Question to Bertuzzi...The FTA is essentially a "probabilistic argument", yes? Ie, it intends to show that the probability of God is much greater than the probability of brute naturalism, yes? And any probabilistic argument for X is essentially an argument that ~X is at least possible, yes? Ie, if ~X were impossible, we wouldn't try to argue that P(~X) << 1, we'd argue that P(~X) = 0, yes? That said, here is my question...Do you consider it dishonest to use the ontological argument in conjunction with the FTA? After all, FTA leaves the door open to the possibility of not God, and the very possibility of not God renders it necessary that there is no God in the ontological argument.
Hatsoff, could you expand on why "strongly" requires "r"? (LL)
Quote from: ontologicalme on August 25, 2016, 10:23:10 pmHatsoff, could you expand on why "strongly" requires "r"? (LL)Sure. Asserting strong support for T over NSU is tantamount to saying that there is some significant to the degree of support for T over NSU. The value r represents the measurement of that degree. Without r, or something comparable, it does not follow that the support for T over NSU is strong.
Bertuzzi,What do you think the best objection to the FTA is?