Ontologicalme raises a couple of issues in his reply post. He writes:AP3 begs the question against necessary truths, or/and it is a non sequitur, since it is true that possible worlds can be formed by the negation of different conjuncts in a maximal description, but this does not imply that it must be the negation of each and every conjunct, some conjuncts staty the same, while others are negated.There is a possible world where 2+2=4 , but, possible worlds can be formed by the negation of different conjuncts in a maximal description, so it is possible that it is not the case that 2+2=4 .What reasons are there to accept that it is possible that it is not the case that 2+2=4? AP3 reads: "IIf a maximally excellent being exists in some possible world and since possible worlds can be formed by the negation of different conjuncts in a maximal description, then a maximally excellent being does not exist in some (other) possible world." I do not see why AP3 begs the question against necessary truths because, in the first place, the ontological argument concerns itself with concrete entities, and not with abstract entities (e.g., numbers) and their logical or mathematical relations. Moreover, while it is verbally possible to assert that the proposition that 2+2=4 is false in some logically possible worlds, Plantinga, Craig, and your truly would maintain that because this assertion is a negation of a logically necessary truth it is, therefore, logically necessarily false. Next, the notion of a maximally excellent being is patently logically coherent and is analytically prior to the notion of a maximally great being. The RF video fails to mention that Craig in his writings defines a maximally great being in terms of a maximally excellent being (i.e., that a maximally great being is a maximally excellent being that exists in all possible worlds). Finally, AP3 conforms to the definitions and basic rules pertaining to possible worlds semantics (as expounded by Plantinga and Craig), as the reader of my essay ("A Critique of the Plantinga Version of the Modal Ontological Argument" [available at http://infidels.org/library/modern/arnold_guminski/]).