emailestthoume wrote: I re-read it and I believe I represented you correctly.
Oh, I'm not suggesting you have
misrepresented me. It's just that your initial response didn't seem to address what I had written. But never mind, since you have done so since.
My reasons for believing are not arguments, though I do not take a leap of faith (like I think you do with trusting your sense experience)... though Dr. Craig's arguments seem good to me. If you are looking for arguments I would refer you to his. If you want to read my personal reasons for believing God, I have written at length about it on other threads and I can link you to that.
WLC's arguments are pretty awful in my judgment (you can find some of my criticisms of his Kalam argument
here, e.g.). But I would be curious to hear what are your personal reasons for believing, so if you have links handy, feel free to share them.
You have no logical reason. You admit you have no non-circular argument to trust induction. Saying "I can't help it, I have no choice" is not a logical reason to accept the proposition, "my senses give me true beliefs." Its just saying you are forced to accept it without a logical reason.
Quite so. But I suggest that this is a reasonable thing to do in this case. Reason cannot justify itself beyond being consistent. So when we look to the foundations of reason, as it were, we ought not be surprised when we cannot justify them on more primitive grounds.
Philosophers have taken this question seriously for ages and you just avoid it by defining the problem away. As you admit, there is no non-circular reason for you to trust your senses. You simply take it by blind faith--whatever you define rational as, this is certian. If you have reason to believe in a good God, the only reason isn't nothing. I think you would have reason to believe that God would not deceive you, and so give you trustworthy sense experience.
First of all, I
do take seriously the problem of induction in the sense that I regard it as a coherent and interesting issue. But I don't regard it as a "problem" in the sense that, so long as it remains unresolved, knowledge is impossible, or some such radical skepticism. We just need to be humble about our epistemic limitations. We are fallible creatures, and the universe in which we live offers us no guarantee that our capacity to reason shouldn't fail us in the most dramatic way.
Second, as to how you think God helps, I should like to point out that the only way to make sense of God acting in the world is to use induction. And this is due to the fact that causation presupposes induction; so that when we say that God causes this or that to occur, we can only do so against the backdrop of inductively-inferred regularities. When you say that God
gives us our capacities for (trustworthy) sensations, you have appealed to causation, and hence to some regularity, presumably between God's will and real events. But why should there be any
universal regularity between God's will and real events? Maybe tomorrow God may will an event to occur without it actually occurring---and the regularity then fails.
Of course you can always build induction into the definition of God. You could say, for instance that God* (God-star) exists, where God* is a God for whom the regularity between his will and reality holds up. And then you would have to presuppose universal regularities of personality, and of a particular sort so that God* would want to create a universe where local regularities hold up in order that we may inductively infer them with some success. And even then, if any of your reasons to believe in God* involve so much as a single inductive inference, the whole enterprise falls into the very same circularity we wanted to avoid in the first place.
So, as I said, God doesn't help with induction. For that, we need God*---but God* is just God and induction bundled together as a package deal. We might as well take induction by itself and leave out the superfluous deity.