Let G be the proposition "a maximally great being exists."By definition, then, if G exists, G exists necessarily. Hence:1.) G iff G2.) <>G iff <>G (from 1)3.) <> G iff G (s5)4.) G iff <>G (from 1 - 3)It is fairly trivial, as this argument shows, that G and <>G entail each other. This means, definitionally, that they have identical entailments and therefore identical extensions--literally, identical literal meanings.And, of course, we can continue:5.) If a premise in an argument and the argument's conclusion have the same literal meaning, the argument begs the question.6.) <>G is a premise in the MOA and G is the conclusion of the MOA.7.) <>G and G have the same literal meaning. (From 4)C.) Therefore, the MOA begs the question.
Given that I have proven your claim trivially false, already, and you responded with nothing more than a flat denial and no response to the actual logic of my proof, you'll forgive me for assuming that you are the troll you certainly appear to be.If you want to have an actual discussion, feel free to address my *formal logical proof* in some substantive manner.
P and possibly P are not the same in all cases, but hey are trivially the same in the case of P = "a maximally great being exists" or "maximal greatness is instantiated."As I have proven.Craig's response regarding de dicto and de res does not address this argument at all.My proof holds in both the de dicto mode and the de res mode.
The support for the possibility of Gid existing cannot--by definition--be anything *less* than the existence of God.As I proved, the existence of God is a *necessary condition* for the possible existence of God.You literally cannot support a proposition without supporting all of its necessary conditions at least as well. That's what necessary conditions are.
This means, definitionally, that they have identical entailments and therefore identical extensions--literally, identical literal meanings.