ParaclitosLogos

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The moral argument:
M1. If God did not exist objective moral values and duties would not exist
M2. Objective moral values and duties exist
M3: God exists
 
M2 (the second premise) from the moral argument has its own support, at least,  in a somewhat similar manner to the following procedure:
P1. My moral intuitions are prima-facie defeasible evidence
P2. I have the intuition that M=necessarily (or contingently), some X is morally wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that M
P6: I am justified in believing M.
 
Corollary: I am justified in believing at least one OMV||D exists.
Roughly speaking, transmission of justification is an ever present epistemic element in science and day to day learning experiences. Epistemic transmission when doing inferential reasoning, for instance, is how we support predictions of future events and, generally expand the sphere of our justified beliefs.
 
In other words, one can conclude a OMV actually exists through the justification for its existence, just as most epistemic matters.
The argument is that by having an intuition that necessarily (or contingently), x is good/bad/right/wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact, one has prima-facie justification (P1 and P2)
Then
 
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that MC: I am justified in believing M.
 
Why would you give the same weight to your intuitions that you give to my intuitions, given that you have no acces to the last, and have direct access to the former ?
 
Nevertheless, you can consider other opinions (P4).
Taken that it is the case that after considering other´s peoples intuitions, your intuition has not changed, you are justified, since you have justification and no defeater for the believe that necessarily, x is good/bad/right/wong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact.
 
Also,That there is disagreement about certain ethical statements does not make them matters of opinion.
 
Quote from: Thinking Critically About the "Subjective"/"Objective" Distinction Sandra LaFave West Valley College
"Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it's wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others."
 
We might disagree on some given moral question, but many agree on the not killing innocent children for fun (for example), for instance.

In summary:
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, killing innocent children for fun is objectively wrong (independent of opinion), as a matter of fact. Thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMVD exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.
 
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, loving innocent children, cherishing them, supporting them is good independent of opinion, thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMV exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.


« Last Edit: May 22, 2016, 04:36:34 pm by ontologicalme »

1

Bertuzzi

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Sorry bud, the MA has already been refuted.
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2

redtilt1

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The moral argument:
M1. If God did not exist objective moral values and duties would not exist
M2. Objective moral values and duties exist
M3: God exists
 
M2 (the second premise) from the moral argument has its own support, at least,  in a somewhat similar manner to the following procedure:
P1. My moral intuitions are prima-facie defeasible evidence
P2. I have the intuition that M=necessarily (or contingently), some X is morally wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that M
P6: I am justified in believing M.
 
Corollary: I am justified in believing at least one OMV||D exists.
Roughly speaking, transmission of justification is an ever present epistemic element in science and day to day learning experiences. Epistemic transmission when doing inferential reasoning, for instance, is how we support predictions of future events and, generally expand the sphere of our justified beliefs.
 
In other words, one can conclude a OMV actually exists through the justification for its existence, just as most epistemic matters.
The argument is that by having an intuition that necessarily (or contingently), x is good/bad/right/wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact, one has prima-facie justification (P1 and P2)
Then
 
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that MC: I am justified in believing M.
 
Why would you give the same weight to your intuitions that you give to my intuitions, given that you have no acces to the last, and have direct access to the former ?
 
Nevertheless, you can consider other opinions (P4).
Taken that it is the case that after considering other´s peoples intuitions, your intuition has not changed, you are justified, since you have justification and no defeater for the believe that necessarily, x is good/bad/right/wong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact.
 
Also,That there is disagreement about certain ethical statements does not make them matters of opinion.
 
Quote from: Thinking Critically About the "Subjective"/"Objective" Distinction Sandra LaFave West Valley College
"Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it's wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others."
 
We might disagree on some given moral question, but many agree on the not killing innocent children for fun (for example), for instance.

In summary:
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, killing innocent children for fun is objectively wrong (independent of opinion), as a matter of fact. Thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMVD exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.
 
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, loving innocent children, cherishing them, supporting them is good independent of opinion, thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMV exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.

Is it objectively wrong to kill and animal for fun?

3

ParaclitosLogos

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The moral argument:
M1. If God did not exist objective moral values and duties would not exist
M2. Objective moral values and duties exist
M3: God exists
 
M2 (the second premise) from the moral argument has its own support, at least,  in a somewhat similar manner to the following procedure:
P1. My moral intuitions are prima-facie defeasible evidence
P2. I have the intuition that M=necessarily (or contingently), some X is morally wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that M
P6: I am justified in believing M.
 
Corollary: I am justified in believing at least one OMV||D exists.
Roughly speaking, transmission of justification is an ever present epistemic element in science and day to day learning experiences. Epistemic transmission when doing inferential reasoning, for instance, is how we support predictions of future events and, generally expand the sphere of our justified beliefs.
 
In other words, one can conclude a OMV actually exists through the justification for its existence, just as most epistemic matters.
The argument is that by having an intuition that necessarily (or contingently), x is good/bad/right/wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact, one has prima-facie justification (P1 and P2)
Then
 
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that MC: I am justified in believing M.
 
Why would you give the same weight to your intuitions that you give to my intuitions, given that you have no acces to the last, and have direct access to the former ?
 
Nevertheless, you can consider other opinions (P4).
Taken that it is the case that after considering other´s peoples intuitions, your intuition has not changed, you are justified, since you have justification and no defeater for the believe that necessarily, x is good/bad/right/wong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact.
 
Also,That there is disagreement about certain ethical statements does not make them matters of opinion.
 
Quote from: Thinking Critically About the "Subjective"/"Objective" Distinction Sandra LaFave West Valley College
"Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it's wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others."
 
We might disagree on some given moral question, but many agree on the not killing innocent children for fun (for example), for instance.

In summary:
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, killing innocent children for fun is objectively wrong (independent of opinion), as a matter of fact. Thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMVD exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.
 
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, loving innocent children, cherishing them, supporting them is good independent of opinion, thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMV exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.

Is it objectively wrong to kill and animal for fun?

I don´t know , what do you think?

Have you converted to Christianity?


PS: by the way, nice to hear from you.

4

Bertuzzi

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Sorry bud, the MA has already been refuted.

Sorry, I can´t read blocked users posts.

Shame, cuz he refuted the MA.
Husband. Father. Photographer. Blogger.

capturingchristianity.com

"No theodicy without eschatology." - Hick

5

redtilt1

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The moral argument:
M1. If God did not exist objective moral values and duties would not exist
M2. Objective moral values and duties exist
M3: God exists
 
M2 (the second premise) from the moral argument has its own support, at least,  in a somewhat similar manner to the following procedure:
P1. My moral intuitions are prima-facie defeasible evidence
P2. I have the intuition that M=necessarily (or contingently), some X is morally wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that M
P6: I am justified in believing M.
 
Corollary: I am justified in believing at least one OMV||D exists.
Roughly speaking, transmission of justification is an ever present epistemic element in science and day to day learning experiences. Epistemic transmission when doing inferential reasoning, for instance, is how we support predictions of future events and, generally expand the sphere of our justified beliefs.
 
In other words, one can conclude a OMV actually exists through the justification for its existence, just as most epistemic matters.
The argument is that by having an intuition that necessarily (or contingently), x is good/bad/right/wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact, one has prima-facie justification (P1 and P2)
Then
 
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that MC: I am justified in believing M.
 
Why would you give the same weight to your intuitions that you give to my intuitions, given that you have no acces to the last, and have direct access to the former ?
 
Nevertheless, you can consider other opinions (P4).
Taken that it is the case that after considering other´s peoples intuitions, your intuition has not changed, you are justified, since you have justification and no defeater for the believe that necessarily, x is good/bad/right/wong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact.
 
Also,That there is disagreement about certain ethical statements does not make them matters of opinion.
 
Quote from: Thinking Critically About the "Subjective"/"Objective" Distinction Sandra LaFave West Valley College
"Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it's wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others."
 
We might disagree on some given moral question, but many agree on the not killing innocent children for fun (for example), for instance.

In summary:
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, killing innocent children for fun is objectively wrong (independent of opinion), as a matter of fact. Thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMVD exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.
 
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, loving innocent children, cherishing them, supporting them is good independent of opinion, thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMV exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.

Is it objectively wrong to kill and animal for fun?

I don´t know , what do you think?

Have you converted to Christianity?


PS: by the way, nice to hear from you.

Thank you I have been very busy so unable to contribute to this forum , have a little free time now. I find it interesting that you don't know if its objectively wrong to kill animals for fun; why are sure about one and not the other?

6

ParaclitosLogos

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The moral argument:
M1. If God did not exist objective moral values and duties would not exist
M2. Objective moral values and duties exist
M3: God exists
 
M2 (the second premise) from the moral argument has its own support, at least,  in a somewhat similar manner to the following procedure:
P1. My moral intuitions are prima-facie defeasible evidence
P2. I have the intuition that M=necessarily (or contingently), some X is morally wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that M
P6: I am justified in believing M.
 
Corollary: I am justified in believing at least one OMV||D exists.
Roughly speaking, transmission of justification is an ever present epistemic element in science and day to day learning experiences. Epistemic transmission when doing inferential reasoning, for instance, is how we support predictions of future events and, generally expand the sphere of our justified beliefs.
 
In other words, one can conclude a OMV actually exists through the justification for its existence, just as most epistemic matters.
The argument is that by having an intuition that necessarily (or contingently), x is good/bad/right/wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact, one has prima-facie justification (P1 and P2)
Then
 
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that MC: I am justified in believing M.
 
Why would you give the same weight to your intuitions that you give to my intuitions, given that you have no acces to the last, and have direct access to the former ?
 
Nevertheless, you can consider other opinions (P4).
Taken that it is the case that after considering other´s peoples intuitions, your intuition has not changed, you are justified, since you have justification and no defeater for the believe that necessarily, x is good/bad/right/wong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact.
 
Also,That there is disagreement about certain ethical statements does not make them matters of opinion.
 
Quote from: Thinking Critically About the "Subjective"/"Objective" Distinction Sandra LaFave West Valley College
"Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it's wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others."
 
We might disagree on some given moral question, but many agree on the not killing innocent children for fun (for example), for instance.

In summary:
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, killing innocent children for fun is objectively wrong (independent of opinion), as a matter of fact. Thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMVD exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.
 
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, loving innocent children, cherishing them, supporting them is good independent of opinion, thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMV exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.

Is it objectively wrong to kill and animal for fun?

I don´t know , what do you think?

Have you converted to Christianity?


PS: by the way, nice to hear from you.

Thank you I have been very busy so unable to contribute to this forum , have a little free time now. I find it interesting that you don't know if its objectively wrong to kill animals for fun; why are sure about one and not the other?

Some intuitions are more <<stable>> than others.


7

redtilt1

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The moral argument:
M1. If God did not exist objective moral values and duties would not exist
M2. Objective moral values and duties exist
M3: God exists
 
M2 (the second premise) from the moral argument has its own support, at least,  in a somewhat similar manner to the following procedure:
P1. My moral intuitions are prima-facie defeasible evidence
P2. I have the intuition that M=necessarily (or contingently), some X is morally wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that M
P6: I am justified in believing M.
 
Corollary: I am justified in believing at least one OMV||D exists.
Roughly speaking, transmission of justification is an ever present epistemic element in science and day to day learning experiences. Epistemic transmission when doing inferential reasoning, for instance, is how we support predictions of future events and, generally expand the sphere of our justified beliefs.
 
In other words, one can conclude a OMV actually exists through the justification for its existence, just as most epistemic matters.
The argument is that by having an intuition that necessarily (or contingently), x is good/bad/right/wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact, one has prima-facie justification (P1 and P2)
Then
 
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that MC: I am justified in believing M.
 
Why would you give the same weight to your intuitions that you give to my intuitions, given that you have no acces to the last, and have direct access to the former ?
 
Nevertheless, you can consider other opinions (P4).
Taken that it is the case that after considering other´s peoples intuitions, your intuition has not changed, you are justified, since you have justification and no defeater for the believe that necessarily, x is good/bad/right/wong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact.
 
Also,That there is disagreement about certain ethical statements does not make them matters of opinion.
 
Quote from: Thinking Critically About the "Subjective"/"Objective" Distinction Sandra LaFave West Valley College
"Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it's wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others."
 
We might disagree on some given moral question, but many agree on the not killing innocent children for fun (for example), for instance.

In summary:
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, killing innocent children for fun is objectively wrong (independent of opinion), as a matter of fact. Thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMVD exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.
 
I have justification to believe that (for example) necessarily, loving innocent children, cherishing them, supporting them is good independent of opinion, thus, I have justification to believe at least an OMV exists, and, I do believe at least an OMV exists. I would suggest many also have such justification.

Is it objectively wrong to kill and animal for fun?

I don´t know , what do you think?

Have you converted to Christianity?


PS: by the way, nice to hear from you.

Thank you I have been very busy so unable to contribute to this forum , have a little free time now. I find it interesting that you don't know if its objectively wrong to kill animals for fun; why are sure about one and not the other?

Some intuitions are more <<stable>> than others.

So how is objective then, if its simply your intuition ?

8

ParaclitosLogos

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So how is objective then, if its simply your intuition ?

We have intuitions about many objective propositions.

Similar (though not exactly) to mathematical intuition, the intuitions is that 2+2=4 is not only true, but necessarily true (objectively).


Quote
“The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says, 2+2=5.” (Michael Russ).

Quote from: Ethics makes strange bedfellows. MATT BEDKE
You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. A great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified beliefs. Details aside, this method in ethics and elsewhere— of first relying on intuitions to form justified beliefs, and subsequently using best-fit (or reflective equilibrium) theorizing on all justified beliefs to move to other justified beliefs— has received a lot of critical attention lately. But it is not a bad method. It is a good method caught in a bad relationship.




Quote from: Intuitions and experimental philosophy: comfortable bedfellows- Neil Levy
Given that knowledge production is a distributed enterprise, we need not demand too much of our intuitions for them to be truth-conducive. As the Condorcet jury theorem shows, individual deliberators need only to be more likely to be right than wrong for their contribution to truth-seeking to be positive. The right question is therefore whether we have good reason to believe that our intuitions are more likely to be right than wrong. There is no general answer to this question, I suggest. With regard to some areas of enquiry, untutored intuitions seem highly suspect. Intuitions about the mind are often highly unreliable: not only are the workings of the mind not transparent to us, but we may in fact be evolved to have systematically false intuitions about it (Carruthers 2011). The mechanisms of mind exist independently of our beliefs about them; these beliefs do not affect their structure and may often be inaccurate. For other targets of philosophical investigation, our beliefs partially constitute the domain. On the naturalistic metaethics I favor, for instance, moral facts are partially constituted by the responses, including the linguistic responses, of suitably placed observers. This entails that the extent to which our intuitions (with a stress on our) can go systematically wrong is constrained. There are further reasons to think that our intuitions in the moral domain are likely to be truth-conducive, reasons which generalize to other areas of enquiry.

 


Quote from: Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory Tamara Horowitz
Quinn appears to assume that anyone who responds to these cases as he does has moral intuitions, which like his, conform to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. After trying several formulations of this doctrine he says, “Perhaps we have found the basic form of the doctrine and the natural qualifications that, when combined with other plausible moral principles, accurately map our moral intuitions”

 . Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (p. 144).
 
« Last Edit: May 22, 2016, 08:22:14 pm by ontologicalme »

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ParaclitosLogos

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With respect then to the Moral Argument 2nd premise.
Quote
Objective moral values and duties exist

Can a person have good enough intuitions about the following negative universal generalization statement about moral facts not existing (NU)?
Quote
No X is morally wrong given any state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
In principle, yes.

Does that mean that someone else could not have intuitions about NU being false?  No.

These questions clarified, to have good enough intuitions about NU, one needs to understand it with a-priori stability, determinately, and one key concept one must understand about it, is that it is a universal generalization.

It means that there is no moral statement that is (objectively) true, not one, not any.

Take for example the following quote :
 
Quote from: Thinking Critically About the "Subjective"/"Objective" Distinction Sandra LaFave West Valley College
"Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it's wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others."
 
If this person is right there are several statements, some general and some more specific, about morality that, are  objectively true, just in this quote: That there are good persons, and certain behaviors that are not ethical,  that it is wrong to take innocent human life, we should take care of children, that we should be compassionate, and she simply right down claims the objectivity of moral statements, plausibly many of you already agree with some of these claims.


Take these two examples also:
necessarily (or contingently), killing innocent children for fun is objectively wrong (independent of opinion), as a matter of fact.

Necessarily (or contingently), loving innocent children, cherishing them, supporting them is good independent of opinion.

If any one of these statements is true (these 2 and the others mentioned above), I mean any one, all that it takes is just one being true, then the 2nd premise of the Moral argument is true, and, if none of these are true, there are many more that could turn out to be true, we could spend all night listing some of them.


NU:
Quote
No X is morally wrong given any state of affairs y, as a matter of fact


Remembering that NU implies that all of the propositions above are false, and, that from all of the uncountable moral claims there can be, similar or quite different to those already mentioned (more specific ones, less specific ones, etc.), none is true.


Yet, some people might want to claim that , we Can , readily, support NU, in practice, by intuitions with the same level of stability that any of those propositions already mentioned, ( when, plausibly, most of you already take as clearly true, at least one or two of the propositions mentioned above, or any other relevant claim that confirms the 2nd premise).



I hope this helps.
« Last Edit: May 23, 2016, 01:18:08 pm by ontologicalme »

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redtilt1

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So how is objective then, if its simply your intuition ?

We have intuitions about many objective propositions.

Similar (though not exactly) to mathematical intuition, the intuitions is that 2+2=4 is not only true, but necessarily true (objectively).


Quote
“The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says, 2+2=5.” (Michael Russ).

Quote from: Ethics makes strange bedfellows. MATT BEDKE
You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. A great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified beliefs. Details aside, this method in ethics and elsewhere— of first relying on intuitions to form justified beliefs, and subsequently using best-fit (or reflective equilibrium) theorizing on all justified beliefs to move to other justified beliefs— has received a lot of critical attention lately. But it is not a bad method. It is a good method caught in a bad relationship.




Quote from: Intuitions and experimental philosophy: comfortable bedfellows- Neil Levy
Given that knowledge production is a distributed enterprise, we need not demand too much of our intuitions for them to be truth-conducive. As the Condorcet jury theorem shows, individual deliberators need only to be more likely to be right than wrong for their contribution to truth-seeking to be positive. The right question is therefore whether we have good reason to believe that our intuitions are more likely to be right than wrong. There is no general answer to this question, I suggest. With regard to some areas of enquiry, untutored intuitions seem highly suspect. Intuitions about the mind are often highly unreliable: not only are the workings of the mind not transparent to us, but we may in fact be evolved to have systematically false intuitions about it (Carruthers 2011). The mechanisms of mind exist independently of our beliefs about them; these beliefs do not affect their structure and may often be inaccurate. For other targets of philosophical investigation, our beliefs partially constitute the domain. On the naturalistic metaethics I favor, for instance, moral facts are partially constituted by the responses, including the linguistic responses, of suitably placed observers. This entails that the extent to which our intuitions (with a stress on our) can go systematically wrong is constrained. There are further reasons to think that our intuitions in the moral domain are likely to be truth-conducive, reasons which generalize to other areas of enquiry.

 


Quote from: Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory Tamara Horowitz
Quinn appears to assume that anyone who responds to these cases as he does has moral intuitions, which like his, conform to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. After trying several formulations of this doctrine he says, “Perhaps we have found the basic form of the doctrine and the natural qualifications that, when combined with other plausible moral principles, accurately map our moral intuitions”

 . Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (p. 144).
 

But we have intuitions that turn out to be wrong, for example that passage of time is not dependant upon our speed. So the fact that we have an intuition about something does not mean it is right, some of our intuitions turn out to be correct and others do not.

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ParaclitosLogos

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So how is objective then, if its simply your intuition ?

We have intuitions about many objective propositions.

Similar (though not exactly) to mathematical intuition, the intuitions is that 2+2=4 is not only true, but necessarily true (objectively).


Quote
“The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says, 2+2=5.” (Michael Russ).

Quote from: Ethics makes strange bedfellows. MATT BEDKE
You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. A great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified beliefs. Details aside, this method in ethics and elsewhere— of first relying on intuitions to form justified beliefs, and subsequently using best-fit (or reflective equilibrium) theorizing on all justified beliefs to move to other justified beliefs— has received a lot of critical attention lately. But it is not a bad method. It is a good method caught in a bad relationship.




Quote from: Intuitions and experimental philosophy: comfortable bedfellows- Neil Levy
Given that knowledge production is a distributed enterprise, we need not demand too much of our intuitions for them to be truth-conducive. As the Condorcet jury theorem shows, individual deliberators need only to be more likely to be right than wrong for their contribution to truth-seeking to be positive. The right question is therefore whether we have good reason to believe that our intuitions are more likely to be right than wrong. There is no general answer to this question, I suggest. With regard to some areas of enquiry, untutored intuitions seem highly suspect. Intuitions about the mind are often highly unreliable: not only are the workings of the mind not transparent to us, but we may in fact be evolved to have systematically false intuitions about it (Carruthers 2011). The mechanisms of mind exist independently of our beliefs about them; these beliefs do not affect their structure and may often be inaccurate. For other targets of philosophical investigation, our beliefs partially constitute the domain. On the naturalistic metaethics I favor, for instance, moral facts are partially constituted by the responses, including the linguistic responses, of suitably placed observers. This entails that the extent to which our intuitions (with a stress on our) can go systematically wrong is constrained. There are further reasons to think that our intuitions in the moral domain are likely to be truth-conducive, reasons which generalize to other areas of enquiry.

 


Quote from: Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory Tamara Horowitz
Quinn appears to assume that anyone who responds to these cases as he does has moral intuitions, which like his, conform to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. After trying several formulations of this doctrine he says, “Perhaps we have found the basic form of the doctrine and the natural qualifications that, when combined with other plausible moral principles, accurately map our moral intuitions”

 . Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (p. 144).
 

But we have intuitions that turn out to be wrong, for example that passage of time is not dependant upon our speed. So the fact that we have an intuition about something does not mean it is right, some of our intuitions turn out to be correct and others do not.

Why is that a problem? (It isn´t).

I am not positing intuitions as infallible, far from it, I am simply saying it is evidence, and not for all types of matters and data (this will depend on many details, the object data, the quality of cognitive state, the possession of relevant categorial and non catergorial knowledge, etc...), and, a defeasible evidence at that, As I said some intuitions are more stable than others, in fact, I quoted researchers that rather take it that intuitions about morality are in a somehat better condition that intuitions about other matters (e.g . intuitions about killing an inocent and defenseless child for fun  vs. intuitions of what the relative delta of  time measurements  depending on our relative speed to one anoter).

We work with defeasible evidence all the time, that just mean we can be wrong, and , further evidence could make us modify or change our conclusion.

Also, I did address considerations about disagreements, and, shortly explained when and why we should take our intuitions as prima-facie evidence (P3), and, when it can become reasonable enough evidence (P4&P5) -still yet defeasible.

If the possibility of being wrong was a deterrant to knowledge we should basically quit all knowlege endevours.
« Last Edit: May 23, 2016, 07:35:23 am by ontologicalme »

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Rostos

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Either OMVs exist as a fact OR the whole human population has been and is living under a delusion.

Take your pick.
"My thoughts are nothing like your thoughts," says the LORD. "And my ways are far beyond anything you could imagine.
Isiah 55:8

"For those who exalt themselves will be humbled, and those who humble themselves will be exalted." - Mathew 23-12

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redtilt1

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So how is objective then, if its simply your intuition ?

We have intuitions about many objective propositions.

Similar (though not exactly) to mathematical intuition, the intuitions is that 2+2=4 is not only true, but necessarily true (objectively).


Quote
“The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says, 2+2=5.” (Michael Russ).

Quote from: Ethics makes strange bedfellows. MATT BEDKE
You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. A great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified beliefs. Details aside, this method in ethics and elsewhere— of first relying on intuitions to form justified beliefs, and subsequently using best-fit (or reflective equilibrium) theorizing on all justified beliefs to move to other justified beliefs— has received a lot of critical attention lately. But it is not a bad method. It is a good method caught in a bad relationship.




Quote from: Intuitions and experimental philosophy: comfortable bedfellows- Neil Levy
Given that knowledge production is a distributed enterprise, we need not demand too much of our intuitions for them to be truth-conducive. As the Condorcet jury theorem shows, individual deliberators need only to be more likely to be right than wrong for their contribution to truth-seeking to be positive. The right question is therefore whether we have good reason to believe that our intuitions are more likely to be right than wrong. There is no general answer to this question, I suggest. With regard to some areas of enquiry, untutored intuitions seem highly suspect. Intuitions about the mind are often highly unreliable: not only are the workings of the mind not transparent to us, but we may in fact be evolved to have systematically false intuitions about it (Carruthers 2011). The mechanisms of mind exist independently of our beliefs about them; these beliefs do not affect their structure and may often be inaccurate. For other targets of philosophical investigation, our beliefs partially constitute the domain. On the naturalistic metaethics I favor, for instance, moral facts are partially constituted by the responses, including the linguistic responses, of suitably placed observers. This entails that the extent to which our intuitions (with a stress on our) can go systematically wrong is constrained. There are further reasons to think that our intuitions in the moral domain are likely to be truth-conducive, reasons which generalize to other areas of enquiry.

 


Quote from: Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory Tamara Horowitz
Quinn appears to assume that anyone who responds to these cases as he does has moral intuitions, which like his, conform to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. After trying several formulations of this doctrine he says, “Perhaps we have found the basic form of the doctrine and the natural qualifications that, when combined with other plausible moral principles, accurately map our moral intuitions”

 . Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (p. 144).
 

But we have intuitions that turn out to be wrong, for example that passage of time is not dependant upon our speed. So the fact that we have an intuition about something does not mean it is right, some of our intuitions turn out to be correct and others do not.

Why is that a problem? (It isn´t).

I am not positing intuitions as infallible, far from it, I am simply saying it is evidence, and not for all types of matters and data (this will depend on many details, the object data, the quality of cognitive state, the possession of relevant categorial and non catergorial knowledge, etc...), and, a defeasible evidence at that, As I said some intuitions are more stable than others, in fact, I quoted researchers that rather take it that intuitions about morality are in a somehat better condition that intuitions about other matters (e.g . intuitions about killing an inocent and defenseless child for fun  vs. intuitions of what the relative delta of  time measurements  depending on our relative speed to one anoter).

We work with defeasible evidence all the time, that just mean we can be wrong, and , further evidence could make us modify or change our conclusion.

Also, I did address considerations about disagreements, and, shortly explained when and why we should take our intuitions as prima-facie evidence (P3), and, when it can become reasonable enough evidence (P4&P5) -still yet defeasible.

If the possibility of being wrong was a deterrant to knowledge we should basically quit all knowlege endevours.

,If i say killing animals for fun is objectively wrong well thats my intuition , so therefore it must be objectively wrong. Correct? My intuition also tells me its wrong not to let gays marry , so again can I say its objectively wrong?

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ParaclitosLogos

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Saying one thinks that x is wrong is not necessarily from an intuition, but ok.

If you have an intuition that  killing animals for fun is objectively wrong, it does not follow that therefore it must be objectively wrong.

But, you have prima-facie (defeasible) evidence that killing animals for fun is objectively wrong, and the same goes for gay marriage. This gets you to step P3.

Quote
P1. My moral intuitions are prima-facie defeasible evidence
P2. I have the intuition that M=necessarily (or contingently), some X is morally wrong given some state of affairs y, as a matter of fact
P3. I have prima facie defeasible evidence that M
P4. I have no other source of reliable evidence that can defeat my intuition that M
P5. I have no other direct intuitions that can defeat my intuition that M
P6: I am justified in believing M.