Noah Hawryshko

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I think it does. I'm at an impasse between the tensions (or what I assume are the tensions) between the Leibniz's argument and the kalam. Why does the kalam say that if something never began to exist, it doesn't need a cause? From this, why does Lebiniz's argument say that everything has an explanation of it's existence, whether in something else or it's own neccessity? It seems like the kalam is saying that god needs no explanation because he never began to exist, but Leibniz's argument seems to assume that even things that don't begin to exist need to have a cause, either in themselves or something else.

But only something greater than something else can cause it, right? Craig says that the cause of the universe needs to be timeless, space-less, immaterial, immensely powerful, and personal (timelessness and spacelessness being derivatives of what the universe is, and therefore the cause cannot be "made out of"). So, if this is true, what is this amazing transcendent thing that sets God apart from everything else, per Leibniz's argument? Why

It seems like there's a contention between premise 1 of Leibniz's argument, and premise 1 of the kalam.

Sorry, this has just been a mess of questions, any help is appreciated. My big points are why timeless or uncreated things need no explanation for their existence, and how they got there without making an infinite regress.
Hey guys! I tend to log on and respond to posts all at once, so don't feel like I'm not reading your responses!

Hi Noah,

It does seem to me that you're a little confused about the difference between the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) and Leibniz's Cosmological Argument (LCA). Perhaps I can be of assistance.

The KCA goes like this:

1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Let's take a look at P1--P1 is not saying that everything has a cause, but rather it is saying that everything that begins to exist has a cause. There is a crucial difference there. So things that didn't begin to exist don't need to have a cause, according to the KCA. This says nothing about whether or not everything has an explanation of its existence or not--this is only talking about causes here. There is a difference between having an explanation and having a cause.

The LCA is committed to something known as the PSR that goes like this: Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence either via the necessity of its own nature or via an external cause. So causes are a type of explanation, but necessity is another type of explanation.

I hope that elicits the difference. The KCA is just talking about causes and saying that only things that begin to exist have a cause--so in that case, God did not have a cause. There is no special pleading here or anything because the KCA never said that everything had a cause. Whereas, the LCA is saying that everything has an explanation, including God (who exists via the necessity of His own nature).

So the LCA and the KCA are basically talking about two totally different things and you should treat them independently of each other. Hope that helps! :)
"The unexamined life is a life not worth living." ~Socrates