pinkey wrote: How are they baseless? You did not back up what you said at all. Let's talk about Craig v. Millican and the related arguments, which have nothing to do with ID, which I know you don't understand, because you call it creationism. If you want to discuss Craig's views on ID and if it's creationism, then start a new thread and I'd be happy to discuss it with you.
How are they baseless?
revo74 wrote: You have created a straw man argument – I have not proposed a "timeless" world, but an eternal world.
You said a "timeless physical universe cannot be the cause of our universe". Why is this impossible? I don't believe this is the case, but I don't see how a non-physical anything could be a more reasonable causal explanation.
silentmatt wrote: Because, for reasons I named, a timeless physical universe in a causal position would yield a timeless effect. On the other hand, a powerful personal being has free will, the only kind of cause that can conceivably, from an atemporal initial condition, transcend atemporality, as a free will is not determined or constrained by its prior conditions. A man timelessly intending to get up, for example, could decide to get up.
silentmatt wrote: The word "eternal" is pretty ambiguous, so I apologize! But if you're positing a world with an infinite past, you run into all the philosophical and scientific arguments against such a past that Craig raises.
Because, for reasons I named, a timeless physical universe in a causal position would yield a timeless effect. On the other hand, a powerful personal being has free will, the only kind of cause that can conceivably, from an atemporal initial condition, transcend atemporality, as a free will is not determined or constrained by its prior conditions. A man timelessly intending to get up, for example, could decide to get up.
belorg wrote: A man, timelessly intending to get up, would also timelessly be standing up.The result of this man's intention cannot be 'delayed' as there is no time to delay anything. That's exactly why Craig's KCA is incoherent.
revo74 wrote: The philosophical and scientific arguments Craig raises are geared toward 'our Universe' for which we are familiar with. They are used to show that our Universe had a finite beginning, nothing more.
Just as you may argue that a timeless anything would not be able to cause something with time, I argue that an immaterial anything would not be able to cause something with matter.
The bottom line is, in order for Craig to define the transcending cause of the Universe as being spaceless, timeless and immaterial, he must make an 'assumption' that these properties only exists in our space-time continuum. This renders the arguments invalid. The only thing the argument shows is that the Universe has a cause that transcends it, nothing more.
silentmatt wrote: A man can intend to stand up but not actually be standing up. A timelessly sitting man of sufficient power intending to stand up could decide to stand up now, and in this decision create a temporal sequence.
silentmatt wrote: The arguments against actual infinities, whether formed by successive addition or simply in themselves, apply to any conceivable universe with a past. The scientific arguments apply to multiverse models that are on average expanding, which includes your proposed scenario.
I can substantiate my argument, namely, that a timeless sufficient cause is, because it is timelessly sufficient for its effect, inescapably therefore the cause only of timeless effects.
Provide me one example of an immaterial thing solely influencing a material thing.
I am postulating an eternal realm of existence with at least one of the three attributes being discussed (space, time, matter/energy). I don't see how a "scientific argument", which requires observation and testing, can apply to anything beyond its methods.
When Craig refers to "the Universe" he is specifically talking about our space-time continuum, which had a finite beginning some 13.7 billion years ago. It is in his interest not to speculate about other physical realms.
If you read the KCA argument carefully, you can clearly see it tries to show that our Universe and its properties came into existence ex nihilo at some finite point in the past and that the cause transcends these properties. It makes the assumption that these properties did not exist anywhere prior to the birth of our Universe 13.7 billion years ago.
I believe I have discovered a knock-down argument against the KCA.
Positing a timeless, impersonal physical world or thing as the cause of our physical world would not yield the temporal universe we observe- if something exists in a timeless state, then any effect it causes in that timeless state
I think that Craig's option, of an immaterial, personal free will of great power is still the superior alternative.
I think Craig would probably say that other options are false options. He already makes mincemeat of naturalistic accounts of objective morality
A timelessly sitting man of sufficient power intending to stand up could decide to stand up now,.
Provide me one example of an immaterial thing solely influencing a material thing.Souls and bodies, for instance.
Could you state what effect exactly a soul has on a body? Could you use that to develop a test to see whether any given body has a soul? Might be useful to be able to demonstrate at what point during pregnancy ensoulment occurs. Or whether animals have souls.
Or is this more of an asserion than a demonstration?
Now that's a false dichotomy. Surely it's not left to either knowing nothing about God's mind, or knowing everything about God's mind.
A dichotomy is when only two mutually exclusive options are possible. Craig is trying to hold two mutually exclusive positions simultaneously. I am happy to entertain the possibility of other options; that doesn't change the fact that Craig's position is incoherent and therefore untenable.
You've got to understand that Craig (and the majority of philosophical theists) define God as "the greatest conceivable being" so God must be perfectly good and desire that all people will come freely into a saving relationship with Him.
But even if we accept that - by that definition, four of the five arguments Craig used in the Millican debate do not even address the question of whether God exists! The KCA doesn't say anything about 'greatest conceivable being', nor does fine tuning, nor morality, nor the Resurrection (I will grant personal belief might, if that's what Craig believes, but it's hard to take that argument seriously). Craig himself says you cannot infer omnipotence from the KCA or fine tuning during the Q&A at 02:08.
As it stands, Millican can simply retort that 'anti-God made the universe for maximum suffering', and his argument is just as strong as Craig's position.if Craig's moral argument works to show that objective moral values are grounded in God as the moral law Giver
As it stands, Millican can simply retort that 'anti-God made the universe for maximum suffering', and his argument is just as strong as Craig's position.
My point is that even if God does create morality, we cannot use that to decide what is right and wrong. Human morality is indistinguishable from the morality we would have if God did not exist; therefore it cannot be used to argue that God does exist.
There are other options for objective morality than a divine lawgiver. So for Craig to insist that only two options are possible (God or subjective morality) is a false dichotomy. Like what? It's Craig's argument that there are none. You have to argue against him that there are some good alternatives to God for objective morality, and he will argue back that they are not good. You have to win this to show that it's a false dichotomoy because it's not self-evident.
There are other options for objective morality than a divine lawgiver. So for Craig to insist that only two options are possible (God or subjective morality) is a false dichotomy.
But where does that leave Craig's argument? He's now saying that we have several options, A, B, C and D. B is disproven, therefore A is proven. But this is obviously bunk - what about C or D? Simply saying C and D are not options won't do, Craig has to show they are not options. If he doesn't do this - and I don't think he did - he has no case here.
As for what C and D might look like - I would argue that our evolutionary psychology makes certain behavioural rules universally binding (at least on humans). Millican ran briefly through some non-religious ethical systems also (though I accept the challenge that Craig no doubt meant to make, that they all rely on the basis that harming people is bad without explaining how we come to that conclusion - evo psych offers such an explanation, theistic morality on the other hand cannot).
Do you really think that gravity disproves strict physicalism? I'm pretty sure gravity is the type of thing that has to exist inside a physical universe.
I don't know what it would mean for gravity to just exist by itself for all eternity not effecting anything and then at a finite point in time, producing a universe, which it then makes things fall to the ground, etc.
Craig's argument that the cause of the universe must possess agent freedom of the will to exist for all eternity without it's effect
The point is, that your arguments against Craig's have to work (which I don't think they do) before you can accuse him of presenting a false dichotomoy.
Sorry, I didn't see this. Can you please elaborate because these are strong claims.
That leads to the ninth objection, that the Nicene Creed says that there is only one incarnation of the son of God. I think the Nicene Creed is written from our perspective on this planet. God, if he has created intelligent life elsewhere in the cosmos can easily provide for the salvation of those beings, perhaps through another incarnation, perhaps through another means of salvation, perhaps those beings never fell into sin and need forgiveness and cleansing as we do, that's God's perogative.
Strong claims indeed - but I think fully justified.
ID, which I know you don't understand, because you call it creationism.
The overwhelming evidence at trial established that ID is a religious view, a mere re-labelling of creationism, and not a scientific theory.
Intelligent design is creationism in new clothes.
There is a term for things that try to sound like science but are not: pseudo-science.
Giford wrote: I disagree, unless you can explain how being a 'personal free will' affects the argument one way or the other.
Again, that's rather a matter of opinion. I thought his arguments against them were rather weak. Perhaps he has used stronger arguments elsewhere?
I think something like the argument used in this Q&A is probably correct- http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7911
In it, he says that duties are necessarily relations to a certain kind of authoritative imperative, and I think that such imperatives entail a personal grounding of such imperatives. This, I think, rules out pretty much all non-theistic groundings of morality.
There is no 'now' for a timeless man; or, alternatively, all times are equally 'now'. Either way, what you say makes no sense to me.
When a timeless man makes such a decision, he ceases to be timeless.
OK, now try a *real* immaterial thing Could you state what effect exactly a soul has on a body? Could you use that to develop a test to see whether any given body has a soul?
Could you state what effect exactly a soul has on a body? Could you use that to develop a test to see whether any given body has a soul?
I'm pretty sure that you can distinguish the activities of the soul from that of the body. For instance, when you perceive something, there is something, namely the perception, that has the form of that which you are perceiving. However, the brain doesn't have this form, nor does any part of it have the form. If it did, it would be shaped like the thing that you are perceiving, which is obviously false. Therefore, there is a property of you, since you grasp the form, that can't be said of your brain, therefore, you are not your brain. This "you," the non-neurological seat of identity, I think one can rightly call your soul.
Now, of course, I'm unclear as to how the interactions between the soul and the brain occur, but it seems plain enough that such interactions occur. I act on my perceptions, after all, and upon the concepts that I abstractly grasp- this seems far more likely to be true than not.
Might be useful to be able to demonstrate at what point during pregnancy ensoulment occurs. Or whether animals have souls.
Interesting questions, to be sure, but I think a bit besides the point. I'm finding hylomorphic dualism to be an interesting solution to both these problems, and I would suggest looking up a copy of Edward Feser's Philosophy of Mind if you want some good reading on the subject.
But the anti-God argument can counter the argument from morality - perhaps anti-God made the moral laws. Perhaps he even deceives us about what those laws are. How, from this theistic base, can you argue that God is not tricking us into thinking murder and rape are evil, when in fact charity is the most heinous crime imaginable? Or perhaps God really is good, but lying is also good. Morally-perfect God is therefore compelled to lie to us about morality - again, murder is good, charity is evil.
My point is that even if God does create morality, we cannot use that to decide what is right and wrong.
Human morality is indistinguishable from the morality we would have if God did not exist; therefore it cannot be used to argue that God does exist.