Craig right once more

[alloneword]

Kevin wrote:   Perhaps you can explain to me how God's foreknowledge of my choice helps me make my choice in the way that a frigid night influences me to choose hot tea over ice water?

   

   It is for Craig to say how God's foreknowledge has no causal effect on my choice.

   

   For the sake of this discussion, I am assuming that he can.

[Kevin]

alloneword wrote:

 My analysis applies to your post not Craig's work. You are making a number of conceptual errors, and therefore, what you're writing doesn't model Craigs work at all. As I clearly showed, there is an obvious incoherence in your worlds 2 and 4. These are  impossible  worlds to begin with and so you can't use them in an analysis of  possible  and  feasible  worlds.

CRAIG CONTINUES

           Moment 2:                  . . . O         O   O          . . .

           Middle Knowledge: God knows the range of feasible worlds

CARR
Here is where the counterfactuals come in.

Take logically possible world A) :-
A) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30, and God infallibly knows that I will choose coffee

God now knows that in those circumstances, I will choose coffee

Take logically possible world B) :-

B) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30, and God infallibly knows that I will choose tea

God now knows that in those circumstances, I will choose tea.

This is an incorrect formulation as I have pointed out before. Middle knowledge delimits the possible worlds. A and B are possible worlds. They are NOT both feasible worlds. Follow this closely: when given a choice for coffee or tea at a given time and place, a free will choice will select only one option. So if the free choice selects option A (coffee), then God can't actualize B.

This is why I think it is clear that you don't understand the concepts involved. If you did, you would realize that the set of feasible is less then the possible worlds. I've pointed this out before. If you start with two worlds A and B, you can't have two  feasible worlds from middle knowlege. The latest Q & A on this website has a discussion on this. To quote from it: "These counterfactuals serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds which are feasible for God to actualize."

The end result, is that be misrepresenting the middle knowledge perspective, you effectively make all possible worlds feasible. Then you step back and say that it's all feasible for God, ergo, it's feasible to make a world where no one commits evil. The argument works... when you get to "cheat."

Again, I appreciate the discussion, but at this point you're simply repeating yourself and I don't see any way to move forward when you keep misrepresenting molinism.

Let me ask you this question: do you or do you not understand that middle knowledge delimits possible worlds? If you do, then explain why your argument contains two feasible worlds when you start with two possible worlds?

And by the way, "Kevin is utterly right...", "Kevin has cleverly spotted...", "Kevin has rescued God...", "Kevin also claims that...", "Kevin is utterly right..." Who exactly are you talking to? Aren't you having the debate with me?













God now knows that these following worlds are not feasible.

C) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30, and God infallibly knows that I will choose tea ,and I then choose coffee

D) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30, and God infallibly knows that I will choose coffee ,and I then choose tea

In circumstances A), I will choose coffee, and God cannot actualise a world where circumstances A) obtain and I choose tea.

So Craig's analyis can hardly be faulted :-)

Kevin also claims that *he* knows that such worlds are not feasible, because they are not logically possible.

SO what? If Craig said it was not feasible for God to create a square circle, would Kevin claim that it was wrong to say it is not feasible for God to create a square circle?

Kevin is utterly right to say that these 'non-feasible' worlds are logically impossible.

But that doesn't stop them being non-feasible.

CRAIG continues
         Divine Creative Decree

           Moment 3                                                      

           Free Knowledge: God knows the actual world

CARR
God then knows which circumstance A or B is the actual world.

Result. God can create a world where I choose coffee, or a world where I choose tea.

Craig has deduced from his analysis that there might be no world where I choose tea (or coffee, as the case may be)

This is wrong. Philosophical sleight-of-hand by Craig.

[Kevin]

alloneword wrote:

 Perhaps you can explain to me how God's foreknowledge of my choice helps me make my choice in the way that a frigid night influences me to choose hot tea over ice water?

It is for Craig to say how God's foreknowledge has no causal effect on my choice.

For the sake of this discussion, I am assuming that he can.

I think you know you're wrong on this point. I think it's patently obvious that God's foreknowledge doesn't affect our choice. Do you have access to anyones mind other then your own? Of course not. It's prima facie obvious, so the burden lies with you.

Furthermore, God's middle knowledge in this context is determined by our free choice. It therefore cannot help determine the choice. Foreknowledge can't determine the choice because it's the choice that determines the foreknowledge.

[alloneword]

Kevin wrote:   This is an incorrect formulation as I have pointed out before. Middle knowledge  delimits  the possible worlds. A and B are possible worlds. They are NOT both feasible worlds. Follow this closely: when given a choice for coffee or tea at a given time and place, a free will choice will select only one option. So if the free choice selects option A (coffee), then God can't actualize B.

   

   

   

   You are correct once more.

   

   Take world A

   

   A) I am offered a choice between tea and coffee, and God has infallible knowledge that I choose coffee.

   

   I will select coffee.

   

   The following world B cannot be actualised by even an omnipotent God.

   

   B) I am offered a choice between tea and coffee, and God has infallible knowledge that I choose coffee, and then I choose tea.

   

   Because the countefactual of world A is that I do actually choose coffee, God cannot actualise a world where A obtains and then I choose tea.

   

   Of course, the following world is feasible :-

   

   C) I am offered a choice between tea and coffee, and God has infallible knowledge that I freely choose tea.

   

   

   We immediately apply Kevin's reasoning to this logical possibility, and ask ourselves , what is the counterfactual truth of what I choose in those particular circumstances.

   

   I freely choose tea.

   

   'Follow this closely: when given a choice for coffee or tea at a given time and place, a free will choice will select only one option.'

   

   I followed Kevin as closely as possible, and totally agree with him that in  the logically possible circumstances C, a free will choice will select only one option.

   

   God knows that, just as surely as Kevin does, and this is what is known as 'middle knowledge'.

   

   

KEVIN wrote:

   

    The end result, is that be misrepresenting the middle knowledge perspective, you effectively make all possible worlds feasible.

   

   

   

   Let me see. I show that an omnipotent being can do anything which is logically possible.

   

   That can't be right, can it?

   

   Everybody knows that the definition of an omnipotent being is that he can do lots of things, hundreds even,  that are logically possible.

   

   

   But let me go through Craig's steps to knowledge *one more time*. (Kevin never attempts to do this....)

   

   Craig insists 1) in all logically possible worlds, there is an omniscient God.

   

   So to describe any logically possible circumstance, there must be a god in the picture.

   

   

   Craig writes 'Thus on the Molinist scheme, we have the following logical order:

   

   Moment 1: . . . O O O O O O . . .

   

   Natural Knowledge: God knows the range of possible worlds'

   

   CARR

   NB, FIRST we deimit the range of possible worlds, and THEN we work out which worlds are feasible, given the counterfactuals of what an agent *actually does* choose in each of the possible worlds.

   

   Given libertarian free will, the range of possible worlds includes the following 4 worlds.

   

   These worlds are mutually exclusive, as actualising any one of them, means that the other 3 cannot be actualised.

   

   A) I am offered a choice of tea or coffee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am precisely, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose coffee

   

   

   B) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am precisely, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose tea.

   

   C) I am offered a choice of toast or a croissant on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am precisely, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose toast

   

   D) I am offered a choice of toast or a croissant on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am precisely, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose a croissant.

   

   Then , we follow Craig's methods to the letter and work out the counterfactual truth of what I will freely choose in each of the 4 mutually exclusive, logically possible worlds.

   

   That is not hard to do, and the knowledge of how I will choose in each of those situations is called 'middle knowledge'.

   

   Finally, we follow Craig and we see which of those 4 possible words are feasible for God to create.

   

   When we do that, we must take into careful consideration the counterfactuals of how an agent chooses.

   

   In A), I choose coffee.

   

   In B), I choose tea

   

   In C), I choose toast

   

   In D), I choose a croissannt.

   

   Depending upon which free will choice works best for God's plans, he accordingly actualises A, B, C, or D.

   

   Craig's writing is so clear that it is childs-play to follow his reasoning.

   

   

[Kevin]

alloneword,

I asked you a question earlier that you didn't respond to. It stikes at the heart of the conceptual problems you are making. I has to be answered if we are to have any hope of continuing this discussion. Otherwise, you are simply repeating what you wrote in the first post, and I'll just repeat my critiques.

So here's my question: "Do you or do you not understand that middle knowledge delimits possible worlds? If you do, then explain why your argument contains two feasible worlds when you start with two possible worlds?"

Refer back to my post that is time stamped "Yesterday at 05:59 PM" for the context.

[alloneword]

Kevin wrote: alloneword,

I asked you a question earlier that you didn't respond to. It stikes at the heart of the conceptual problems you are making. I has to be answered if we are to have any hope of continuing this discussion. Otherwise, you are simply repeating what you wrote in the first post, and I'll just repeat my critiques.

So here's my question: "Do you or do you not understand that middle knowledge delimits possible worlds? If you do, then explain why your argument contains two feasible worlds when you start with two possible worlds?"

'"Do you or do you not understand that middle knowledge delimits possible worlds?'

Middle Knowledge does not delimit logically possible worlds. They delimit which worlds are feasible.

Craig is adamant that we have libertarian free will, and so these circumstances in which we make choices are logically possible.

A) I am offered a choice of tea or coffee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose coffee


B) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose tea.

C) I am offered a choice of toast or a croissant on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose toast

D) I am offered a choice of toast or a croissant on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose a croissant.

Then we have to work out what God's knowledge is of what we ACTUALLY WILL DO in each of those 4 different *logically* possible worlds.

In A), I choose coffee.

In B), I choose tea

In C), I choose toast

In D), I choose a croissant.

This means that the following worlds are not feasible worlds.


E) I am offered a choice of tea or coffee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose coffee, and I then choose tea


F) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose tea, and I then choose coffee.

However. Craig's analysis of counterfactuals shows that these words ARE feasible.

G) I am offered a choice of tea or coffee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose coffee, and I then choose coffee


H) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am *precisely*, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose tea, and I then choose tea.

I think Kevin's problem is that he is a determinist, who claims that the choices we make determine the circumstance in which we choose.

I remind him that Craig believes in libertarian free will, not a determinist, and he does not believe that our choices determine the circumstances in which we choose.

[Kevin]

alloneword wrote:
'"Do you or do you not understand that middle knowledge delimits possible worlds?'

Middle Knowledge does not delimit logically possible worlds. They delimit which worlds are feasible.

To quote Craig from last weeks Q & A, "These counterfactuals serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds which are feasible for God to actualize." Middle knowledge delimits possible worlds leaving us with feasible worlds. Hence, there are less feasible worlds then possible. Your attempt to critique Craig's work on this issue is flawed from the beginning.

I'm going to end my part in this discussion. You are more or less repeating what I take to be a flawed formulation of molinism. I have tried to show why this is the case. At this point, I think I've said all that needs to said to address your points, and I don't see how it is fruitful for either of us to keep going in this thread.

I'm hope to see you in other threads.

[alloneword]

Kevin wrote: [ Middle knowledge delimits possible worlds leaving us with feasible worlds.

   

   

   

   Correct.

   

   

Kevin wrote:

   

    Hence, there are less feasible worlds then possible.

   

   Wrong.

   

   Let us go through Craig's reasoning *one more time*.

   

   I note that Kevin simply has not the capability to follow Craig's reasoning himself. At least , he never attempts to do so.

   

   But it really isn't that difficult, provided you stick closely to what Craig says, and don't try to second-guess him.

   

   CRAIG

   By means of it God knows what is the full range of possible worlds, or as you put it, worlds that are intrinsically possible. He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.

   

   CARR

   Full range.... both are possible.

   

   First of all, we have to draw up a full list of logically possible circumstances in which I make choices.

   

   Here are 2 , mutually exclusive, sets of logically possible circumstances.

   

   A) I am offered a choice of tea or coffee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am precisely, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose coffee

   

   

   B) I am offered a choice of tea or cofee on Sun 27/05/2007 at 8.30 am precisely, and God infallibly knows that I will freely choose tea.

   

   Not so hard to follow, was it?

   

   How does Craig continue?

   

   CRAIG

   God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood, including propositions about creaturely free actions. For example, logically prior to His creative decree, God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Such subjunctive conditionals are often called counterfactuals.

   

   CARR

   We have to apply Craig's rules to the circumstances A and B, and see what I would freely choose in each of those circumstances.

   

   This is not hard.

   

   In A) I freely choose to order coffe.

   

   In B) I freely choose to order tea.

   

   Now we apply Craig's 3rd rule.

   

   CRAIG

   God then decrees to create certain free creatures in certain circumstances and, thus, on the basis of his middle knowledge and His knowledge of His own decree, God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen (His free knowledge).

   

   CARR

   God then decrees that I am in circumstances A or circumstances B, and He knows what I will freely choose.

   

   Because I really do drink coffee in circumstances A, and really do order tea in circumstances B, then there is no problem.

   

   But this means God can create a world where I freely hoose coffee or a world where I freely choose tea, whatever pleases Him.

   

   And by extension God can easily create worlds where I freely choose good.

   

   If you would like me to go through Craig's reasoning another time, please ask.

[Harvey]

I guess I'm confused why you bring this up in another thread after I provided my example on why certain worlds are not feasible (e.g., there is a problem with the 550,000 worlds where you choose good, so God cannot actualize those worlds even though they are logically possible).

[alloneword]

harvey1 wrote: I guess I'm confused why you bring this up in another thread after I provided my example on why certain worlds are not feasible (e.g., there is a problem with the 550,000 worlds where you choose good, so God cannot actualize those worlds even though they are logically possible).

   

   

   Sorry.

   

   I didn't realise you thought your answer made sense.

   

   There is a logically possible world where all people choose good.

   

   That is only true if you believe everybody has libertarian free will to choose good.

   

   In that world, God infallibly knows that all people choose good.

   

   Therefore, in that world, all people are always in the circumstance 'God infallibly knows that people will choose good'.

   

   So the counterfactuals of freedom are that they *will* choose good.

   

   You may have noticed Craig's sleight-of-hand...

   

   CRAIG

   He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.

   

   CARR

   'Identical'?

   

   In the world where Peter denies Christ, there is a God with infallible knowledge from the moment of creation onwards that Peter will deny Christ.

   

   

   In the world where Peter does not deny Christ, there is a God with infallible knowledge from the moment of creation onwards that Peter will not deny Christ.

   

   Craig calls these 'identical circumstances', although they obviously are not.

   

[Harvey]

alloneword wrote: I didn't realise you thought your answer made sense.

Sorry to slow you down. Please bear with me.

alloneword wrote: Craig calls these 'identical circumstances', although they obviously are not.

Why can't they be identical circumstances? I know I'm missing something important, so I appreciate if you could explain it more fully.

[alloneword]

harvey1 wrote:

I didn't realise you thought your answer made sense.

   Sorry to slow you down. Please bear with me.  

alloneword wrote: Craig calls these 'identical circumstances', although they obviously are not.

  Why can't they be identical circumstances? I know I'm missing something important, so I appreciate if you could explain it more fully.

   

   They *are* identical circumstances.

   

   Apart from the parts which are not identical.

   

   If you believe there is an omniscient God, then God created a world knowing that Peter would deny Christ, or God created a world knowing Peter would not deny Christ.

   

   From the moment of creation onwards, the contents of God's knowledge are different, not identcal.

   

[Harvey]

alloneword wrote: They *are* identical circumstances. Apart from the parts which are not identical... From the moment of creation onwards, the contents of God's knowledge are different, not identcal.

So, if I'm understanding you correctly, you are asking how can God actualize a particular possible world at the beginning of time? If it is because God knows what the creature will do because this is the world God actualizes, then it undercuts libertarian free will since there is some other determining factor in the creature's decision besides the creature's own libertarian free will since the creature is not actually choosing the world it very well might have chose if God didn't put restrictions on which world was actualized. However, I'm not sure that this is what WLC is suggesting. God could refuse to actualize a world that an individual chooses tea instead of coffee as the individual is choosing tea or coffee. And, therefore, by refusing to actualize the world where the individual chooses tea, the only possible world remaining is the world where the individual chooses coffee.

I agree that this raises the free will question again since an individual could have chosen tea, but actually couldn't because the possible world they wanted to choose (i.e., the world they drink tea) God refused to actualize (or perhaps God couldn't actualize that world for them). This certainly suggests that God actualizes every free will event, even evil decisions. This makes God culpable for evil. You could get around this by advocting the Many Worlds hypothesis. That is, worlds lawfully split anyway--apart from God's actualizing them, so if God doesn't actualize one of those worlds, it's not like the world of coffee wouldn't have existed anyway--it certainly would have existed. God is under no obligation to guarantee that a certain quantum world exist.