Hi there,So I have recently read Platinga's argument that "the de jure question is not independent of the de facto question" (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/plantinga/warrant3.vi.i.iii.html), in which he basically concludes that if God exists, belief in him is warranted (because 'sensus divinitatis' is then a valid method of gaining knowledge), and conversely if he doesn't exist, then such belief is not warranted, and 'sensus divinitatis' is a hallucination.I am almost happy with this argument, but there is one point that concerns me. It seems kind of circular, on the positive side. The argument claims that if God exists then everyone essentially already knows it deep down due to 'sensus divinitatis', which implies to me that no further proof is necessary in this case. However, since 'sensus divinitatis' is a hallucination if God does not exist, there is a risk that one is misled by this sense. To be confident of its validity, one must already know God exists. So one needs some reason to believe this that is independent of 'sensus divinitatis' to avoid circularity. Yet Platinga seems to be trying to argue that 'sensus divinitatis' is all one needs.So how is the circularity removed? So far the argument seems to prove that 'sensus divinitatis' is not by itself sufficient to produce a warranted belief in God.