Alvin Plantinga’s ontological argument can be stated as follows:
Here’s a parody of that argument, with essentially the same form but “maximal ungreatness” substituted for “maximal greatness” and “evil” substituted for “good”:
Of course, Plantinga, like myself, would reject (10). So, if he is right, (7) must be false. But, a priori, there seems to be no good reason to think that (2)—It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness—is true and (7)—It is possible that there is a being that has maximal ungreatness—is false. So I don’t think Plantinga’s ontological argument is particularly helpful in establishing either God’s existence or God’s goodness.
dadalus wrote: Even if you take out the term great or ungreat and insert any maximal thing: most red, dirtiest, most feminine, most alive, whatever, the onto fails because it rests on the fault that "possibly necessary= necessary"
Theists simply define 'great' to mean the god they beleive in, but the greatest possible being might actually and necessarily restricted to the laws of a greater law: that of reality. Maybe the greatest being was steve jobs? Maybe he was literally the fully greatest a single being could be based on the laws of the universe. Or maybe you?
The point is, there is no rule that, for example, the most powerful being must also be the most intelligent or most good, especially according to a talking apes assessment.
Kix wrote: Is this meant to be responded to? Is it serious? I'm not saying this to offend you, it's an honest question.
Kix wrote: "Ungreatness" would seem to imply privation of greatness to at least some degree and being "maximally ungreat" would be equivalent to absolute privation such that a thing has no power at all, no presence, no knowledge and wouldn't be necessary. This idea is incoherent as a thing that lacks presence or powers seems to be nothing which isn't a possible entity since it's "not anything."
Kix wrote: Evil inherently makes no sense other than being a privation of the good and so a maximally great being would not have the lack entailed by being evil but would rather be what evil is a privation of, namely the good.
tlarsen wrote: Are power, presence, knowledge, and so on great-making properties that point to a good being? A maximally wicked being, for example, could have perfect power, presence, and knowledge and yet be absolutely evil. So by "ungreat" I don't mean "non-great," I mean "great but evil."