I think you are not informed enough about Plantinga´s modal ontological argument. Plantinga´s argument does not assume existence is a property, as your comments seem to indicate:
Quote“So existence and necessary existence are not themselves perfections, but necessary conditions of perfection.” (Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic & Philosophy) (p. 214). Oxford University Press)Also, Plantinga´s argument does not define a MGB as existing, but, rather argues for the possibility of the property of maximal greatness being exemplified. That there is a property does not imply it obtains in actuality, so, your objections rather miss the target, completely
“So existence and necessary existence are not themselves perfections, but necessary conditions of perfection.” (Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic & Philosophy) (p. 214). Oxford University Press)
That you think that Possible worlds only exist as ideas in our brains implies that things could not have been different. In other words, that it is impossible that things are not the way they are. This is by far not a view most people hold, rather we all think that if we do things one way or the other different results will ensue. So, I´d like to see an argument for that conclusion. After all, the burden of proof is on those making claims of what is the case and what is impossible.
Obviously this analogy is intended to show absurdity of defining MGB as existing being and calling it "proof".
But I know you don't think existence has anything to do with MGB definition so I'll wait until you explain how otherwise you come up with existence given that MGB is new being that one makes up in one's mind.
I don't understand why would you demand anyone to respect anyone's worldview.
QuoteBut I know you don't think existence has anything to do with MGB definition so I'll wait until you explain how otherwise you come up with existence given that MGB is new being that one makes up in one's mind.No - the concept of an MGB may be in someone's mind - the MGB itself isn't. (Likewise, the concept of possible worlds may be in someones mind; the worlds themselves aren't. After all, the actual world is a possible world, and it is not in my or your mind.)
Existence of the MGB is derived first through A5, which brings one from ◊□S to □S, and then M, which takes the step from □S to S. Of course it needs the initial input of ◊□S - if that isn't true, the argument ends up showing that an MGB cannot exist - because if a necessary being does not exist, it cannot exist.So the argument hinges critically on the premiss that an MGB is possible, that, using possibilist terminology, there actually exists a possible world with an MGB, and defenders of the argument have a burden of proof there. Merely thinking that such a possible world might exist won't cut it: it needs to be shown or made plausible that it actually does exist.
So basically speaking to make modal ontological argument for the existence of god working we have to independently prove that god exists.
And it's possible that UnicornPlus necessarily exists.
How do you argue that? Such a unicorn would be an existent, an ens, an entity - so how would you go about arguing that it can have necessary existence? Or are you claiming that U+ is also existence itself, i.e. God with the extra property of always incarnating in the shape of a unicorn? Then you'd have to argue that it is impossible for God not to incarnate in that way - otherwise such incarnation is merely something that God can do, and you are back with basically the orthodox notion of God..
But for now I'd be happy if you could explain why do you think may counterexample doesn't fly.
There are many issues here and I'd still like to know what's your standpoint, does any of these arguments prove anything of practical impact, or are we just dealing with logical exercise? In other words, is this argument both valid and sound or just valid?
1. For one thing I can just say that it's possible that natural world exists necessarily. You can't deny it without begging the question.
2. I think it's false dichotomy that god either cannot exist or he exists necessarily.
But I don't see anything wrong with mere saying that it's possible that god exist without using word necessary.
3. I don't see how does it follow that introducing necessary god to every possible world somehow automatically means god is all existence.
Maybe I'm wrong but isn't it perfectly plausible that there may be more than one necessary being? Aren't number necessary for example?
4. It's just came to my mind, since we don't define as necessary, what if we formulate our premise differently, namely it's possible that it's necessary that god doesn't exist.
I can perfectly imagine that there may be some logical or metaphysical, and certainly physical obstacles against the concept of omnipotent disembodied mind.
5. Even if all objections you wrote were perfectly spot on I could still cut out almost everything. We don't need omnibenevolence here, nor omniscience, nor personality.
Or I can switch from omnibenevolence to omnimalevolence so already at this point you have to admit you can't prove omnibenevolent god using this agument because it may be used to prove god of evil too.
If you really want something that may be easily imaginable as necessary I can come up with some mystical impersonal energy capable of creating universes.
However I think it's dangerously similar to quantum vacuum and we can skip word mystical completely thus reducing this case to just one nation, namely natural world may exist necessarily.
6. I still can't detect any transit between logical constructs and factual world.
Every possible world we're talking about here is just idea or concept, when we refer to actual world what we in fact mean is concept of actual world that exists as an idea in our mind.
Yep, that is basically what brute existence is - except that it isn't an energy, because energy would make it an existent again, requiring something greater to explain it.
@ AI Graham.Just like Quantification in general quantification of maximality does not depend on numbers having maximal value.For example (it´s just an example), one can take it that Maximal greatness is to have all perfections relevant to God´s divine nature, not one less , not one more.Or have it that perfect goodness is to be the paradigm of the highest good itself, there is no higher good , and no less than that, and, so on. These are forms of quantification that has no dependance whatsoever with numbers.
Quote from: ontologicalme on November 03, 2016, 04:22:46 am@ AI Graham.Just like Quantification in general quantification of maximality does not depend on numbers having maximal value.For example (it´s just an example), one can take it that Maximal greatness is to have all perfections relevant to God´s divine nature, not one less , not one more.Or have it that perfect goodness is to be the paradigm of the highest good itself, there is no higher good , and no less than that, and, so on. These are forms of quantification that has no dependance whatsoever with numbers.In one sense I agree with you, and I admit it seems rather crude to try to impose mathematical logic on our understanding of God's nature. But the point I was making concerns the use of the term 'maximal'. Goodness is simply goodness, and greatness is simply greatness. And if I could express this in a numerical way: the number 'one' in the set consisting only of the number 'one' is both the maximum and minimum member of the set. A maximum that is also a minimum is, of course, an absurdity. One cannot talk about something being 'maximal' when it is indivisible and therefore not distributable in different measures. The perfect qualities of God, though imperfectly reflected in man, are not divisible. The language of 'maximum', 'minimum', "more than", "less than", even when applied to qualities, even moral qualities, is the language of quantification, even if the 'measures' used are entirely abstruse. I put together the following line of argument:1. "Maximal greatness" is "greatness to a maximum degree".2. 'Degree' implies the existence of a scale.3. A scale is, in principle, measurable.4. Anything measurable consists of measures.5. There is no maximum measure in an unbounded infinite set.6. Therefore the set of "measures of greatness" is bounded if "maximal greatness" exists.7. If God possesses maximal greatness, then God's greatness is bounded.8. God, by definition, is the highest authority in all respects, and is therefore not bounded by anything other than Himself.9. Therefore God cannot possess "maximal greatness" (except by question begging if God Himself is the bound by which maximal greatness is defined)or His greatness cannot be described as 'maximal' or if "maximal greatness" is part of the definition of God, then God does not existor God exists and is bounded by something other than Himself and thus cannot be the highest authority, because whatever defines the boundary at which God's greatness operates is greater than God, and thus "being the highest authority" is not part of the definition of God,or if it is, then God does not exist.The only conclusion acceptable to a theist is this: God is great, but His greatness cannot be described as 'maximal'. This does not denigrate His greatness, because there is no need to compare His greatness with any other greatness, because no other greatness exists.There is no greatness other than the greatness of God, and any other true greatness is merely a reflection of God's greatness. Since there is only one greatness, then it cannot be 'maximal' - and to repeat the example I gave above - in the same way that the number one in the set consisting only of the number one is neither the maximum nor minimum member of the set or it is both. A maximum that is also a minimum is not a maximum at all.The idea of "maximal greatness" applied to God is, paradoxically, an expression of creaturely hubris, as it implies that other 'greatnesses' actually exist (potentially in competition with God's greatness, despite being inferior), and thus denies created reality's entire dependence on God, who is the source of all that is good and great. Thus, ironically, the idea of "maximal greatness", when applied to God, undermines the greatness of God. Interestingly, Jesus Himself stated that "there is no one good but God", when He Himself was referred to as "good teacher". Goodness is therefore a singularity unique to God and therefore cannot operate on any kind of moral or spiritual sliding scale which defines the concepts of 'maximum' and 'minimum'.Also... from where do we derive the standard by which we judge greatness and maximal greatness? If God ultimately provides the standard by which we judge His attributes and qualities, is this not a form of question begging?