical Positivist, nor a neo-Wittgensteinian.
We can not possibly know things by sensing them, for all we would know are our sensations.
Our knowledge of our sensations exist in the mind, but we infer that there is something external to our minds, in order to account for our perceptions. We can also infer logically that God exists, in order to account for propositions which we hold to be true. God is a being. It is self-contradictory to assert that a being is non-being(does not exist), therefore God exists, and it is self-contradictory to assert otherwise.
That can't be true because words are made of ink, pencil lead, or lit pixels on a computer screen (as here) whereas the things they represent are usually composed of something other than ink, pencil lead, or lit pixels on a computer screen.
I disagree that the word "dog" is anything other than just the ink, pencil lead, or lit pixels on a computer screen. You will never hear the word "dog" bark. You will never see the word "dog" wag its tail, for it has no tail to wag, unless the tail on the bottom of the "g" :-)
When you say "All we would know are our sensations", I can only interpret that as "all we would know is what we sense or can think of sensing"
But there are no dogs in my brain. There are only neurons with chemically stored memories of dogs in there. I'm sorry but I can't seem to get any sense out of what you are saying here. Maybe we need to discuss the words "mind" and "brain".
Anything that can be said using the word "mind" can always be reworded using only "brain" and "brain activity"
WLC says there is no logical contradiction in the proposition, “God does not exist,” but he also affirms that God is a logically necessary being. These two affirmations appear to be in conflict. If God is a logically necessary being, then to say “God does not exist” is equivalent to saying “a logically necessary being does not exist” which is self-contradictory. Surely WLC recognizes this. Perhaps he just means the contradiction is not self-evident as is the case with a proposition such as “it is true that there is no truth.” Is anyone aware of a place where WLC discusses this? Does anyone know how WLC explains himself?
"The King will reply, 'I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me.'
Tell me: Does it not make sense that if metaphysics were knowable in the way science is now that there would be a good deal more consensus about it?
How is anything in science, knowable?
I would say the scientific method is the best that human beings have come to being able to decide which models better reflect reality, or physical, temporal reality anyway.
I would say that the success of science is the best argument for that opinion.
For example, germ theory and evil spirit theory are both models of our physical reality. Germ theory however has many advantages over evil spirit theory however. First, germs are empirically evident while spirits are not. Further, germ theory has explanatory power and allows us to make testable hypothesis. If the idea that many diseases are caused by germs is not knowledge, I'm not sure what is.