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Ontological Argument

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joncantey

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Re: Van Inwagen's "Knowno's"
« Reply #15 on: June 20, 2016, 08:39:43 pm »
...However, I think Van Inwagen casts doubt on the ability to evaluate that premise as being true.  Not that he demonstrates it as false though; simply that we might not have a reason to accept it.

Is Van Inwagen’s assertion simply a more narrow restatement of the more general Atheological Premise (i.e. “it is possible that a MGB doesn’t exist”)?  If so, doesn't this at best only leave us with a stalemate of epistemic uncertainty (like you seem to be concluding) -- i.e. agnosticism?  Is the purpose of the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA) to address epistemic certainty?

This seems to me not an attack on the MOA, since the premise being addressed is whether a MGB possibly exists (metaphysically or broadly logically possible) -- not whether some contradictory premise is conceivable or even epistemically possible.

I think we have to look at other arguments for whether it is more rational to believe that a MGB possibly exists or whether a knowno exists.

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James

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Re: Van Inwagen's "Knowno's"
« Reply #16 on: August 19, 2016, 08:44:48 am »
...However, I think Van Inwagen casts doubt on the ability to evaluate that premise as being true.  Not that he demonstrates it as false though; simply that we might not have a reason to accept it.

This seems to me not an attack on the MOA, since the premise being addressed is whether a MGB possibly exists (metaphysically or broadly logically possible)

Isn't "possibly, a maximally great being exists" that part of the MOA?  Is looks to me like a challenge to one of the premises in the argument.

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joncantey

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Re: Van Inwagen's "Knowno's"
« Reply #17 on: August 19, 2016, 09:07:08 am »
James, if he isn't demonstrating it as false, then am I to take "we might not have a reason to accept it" as merely indicating potential for epistemic doubt?  If that's the case, then that doesn't address the premise (which is ontological not epistemological).  Am I misunderstanding the difference between these two in your statement?

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lucious

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Re: Van Inwagen's "Knowno's"
« Reply #18 on: November 10, 2016, 12:47:13 am »
Would a knowno be omniscient? I.e does it believe all true propositions and reject all false ones?


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HIJ

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Re: Van Inwagen's "Knowno's"
« Reply #19 on: November 23, 2016, 03:25:08 pm »
Late to the party on this. But if proper functionalism is correct, then a Knowno cannot exist.