So, to think of it another way:If the only goal of the MOA were to show that, under s5 and the stipulated definition of the MGB (both of which are perfectly reasonable, I think) that the existence of an MGB and the possibility of an MGB are just the same thing, then that's great. I agree. That's what I shoe in my first four premisesBut that isn't how the MOA is used.It is used to frame the rhetorical suggestion that belief in God can be justified by way of some fairly standard heuristics for evaluating possibility (like coherent cobceptualization). That there is some route to justified belief through a much easier-to-meet standard stemming from this sort of metaphysical speculation.And this is trivially false.In fact, what the MOA proves is that this is *not* the case. Not that it *is* the case. The MOA illustrates a critical weakness in that sort of informal heuristic, in fact.And that's why we need to call out the MOA for not just being circular (which is trivial) but for being *viciously* circular, or being used to beg the question in a rhetorical context.It is presented as though it served to demonstrate that proving God is no more difficult than proving the possibility of God, and this is true, but the rhetorical implication here is completely wrong.Indeed, it also proves that proving the possibility of God is no easier than proving the necessity of God.The argument doesn't change what justification is required for one's belief in God. All it does is show that the justification required for belief in even the mere possibility of God is the same.
Simply, none of the things you mentioned constitute support for p2 in your simple reformation except where the constitute identical support for the conclusion.Precisely, this is the case because one cannot be justified in asserting <>P unless one is justified in asserting ~((~(p))) as I explained above.This is true as per the definition of "<>."No support for p2 which does not establish this fact could ever be sufficient for p2.And once this fact is established, p2 is pointless. The conclusion has already been reached.
And, of course we see this illustrated nicely by the reverse MOA:1.) If <>(~G) then ~G2.) <>(~G)C.) ~G1, again, is just s5. On what grounds can you object to p2?It is intuitively true. The coherence of (~G) is not in question.
<<Metaphysical possibility is determined by a-priori modal intuition, >>This is meaningless. This isn't a method for determining anything.Might as well say, "metaphysical possibility is determined by consulting the quartzite metaphysical divining rod".Metaphysical possibility is determined by determining whether a concept meets the definition of metaphysical possibility.Which is impossible to do, because metaphysical possibility is poorly defined.It's not a useful system.Be that as it may, my point--and, indeed, any point about question begging--revolves around epistemic warrant, and my argument is that the premise <>G demands exactly the same warrant as the question of interest does: G or ~GThe MOA does nothing at all to change the epistemic conditions surrounding the question of interest.It is literally circular.It literally begs the question.In what sense, then, is it worth anything beyond accomplishing what the first four lines of my argument accomplish? Also, <>(~G) is "possibly, God is not instantiated."
From an epistemological point of view both Lowe and Hale provide a picture of our knowledge of modality that sharply contrasts with accounts that take conceivability or intuition to be our fundamental source of justification for believing metaphysically modal truths. The core contrast, for example with conceivability, is that modal knowledge derives from essentialist knowledge, and that conceivability is explained as being successful only in virtue of our possession of essentialist knowledge that is unpacked in a conceivability exercise.
Björnsson, Gunnar, 2004, “A Naturalist’s Approach to Modal Intuitions”, in Weber & De Mey 2004: 77–92.Levin, Janet, 2005, “The evidential status of philosophical intuition”, Philosophical Studies, 121(3): 193–224.Miščević, Nenad, 2004, “The Explainability of Intuitions”, Dialectica, 58(1): 43–70.Wright, Crispin, 2004, “Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws”, Dialectica, 58(1): 155–175.
That large volumes of philosophy have been developed on the basis of it does not indicate that it or those volumes have any actual value, meaning, or relevance to reality.<>(~G) is intuitively obvious Seriously, I don't care. This entire field is defunct as an epistemic venture. I am not interested in prosecuting the reverse MOA as though it offered some serious means of getting at truth or knowledge. It doesn't. Just like the MOA doesn't.I offer it just as a mirror. Anything you can offer in support of p2 of the MOA I can mirror in support of p2 of the RMOA.
<<With all due respect, It gives much more powerful evidence that it does have value, meaning and relevance that your negation that it does not gives against.>>I completely disagree. I don't think this true for any functional notion of evidence.<<<And your answer is still "No".>>>My answer to *what* is still no?
I think it is nonsense to say that two things can be semantically equivalent and mean two very different things. Clark Kent and Super Man are either semantically equivalent or they mean different things. Not both, and what matters is precisely what is meant by both.
Quote from: cnearing on March 29, 2016, 10:54:08 am<<With all due respect, It gives much more powerful evidence that it does have value, meaning and relevance that your negation that it does not gives against.>>I completely disagree. I don't think this true for any functional notion of evidence.<<<And your answer is still "No".>>>My answer to *what* is still no?You are simply asserting, giving your personal opinions (you even say that you don´t care and merely declare the field defunct, that´s not really a real objection to any of it), with out any support from the literature, with out any real argument or support for your premises: that Modal epistemoloy has no value, while asserting that ~G is intuitively obvious (which is contradictory) , that this or that. Modal epistemology is a well on its way area of epistmology research, and, intuition at its core is argued to be evidence, and this is rather unproblematic, rather the question at times is how, when, in which way it is evidence not if it is evidence.
Quote from: cnearing on March 29, 2016, 05:49:42 amI think it is nonsense to say that two things can be semantically equivalent and mean two very different things. Clark Kent and Super Man are either semantically equivalent or they mean different things. Not both, and what matters is precisely what is meant by both.You've got some weird intuitions, then. I think it's a thousand fold more nonsensical to claim that two terms can mean the same thing even though competent English speakers would so routinely fail to recognize it. If you're right then "Clark Kent is Super Man" is a trivial truth. But that's a pretty crazy thing to claim. Much crazier than supposing that two terms can have different meanings while referring to the same thing.