This being the case, a particular soul's freedom or self determination would be beyond God's control to change, and so, although CF's are grounded in God as ideas, yet creaturely freedom is safeguarded.
This is a fascinating discussion. On Dr Craig's scholarly articles, he challenges the grounding objection on the basis that it presupposes truth-maker theory - a controversial and potentially unsound branch of the correspondence theory. If this is correct, then we don't even necessarily need a solution to the grounding objection, as it doesn't even get off the ground in the first place. Putting this reservation to the side what might we say about the suggestion that countefactuals are grounded in God's mind? Firstly I do agree that this doesn't necessarily mean that counterfactuals are dependent on God's will. After all, it seems clear that we can have knowledge of all sorts of truths (both necessary and contingent) that do not depend on our will. It also seems like a clever move, because what else is there to ground the truth of these counterfactuals prior to God's creative decree? Prior to Creation God is the only thing that actually exists, so where else could we ground true propositions? (if they do need to be grounded).I wonder whether grounding God's middle knowledge in God's mind might lead to the extreme conclusion that all reality grounded God's mind? Rather like the suggestion that the physical universe is simply a thought in God's mind? Middle knowledge after all doesn't just comprise of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Rather middle knowledge consists of all God's contingent, prevolitional knowledge that is independent of his will. I am not convinced that your proposal does lead to this type of idealism, but I do think it is a risk. Another risk here is circularity: when the grounding objector asks what grounds the truth of a proposition like a counterfactual, they are asking what real and actual state of affairs the proposition corresponds to. If we respond by saying that the proposition is grounded in the mind of God, what we are really saying is that the proposition is true because God knows it is true. But then, the objector may ask, why does God know it is true? What grounds that fact? The only answer we can give is that God knows the proposition is true because it is true.... and so on. So essentially we would just be saying that the proposition is just an ungrounded fact in the mind of God. So I think we would be better of agreeing with Dr Craig that true propositions don't need truth-makers. They only need to correspond to reality (not actuality) in the way that Fredosso suggests. Counterfactuals are simply grounded at the temporal and modal location that the proposition specifies: namely “It would the case (at Y) that Z” is now grounded if and only if “Z is now grounded” would the case (at Y) (Where Y = any specified conditions, and any temporal or modal indicators).