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Nightvid Cole

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The geographical distribution argument
« on: January 03, 2012, 02:54:30 pm »
Here is an argument I have formulated which argues against Dr. Craig's view on free will and theology.


Premise 1. IF Dr. Craig's libertarian view of free will is correct, then
Of the people who believe that

a) a God with the properties posited by Judaeo-Christian theology exists
b) and wants a relationship with human beings;
c) Revealed himself through Jesus; and
d) believe they know exactly how to "accept" or "reject" such a relationship with God through Jesus

the percentage which do what they believe to be "accepting" said relationship depends only on the free choices of said person, and does not depend on any factor(s) outside of such person's control. [My interpretation of Craig's view on free will as it pertains to Christian belief]

Premise 2. IF Dr. Craig's strong version of the Holy Spirit Epistemology (HSE) which includes a universal knowledge of (a) thru (d) above, is true and correct, the percentage of people with a knowledge of (a) thru (d), regardless of whether they choose to accept or reject a relationship with God through Jesus, is equal to 100%. [My interpretation of Craig's view on knowledge of the divine]

Premise 3. No human person has a choice where to be born. [self-evident fact]

Premise 4. a "Christian" is any person who believes (a) - (d) and does whatever, to the best of their knowledge and ability, they believe to be "accepting" a relationship with God through Jesus [Definition which as I understand seems to capture Craig's view on the matter]

Premise 5. The place of a person's birth affects the probability they will be a Christian . [Empirical fact in human geography]

C1. From P4 and P5, the place of a person's birth affects the probability they will believe (a) - (d) and "accept" (as defined above) a relationship with God through Jesus

C2. From C1 and P3, a person's belief in (a) - (d) and what they believe to be accepting a relationship with God through Jesus depends on at least one factor which is not a matter of their free choice

C3. From C2 and P2, IF Dr. Craig's HSE view on human knowledge of the divine is correct and true, Of the people who believe that

a) a God with the properties posited by Judaeo-Christian theology exists
b) and wants a relationship with human beings;
c) Revealed himself through Jesus; and
d) believe they know exactly how to "accept" or "reject" such a relationship with God through Jesus

the percentage which do what they believe to be "accepting" said relationship depends on at least one factor outside of the person's control

C4. From C3 and P1, Dr. Craig is wrong on either HSE or free will (or both)

Notice that the argument does not assume either that (a) - (d) is true, or that it is false.

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pinkey

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The geographical distribution argument
« Reply #1 on: January 05, 2012, 09:32:44 pm »
Craig's view of free will doesn't mean that you're always free. Just that you have the genuine ability to do things by your own will without being fully determined to do them. Ofcourse it's not up to our free will to choose where we get born.

Read up about Craig's views on God's middle knowledge. Craig thinks God knows what any given person will freely do in any given circumstance, and so placed the people he knew would freely reject Christ in places of the world where they are least likely to hear or accept the gospel.
"[A]ll such persons as I am speaking of, who profess themselves to be atheists not upon any present interest or lust but purely upon the principles of reason and philosophy, are bound by these principles to aknowledge that all mocking and scoffing at religion, all jesting and turning arguments of re

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Nightvid Cole

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« Reply #2 on: January 11, 2012, 08:50:44 pm »
Pinkey,

This doesn't work, at least for Craig to remain consistent. If Christianity is true, and God could know what someone would do given prior circumstances without violating their "free will", then God could create only those in prior circumstances that would cause them to freely accept him, and reveal himself to them without violating free will or being rejected by anyone, a view which Craig vehemently denies when asked why God doesn't just come down and prove that He exists, say by writing in big letters in the sky where everyone could see.

Hence my argument stands unrefuted.


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troyjs

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The geographical distribution argument
« Reply #3 on: January 13, 2012, 12:29:40 am »
The placement/location of individuals, on Craig's account, does not affect whether or not the Holy Spirit will teach them a - d. what affects people's 'free choices' according to Dr Craig's schemata, is two things -- the free-will of others, and the free-will of God.

God could have, according to Craig's Molinism, created a world in which location was no factor in who is or is not saved. Even so, there would still be those who do not to trust in God alone for their salvation.

Logically prior to God's creative act, God knows all of the worlds that could exist, and God knows that in every single one of those worlds, there is someone who does not choose to trust in God. The reason why every one of the actualisable worlds contains such a person, is because of free-will.

All of the influences we may conceive of, eg, location, language, mental ability, etc, are only negative or positive influences after the fact of free-will (think of Adam and Eve being morally perfect, yet they fell through free-will).

According to Craig's Molinism, God may not have been able to create only those people who He knew would freely choose to trust in Him, because the existence of the other people may have been a necessary influence upon their 'decision' to believe God.

Free-will has the effect of both positive and negative influences upon other persons free-wills. Because God, according to Craig, can not violate free-will, God is excused in Craig's system.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

I am totally opposed to Craig's Molinism, but I do not believe your objection is a defeater. The debate is between the logical prioricity of either God's will and creative decree, or human freedom -- does God predestine the elect because they will freely come to Him, or do they freely come to Him solely because God predestines that they will. Molinism makes something in creation, ie. human freedom, logically prior to God's knowledge of the actual world and His will. You can see how this could be an issue for someone who believes God's will is logically prior to everything other than God Himself.


kind regards
“Knowledge of the sciences is so much smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ” -- John Calvin.
“I consider looseness with words no less of a defect than looseness of the bowels” -- John Calvin

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Nightvid Cole

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« Reply #4 on: January 16, 2012, 11:32:55 am »

troyjs wrote: The placement/location of individuals, on Craig's account, does not affect whether or not the Holy Spirit will teach them a - d. what affects people's 'free choices' according to Dr Craig's schemata, is two things -- the free-will of others, and the free-will of God.

God could have, according to Craig's Molinism, created a world in which location was no factor in who is or is not saved. Even so, there would still be those who do not to trust in God alone for their salvation.

Logically prior to God's creative act, God knows all of the worlds that could exist, and God knows that in every single one of those worlds, there is someone who does not choose to trust in God. The reason why every one of the actualisable worlds contains such a person, is because of free-will.

All of the influences we may conceive of, eg, location, language, mental ability, etc, are only negative or positive influences after the fact of free-will (think of Adam and Eve being morally perfect, yet they fell through free-will).

According to Craig's Molinism, God may not have been able to create only those people who He knew would freely choose to trust in Him, because the existence of the other people may have been a necessary influence upon their 'decision' to believe God.

Free-will has the effect of both positive and negative influences upon other persons free-wills. Because God, according to Craig, can not violate free-will, God is excused in Craig's system.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

I am totally opposed to Craig's Molinism, but I do not believe your objection is a defeater. The debate is between the logical prioricity of either God's will and creative decree, or human freedom -- does God predestine the elect because they will freely come to Him, or do they freely come to Him solely because God predestines that they will. Molinism makes something in creation, ie. human freedom, logically prior to God's knowledge of the actual world and His will. You can see how this could be an issue for someone who believes God's will is logically prior to everything other than God Himself.


kind regards


This completely avoids my argument. If you are to be justified in claiming that it is weak, you must either pick a premise and point to a problem, or show the logic to be flawed. You have done neither.

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troyjs

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« Reply #5 on: January 19, 2012, 07:00:54 pm »

If you are to be justified in claiming that it is weak, you must either pick a premise and point to a problem, or show the logic to be flawed. You have done neither.

This does not logically follow.

In any case, I had done this, but if you had missed, let's play 'spot the contradiction':

from P1:
the percentage which do what they believe to be "accepting" said relationship depends only on the free choices of said person, and does not depend on any factor(s) outside of such person's control.


from P5:
Premise 5. The place of a person's birth affects the probability they will be a Christian . [Empirical fact in human geography]


Does someone's being a christian Not depend on external factors(P1), or does it depend also on external factors such as location?(P5).

Although I am not a Molinist, I am not fond of misunderstanding or misrepresentation.

kind regards

“Knowledge of the sciences is so much smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ” -- John Calvin.
“I consider looseness with words no less of a defect than looseness of the bowels” -- John Calvin

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Nightvid Cole

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« Reply #6 on: January 20, 2012, 09:32:45 pm »
troyjs wrote:

If you are to be justified in claiming that it is weak, you must either pick a premise and point to a problem, or show the logic to be flawed. You have done neither.

This does not logically follow.

In any case, I had done this, but if you had missed, let's play 'spot the contradiction':

from P1:
the percentage which do what they believe to be "accepting" said relationship depends only on the free choices of said person, and does not depend on any factor(s) outside of such person's control.


from P5:
Premise 5. The place of a person's birth affects the probability they will be a Christian . [Empirical fact in human geography]


Does someone's being a christian Not depend on external factors(P1), or does it depend also on external factors such as location?(P5).

Although I am not a Molinist, I am not fond of misunderstanding or misrepresentation.

kind regards



You omitted the conditional in the first premise. If one premise of an argument is "If a then b" and another is "not b" , this is not a contradiction. It means "a" is false. This is called a modus tollens inference.

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troyjs

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« Reply #7 on: January 22, 2012, 09:39:53 pm »
Ncole1,

I apologise for misrepresenting your argument, there is the conditional in P1 which I missed.

Nevertheless, because Dr Craig affirms P1, he does not affirm P5. If you are to a priori affirm P5, you are a priori denying the truth of P1.

Because your conclusion is that there is a factor external to freewill in regards to people's salvation, P5 begs the question

Your question-begging premise:
Premise 5. The place of a person's birth affects the probability they will be a Christian . [Empirical fact in human geography]



Your conclusion:
C1. From P4 and P5, the place of a person's birth affects the probability they will believe (a) - (d) and "accept" (as defined above) a relationship with God through Jesus

C2. From C1 and P3, a person's belief in (a) - (d) and what they believe to be accepting a relationship with God through Jesus depends on at least one factor which is not a matter of their free choice

C3. From C2 and P2, IF Dr. Craig's HSE view on human knowledge of the divine is correct and true, Of the people who believe that

a) a God with the properties posited by Judaeo-Christian theology exists
b) and wants a relationship with human beings;
c) Revealed himself through Jesus; and
d) believe they know exactly how to "accept" or "reject" such a relationship with God through Jesus

the percentage which do what they believe to be "accepting" said relationship depends on at least one factor outside of the person's control

C4. From C3 and P1, Dr. Craig is wrong on either HSE or free will (or both)  


kind regards
“Knowledge of the sciences is so much smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ” -- John Calvin.
“I consider looseness with words no less of a defect than looseness of the bowels” -- John Calvin

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Nightvid Cole

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The geographical distribution argument
« Reply #8 on: January 23, 2012, 12:33:18 pm »

troyjs wrote: Ncole1,

I apologise for misrepresenting your argument, there is the conditional in P1 which I missed.

Nevertheless, because Dr Craig affirms P1, he does not affirm P5. If you are to a priori affirm P5, you are a priori denying the truth of P1.

Because your conclusion is that there is a factor external to freewill in regards to people's salvation, P5 begs the question

Your question-begging premise:
Premise 5. The place of a person's birth affects the probability they will be a Christian . [Empirical fact in human geography]



Your conclusion:
C1. From P4 and P5, the place of a person's birth affects the probability they will believe (a) - (d) and "accept" (as defined above) a relationship with God through Jesus

C2. From C1 and P3, a person's belief in (a) - (d) and what they believe to be accepting a relationship with God through Jesus depends on at least one factor which is not a matter of their free choice

C3. From C2 and P2, IF Dr. Craig's HSE view on human knowledge of the divine is correct and true, Of the people who believe that

a) a God with the properties posited by Judaeo-Christian theology exists
b) and wants a relationship with human beings;
c) Revealed himself through Jesus; and
d) believe they know exactly how to "accept" or "reject" such a relationship with God through Jesus

the percentage which do what they believe to be "accepting" said relationship depends on at least one factor outside of the person's control

C4. From C3 and P1, Dr. Craig is wrong on either HSE or free will (or both)  


kind regards


No, begging the question means using the conclusion as support or justification for one or more premises. Here, I am appealing to empirical evidence for P5, not theological claims or counters thereto.

If you only mean that the premises wouldn't be accepted by anyone who doesn't accept the conclusion, well....that's true of ALL deductive arguments, so unless you want to call them ALL "question-begging", my argument certainly isn't so.

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troyjs

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« Reply #9 on: January 23, 2012, 10:42:46 pm »

No, begging the question means using the conclusion as support or justification for one or more premises. Here, I am appealing to empirical evidence for P5, not theological claims or counters thereto.


Let us look at P5 again:

Premise 5. The place of a person's birth affects the probability they will be a Christian . [Empirical fact in human geography]


It does not logically follow from P5, that there are external factors outside of freewill, which affect one's being a christian, ie., it is not necessarily true (a truth of reason, analytic, metaphysically necessary). You even appeal to empirical evidence in support for P5 -- this is why P5 is question-begging, for if the conclusion is to follow, P5 must beg the question.

Because P5 is founded upon empiricism, it commits the deductive fallacy of 'affirming the consequent', if A then B. B, therefore A. That is:
If location is an external factor, there will be locations with more christians.
There are locations with more christians, therefore location is an external factor.

This is no different in logical form to saying:
If it is raining, the street is wet.
The street is wet, therefore it is raining. (If A then B. B, therefore A)
The deductive fallacy of affirming the consequent.

I have been trying to be charitable to your argument, and have tried to allow for your conclusion to logically follow, but it can only do so, if P5 begs the question, namely -- that there are external factors.

Simply: (There are more christians in some locations than in other locations,) (therefore there is an external factor.) and, (If there is an external factor), (there are more christians in some locations than in other locations.)
blue, therefore red. red, therefore blue.

If it is not true that (If there is an external factor), (there are more christians in some locations than in other locations.), then the facticity of there being more christians in some locations than others, does not lead to the conclusion that there is in fact an external factor.


Your argument does not have parity with the following syllogism:
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal

This classical syllogism would be begging the question, if the justification for the minor premise was founded upon Socrates being mortal. Since the justification for the minor premise is founded upon Aristotlean essentialism, or in more modern terminolgoy -- metaphysical necessity, the conclusion logically follows from the premises without the conclusion being presupposed to make sense of either of the two premises.

kind regards

“Knowledge of the sciences is so much smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ” -- John Calvin.
“I consider looseness with words no less of a defect than looseness of the bowels” -- John Calvin

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Nightvid Cole

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« Reply #10 on: January 24, 2012, 03:22:46 pm »
troyjs wrote:
No, begging the question means using the conclusion as support or justification for one or more premises. Here, I am appealing to empirical evidence for P5, not theological claims or counters thereto.


Let us look at P5 again:

Premise 5. The place of a person's birth affects the probability they will be a Christian . [Empirical fact in human geography]


It does not logically follow from P5, that there are external factors outside of freewill, which affect one's being a christian, ie., it is not necessarily true (a truth of reason, analytic, metaphysically necessary). You even appeal to empirical evidence in support for P5 -- this is why P5 is question-begging, for if the conclusion is to follow, P5 must beg the question.



This is not comprehensible. Are you saying that all of empirical science is question-begging, or that my specific argument is question-begging even though not all empirical evidence is? If the latter, please point out exactly where I must assume something about free will in order to make the observation that most people in the USA are Christian, most in Turkey and Saudi Arabia are Muslim, and most in rural India are Hindu?

troyjs wrote:



Because P5 is founded upon empiricism, it commits the deductive fallacy of 'affirming the consequent', if A then B. B, therefore A. That is:
If location is an external factor, there will be locations with more christians.
There are locations with more christians, therefore location is an external factor.

This is no different in logical form to saying:
If it is raining, the street is wet.
The street is wet, therefore it is raining. (If A then B. B, therefore A)
The deductive fallacy of affirming the consequent.



You clearly don't understand what empirical evidence is, or else your comment is so incomprehensible that it is impossible to determine what you are actually trying to say. The logical form of an empirical argument based on street wetness to infer rain is:

1. If it is not raining (and has not been within the last hour), the street is very unlikely to be wet all over.
2. The street is wet all over

C: Therefore it is (or has been) raining. (If not A then probably not B. B, therefore A)

This is emphatically not affirming the consequent! It is statistical modus tollens (Look up "Statistical syllogism" on Wikipedia)

troyjs wrote:


I have been trying to be charitable to your argument, and have tried to allow for your conclusion to logically follow, but it can only do so, if P5 begs the question, namely -- that there are external factors.

Simply: (There are more christians in some locations than in other locations,) (therefore there is an external factor.) and, (If there is an external factor), (there are more christians in some locations than in other locations.)
blue, therefore red. red, therefore blue.

If it is not true that (If there is an external factor), (there are more christians in some locations than in other locations.), then the facticity of there being more christians in some locations than others, does not lead to the conclusion that there is in fact an external factor.



Your argument does not have parity with the following syllogism:
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal

This classical syllogism would be begging the question, if the justification for the minor premise was founded upon Socrates being mortal. Since the justification for the minor premise is founded upon Aristotlean essentialism, or in more modern terminolgoy -- metaphysical necessity, the conclusion logically follows from the premises without the conclusion being presupposed to make sense of either of the two premises.

kind regards



I think we are having severe communication and comprehension problems between the two of us, and maybe part of it is my fault, I don't know. What I am saying is, if it were not the case that the percent of people who are Christian is inhomogeneous geographically, it is unlikely that all the cultural data, census data, survey data, and indirect cultural evidence would seem to indicate that. They do seem to indicate that. Therefore, [P5].

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troyjs

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« Reply #11 on: January 24, 2012, 08:43:39 pm »
This is not comprehensible. Are you saying that all of empirical science is question-begging, or that my specific argument is question-begging even though not all empirical evidence is? If the latter, please point out exactly where I must assume something about free will in order to make the observation that most people in the USA are Christian, most in Turkey and Saudi Arabia are Muslim, and most in rural India are Hindu?

You are making a deductive argument. The problem is that your argument hinges upon an inductive inference. I am sure you are aware of the fact that inductive arguments are deductively invalid. I am not rejecting induction per se, however if you are wanting to construct a deductive argument, of which one of it's premises is an inductive inference, then the deduction will be invalid, and is only as strong as the inductive inference itself.

I am sure we both agree, that it does not strictly, deductively follow, that because the sun has rose approximately every 24 hours, in the past for millennia, that it will rise tomorrow.

If not A then probably not B. B, therefore A)

Your conclusion, 'B, therefore A', does not logically follow. As it stands, it still commits the fallacy of 'affirming the consequent', as it allows for another possibility of a wet street, other than rain. Eg,

'If not A then probably not B'
and 'If B, then improbably but possibly C'
Therefore, 'If B, then A" (Affirming the consequent)

In order for you not to commit the fallacy of 'affirming the consequent', your conclusion must be: Therefore, if B then probably A'.

I am quite aware of the fact that since Karl Popper and the hypothetico-deductive method, philosophers of science have been trying to solve the problem of Hum's Problem of Induction, and the fact that all inductive arguments commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent, by the means of bayesian probability theory. I am also aware that philosophers of science understand that probabilistic justifications of induction can only make science tentative, and more pragmatic rather than epistemological. Even so, Hume's Problem of Induction also applies to probability, and any appeal to the probability of phenomena given certain events in the past, in order to justify an inference in the present, is to beg the question. It begs the question for the justification for appealing to past experience, will require one to invoke past experience.

What I am saying is, if it were not the case that the percent of people who are Christian is inhomogeneous geographically, it is unlikely that all the cultural data, census data, survey data, and indirect cultural evidence would seem to indicate that. They do seem to indicate that. Therefore, [P5].

Prior to the argument, we do not presume that the reason why people in the middle-east tend to be muslims, is because of external factors, for this would be to beg the question. Neither does it logically follow from the fact that most people living there are muslims, that this is due to any external factor. If the conclusion wanted, is that people living there being muslims rather than christians entails that there is an external factor, one must presuppose that the reason why they are muslims and not christians, is because of an external factor -- but this is the question we are asking.

Furthermore, we have not exprienced any other world with christians living there, of which we absolutely know that this is due to external factors.
If there were 2 other worlds of which the christians there were such, due to external factors, we might say that the christians in this world are probably the same. Since it is this world we are dealing with, we can only draw any conclusions from our observations of this particular world, and we can not draw any conclusions from our observations of it, without interpreting our observations in a particular way. The conclusion can only logically follow, if one's interpretation presupposes the truth of one's conclusion, which is to beg the question. There are deductive arguments which refute Dr Craig's molinism, but I believe you may want to develop this argument, and I am sure you are only wanting to bounce it off other people, in this process.

kind regards
“Knowledge of the sciences is so much smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ” -- John Calvin.
“I consider looseness with words no less of a defect than looseness of the bowels” -- John Calvin

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Nightvid Cole

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« Reply #12 on: January 25, 2012, 10:22:39 am »
troyjs wrote:
This is not comprehensible. Are you saying that all of empirical science is question-begging, or that my specific argument is question-begging even though not all empirical evidence is? If the latter, please point out exactly where I must assume something about free will in order to make the observation that most people in the USA are Christian, most in Turkey and Saudi Arabia are Muslim, and most in rural India are Hindu?

You are making a deductive argument. The problem is that your argument hinges upon an inductive inference. I am sure you are aware of the fact that inductive arguments are deductively invalid. I am not rejecting induction per se, however if you are wanting to construct a deductive argument, of which one of it's premises is an inductive inference, then the deduction will be invalid, and is only as strong as the inductive inference itself.

I am sure we both agree, that it does not strictly, deductively follow, that because the sun has rose approximately every 24 hours, in the past for millennia, that it will rise tomorrow.



Fair enough. I thought that was a trivial matter, though, since "everyone knows" only logical and mathematical truths can be proven by deduction alone. And I thought you knew that this was so obvious that I could not have really been claiming that the premises of my deductive argument are justified without invoking induction. I think you are being extremely uncharitable to the argument.
troyjs wrote:


If not A then probably not B. B, therefore A)

Your conclusion, 'B, therefore A', does not logically follow. As it stands, it still commits the fallacy of 'affirming the consequent', as it allows for another possibility of a wet street, other than rain. Eg,

'If not A then probably not B'
and 'If B, then improbably but possibly C'
Therefore, 'If B, then A" (Affirming the consequent)

In order for you not to commit the fallacy of 'affirming the consequent', your conclusion must be: Therefore, if B then probably A'.

I am quite aware of the fact that since Karl Popper and the hypothetico-deductive method, philosophers of science have been trying to solve the problem of Hum's Problem of Induction, and the fact that all inductive arguments commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent, by the means of bayesian probability theory.



1. "B" is true in case 1
2. "B" is true in case 2
3. "B" is true in case 3
4. "B" is true in case 4
5. "B" is true in case 5
6. "B" is true in case 6

C: "B" is true in case 7

The above is an inductive inference. If you want to claim it commits a fallacy of affirming the consequent, please demonstrate that to be true by re-casting the argument in the form

1. If X then Y
2. Y

C: therefore X

Until you do so, claiming that inductive inferences commit an "affirming the consequent" fallacy only makes me think you are confused.

troyjs wrote:



I am also aware that philosophers of science understand that probabilistic justifications of induction can only make science tentative, and more pragmatic rather than epistemological. Even so, Hume's Problem of Induction also applies to probability, and any appeal to the probability of phenomena given certain events in the past, in order to justify an inference in the present, is to beg the question. It begs the question for the justification for appealing to past experience, will require one to invoke past experience.



Or, you could accept induction as axiomatic (though, unlike deduction, fallible). Or work in the framework of fuzzy logic. Classical logic isn't the only game in town, you know...

troyjs wrote:

What I am saying is, if it were not the case that the percent of people who are Christian is inhomogeneous geographically, it is unlikely that all the cultural data, census data, survey data, and indirect cultural evidence would seem to indicate that. They do seem to indicate that. Therefore, [P5].

Prior to the argument, we do not presume that the reason why people in the middle-east tend to be muslims, is because of external factors, for this would be to beg the question. Neither does it logically follow from the fact that most people living there are muslims, that this is due to any external factor.


 
Of course. That's what the other premises are for! Please stop pretending that you don't understand the argument!

troyjs wrote:



If the conclusion wanted, is that people living there being muslims rather than christians entails that there is an external factor, one must presuppose that the reason why they are muslims and not christians, is because of an external factor -- but this is the question we are asking.



See above.

 
troyjs wrote:

Furthermore, we have not exprienced any other world with christians living there, of which we absolutely know that this is due to external factors.
If there were 2 other worlds of which the christians there were such, due to external factors, we might say that the christians in this world are probably the same. Since it is this world we are dealing with, we can only draw any conclusions from our observations of this particular world, and we can not draw any conclusions from our observations of it, without interpreting our observations in a particular way. The conclusion can only logically follow, if one's interpretation presupposes the truth of one's conclusion, which is to beg the question.


 
I am going to try to remain polite, but I am really getting sick and tired of you accusing me of begging the question when what has really happened is you simply ignored the argument.

troyjs wrote:


There are deductive arguments which refute Dr Craig's molinism, but I believe you may want to develop this argument, and I am sure you are only wanting to bounce it off other people, in this process.

kind regards


I do appreciate *thoughtful* criticism, however, I see no point in engaging in a discussion where all you are going to do is accuse me of committing fallacies that it's not clear I am committing while refusing to demonstrate that I am in fact committing them!

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troyjs

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The geographical distribution argument
« Reply #13 on: January 26, 2012, 07:03:46 pm »
We agree that there are more christians in some countries than in others. You are arguing that this fact entails there being an external factor in regards to one's being a christian. This does not deductively follow, as you agree, but you maintain that it is more probable. This presupposes that of all worlds in which christians might exist, if there are more christians in some places than in others, this is probably due to external factors. there are more christians in some places than in others, in this world, therefore in this world, there is an external factor. The presupposition however, is the question you are trying to address, viz., whether or not the phenomenon of there being more christians in some places than in others, is in fact due to some external factor.

kind regards
“Knowledge of the sciences is so much smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ” -- John Calvin.
“I consider looseness with words no less of a defect than looseness of the bowels” -- John Calvin

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Nightvid Cole

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The geographical distribution argument
« Reply #14 on: January 28, 2012, 09:01:51 pm »

troyjs wrote: We agree that there are more christians in some countries than in others. You are arguing that this fact entails there being an external factor in regards to one's being a christian. This does not deductively follow, as you agree, but you maintain that it is more probable. This presupposes that of all worlds in which christians might exist, if there are more christians in some places than in others, this is probably due to external factors. there are more christians in some places than in others, in this world, therefore in this world, there is an external factor. The presupposition however, is the question you are trying to address, viz., whether or not the phenomenon of there being more christians in some places than in others, is in fact due to some external factor.

kind regards


No, what I agreed to was that one cannot be sure that the distribution of Christians is as inhomogeneous as it appears to be. I did not agree that the conclusion of my argument does not follow from its premises. If you want to dispute the validity of my argument, please make sure you understand it first.