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grosso

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Re: Parsimony and Inconsistency
« Reply #30 on: May 20, 2015, 09:10:44 pm »
What is more parsimonious than physicalism?

Physicalism posits trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like. Solipsism posits only one mind. There's no need for the solipsist to posit physical reality.

Solipsism posits one mind that experiences "trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like."

Physicalism posits one fundamental type of stuff that forms the building blocks for "trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like."

Solipsism isn't any more parsimonious, and it is much less adequate.

I don't think you're thinking this through completely.

In the real world, you have to be able to provide a physical story to account for both actuals and counterfactuals. But in a solipsist world, counterfactuals aren't necessary.

Solipsism is the #1 contender for parsimony-motivated atheists on this metric.

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Booger

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Re: Parsimony and Inconsistency
« Reply #31 on: May 20, 2015, 10:55:44 pm »

Solipsism posits one mind that experiences "trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like."

That's the Wiki definition. It describes some forms of idealism better than it does solipsism. Most others follow this line:

1. Philosophy The theory that the self is the only thing that can be known and verified.
2. The view that the self is the only reality.

« Last Edit: May 20, 2015, 11:00:17 pm by Booger »
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Fred

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Re: Parsimony and Inconsistency
« Reply #32 on: May 20, 2015, 11:33:11 pm »
What is more parsimonious than physicalism?

Physicalism posits trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like. Solipsism posits only one mind. There's no need for the solipsist to posit physical reality.

Solipsism posits one mind that experiences "trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like."

Physicalism posits one fundamental type of stuff that forms the building blocks for "trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like."

Solipsism isn't any more parsimonious, and it is much less adequate.

I don't think you're thinking this through completely.

In the real world, you have to be able to provide a physical story to account for both actuals and counterfactuals. But in a solipsist world, counterfactuals aren't necessary.
Counterfactuals aren't ontic in a physicalist ontology. They are just epistemic statements about what does not exist - their truthmaker is the set of things that do exist. 
Fred

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grosso

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Re: Parsimony and Inconsistency
« Reply #33 on: May 21, 2015, 08:32:16 pm »
What is more parsimonious than physicalism?

Physicalism posits trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like. Solipsism posits only one mind. There's no need for the solipsist to posit physical reality.

Solipsism posits one mind that experiences "trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like."

Physicalism posits one fundamental type of stuff that forms the building blocks for "trillions and trillions of separate entities with different properties, complex organisms, and the like."

Solipsism isn't any more parsimonious, and it is much less adequate.

I don't think you're thinking this through completely.

In the real world, you have to be able to provide a physical story to account for both actuals and counterfactuals. But in a solipsist world, counterfactuals aren't necessary.
Counterfactuals aren't ontic in a physicalist ontology. They are just epistemic statements about what does not exist - their truthmaker is the set of things that do exist. 

I don't see how this disproves what I'm saying, since I'm not assuming counterfactuals are ontic.

I'm saying on a naturalist ontology you still have to provide an account for (non-ontic) counterfactuals, whereas on solipsism you don't.

To put this in concrete terms, in a naturalistic framework your science has to be able to explain what would happen if the sun were to collide with the earth, in addition to the set of facts science has to explain.

In a solipsistic framework, you have no such burden. Just explain what illusions you're actually experiencing.

As such, naturalism invokes an explanatory burden far greater and troublesome than solipsism.