If you hooked me and the Pope (or any devout moral realist) up to a super-advanced neuro scanner and showed us holograms of child torture I am quite sure our reactions would be almost identical. … I would be perfectly happy to leave it at that. The pope, by contrast, would insist on finding some metaphysical label, like "immoral," upon which to ground his reaction. But why not simply accept our strongest preferences as a legitimate stopping place?
He notes that my view is no more parsimonious than "some forms of realism." (His form? Not sure, but maybe.) Both make "the same ontological commitments." Then he says, "Surely banjo believes in such things as health, happiness, well-being and so on."If "believes in" means I hope for, long for, and feel these contribute to human flourishing, he is correct. And if to be "wrong" means to undermine that flourishing then we can agree about child torture being wrong. And if that is ontology, I’ll take it. But I suspect Aleph's MR makes a much more robust ontological claim than that.
Quote from: Asherah on February 04, 2016, 04:44:56 pmDo you have some basis for trusting your intuitions?What exactly do you mean by "trust"? If you mean to ask whether I have some reason to think my intuitions are reliable (in that they probably produce true belief), the answer is no. But I don't think that's a problem since I'm not trying to infer anything from the fact that a belief is intuitive.
Do you have some basis for trusting your intuitions?