lucious

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Re: Where is the evidence that an immaterial, timeless, mind created universe?
« Reply #30 on: February 23, 2017, 05:59:27 am »
The term Creator is derived from considering the fact the cause of time is an instance of ontological creation. Time, the universe is caused to be without the assumption of any antecedent metaphysical scheme or potency in anything else. Not even the potency for the existence of the universe predates its coming to be--there is nothing or nowhere for that potency to be itself, to be adduced out of something else (which is every instance of causation we see in mutable, changeable reality)

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bruce culver

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The term Creator is derived from considering the fact the cause of time is an instance of ontological creation. Time, the universe is caused to be without the assumption of any antecedent metaphysical scheme or potency in anything else. Not even the potency for the existence of the universe predates its coming to be--there is nothing or nowhere for that potency to be itself, to be adduced out of something else (which is every instance of causation we see in mutable, changeable reality)

Not sure i get what you are saying, but why does time have to have a cause? If time is a property of the universe and the universe is uncaused, then time is uncaused also. Even if time does not prove to be fundamental, it's still conceivable that it is an emergent property of a timeless physical universe. This attempt to bring personality into the picture seems heavily forced to me. Especially given the fact that the only experience we have of personality is associated with the existence of sentient beings. What reason is there to even think that timeless/immaterial person is a coherent concept?
"The world is my country and my religion is to do good."

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lucious

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Actually your objection here is just an objection to p2.


If there is a state of affairs where the universe exists timelessly, this is a violation of begins to exist and the universe is precluded.


I don't think this option is conceptually plausible or supported by evidence. Read Jim Sinclairs posts on this --he has an account here. Really good and thoughtful stuff.


Besides, I think the universe being both timeless and temporal like this causes incoherency issues--namely that this seems to imply that the universe would just be timeless per se, and what you call 'the cause' is just a deeper structural level of the universe grounding it--but no coherent way of talking about a logical and conceptual separation between the universe and its cause.

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bruce culver

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Actually your objection here is just an objection to p2.


If there is a state of affairs where the universe exists timelessly, this is a violation of begins to exist and the universe is precluded.


I don't think this option is conceptually plausible or supported by evidence. Read Jim Sinclairs posts on this --he has an account here. Really good and thoughtful stuff.


Besides, I think the universe being both timeless and temporal like this causes incoherency issues--namely that this seems to imply that the universe would just be timeless per se, and what you call 'the cause' is just a deeper structural level of the universe grounding it--but no coherent way of talking about a logical and conceptual separation between the universe and its cause.

Well, you may be right on this point, but it seems a bit off the topic. I was responding to the argument generally not in the context of my argument against premise 1 of the KCA but the KCA in general as it relates to Dr. Craig's arguments that the supposed cause of the universe must be a timeless, immaterial person/mind, and the my sense of the questionable coherence of that idea.
"The world is my country and my religion is to do good."

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stuartr

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"Where is the evidence that an immaterial, timeless, mind created universe?" the OP asked.

As long as you accept the view of the universe supported by science, then in no way will it be possible for anyone to prove the existence of such a "mind", or God, because every avenue is closed by the very definition of that "mind". Consequently, if the existence of such a "mind" is unproven, then there can be no evidence for any assertion that it is responsible for the creation of said universe.

But, what if science is mistaken? What if there were a realisation of Copernican proportions?

The OP asked for evidence, a link to some paper that provides it. I have just read an account that turns science on its head and provides just the evidence needed. The writer has produced a gentle, occasionally amusing, but always cogent and compelling argument that, in my view, constitutes the only possible evidence for or proof of an immaterial, timeless mind and it's role in the creation of our universe. This account fully satisfies the OP's request, but also answers the perennial question on the lips of millions: Does God exist?

I refer back to "The OP asked for evidence, a link to some paper" and on this basis alone I recommend Googling 'My God: Welcome To The Reality' by James Harvey.

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nswoll

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Re: Where is the evidence that an immaterial, timeless, mind created universe?
« Reply #35 on: February 28, 2018, 07:46:28 pm »
 If one assumes our universe came into existence due to the "death" of the previous universe than the entire premise of "timeless, personal,  immaterial" completely falls apart.  And this assumption is much more plausible than a god.

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lucious

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That would put the discussion back within the scope of premise 2.

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Where it is?

Can you please link some paper which proves it?

I mean seriously,without it KCA is just typical god of the gaps argument.

"Once again science can't explain something. Therefore we're going to say that goddidit! Nevermind we tried it for centuries and always failed"

Really, you can't just say that because we don't have the answer, goddidit is somehow correct by default. That's now how it works. I can just say that all our reality is a matrix and aliens who did it live in perfectly explained, eternal universe. For multiple reasons it's much better expalation than "goddidit".

So I'm asking: Where is any scientific evidence that disembodied, immaterial, timeless, powerful, inteligent mind created our universe?

I think a better question would be: why do you think there must be scientific evidence of the existence of a disembodied, immaterial, timeless, powerful and intelligent mind to accept the conclusion? What is your justification? (do you have some academic bibliography that stipulate that or is your subjetive preference?) Science works with physical reality, and the inferred cause is non-physical, so your question is similar to asking:

Why i don't find evidence in favor of atheism with my metal detector? Well, because metal detectors are not made for that. You are using the wrong tool.

What you should look for are good deductive, abductive and inductive reasons in favor of that. And there are several.

Now, do not forget that the kalam is a deduction that proves the existence of immaterial minds. You do not need to prove that there are immaterial minds before the kalam (only that these are metaphysical possibilities, so that they are legitimate candidates), the kalam proves it (that is their conclusion).

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Pieter

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I think a better question would be: why do you think there must be scientific evidence of the existence of a disembodied, immaterial, timeless, powerful and intelligent mind to accept the conclusion? What is your justification? (do you have some academic bibliography that stipulate that or is your subjetive preference?) Science works with physical reality, and the inferred cause is non-physical,

Good point. I was thinking: Can you prove scientifically that there must always be scientific evidence for anything? What lab experiment can you do to prove that only scientific evidence is valid or shows truth?
Pieter van Leeuwen

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Pieter

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Whatever [caused] the first event couldn't be condtioned by time. I think tied into this is the personal nature of the cause as well, since the only way the counterfactual scenario where the universe doesn't exist, and the cause exists sans the universe, is if the cause is personal. That is the only ontological condition where the cause and effect can be counterfactually disentangled.

That leap from cause to creator is where I think the argument is at its weakest. So Craig points out that the causal relationship here must be object-event causation. But why think the object must be a person? He seems to assume that persons are the only sort of thing that can stand in that sort of relationship, but why should anyone think that?

Edit: In fact, to motivate agent causation in the first place as a form of LFW, don't incompatibilists have to point to examples of impersonal objects standing in object-event causal relationships? If object-event causation must be unique to persons, then it is a very queer sort of causation that we have no reason to believe in other than a very roundabout argument from LFW. That's a very tenuous thing to base the Kalam on.

Why this object-event causation must be personal? The way I see it is that an impersonal cause has its explanation externally. A personal cause has its explanation internally, i,e. is self-initiating by an act of will based on reason. An impersonal cause without an external explanation has no explanation at all.

I find Aquinas' explanation quite helpful. A stick can either be potentially on fire or actually on fire. The explanation why it may be on fire is external, i.e. set on fire by another stick for example.
A person raising her arm does not have an external explanation, but an internal one, i.e. she has a reason to raise her arm and decides freely to do it.

Of course, a deterministic mind cannot be the case as this would have an external explanation (its actions are determined by natural forces outside itself). Therefore, the mind we are talking about must possess libertarian freewill. You can't get much more personal than that :)
Pieter van Leeuwen

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Tom Paine

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Whatever [caused] the first event couldn't be condtioned by time. I think tied into this is the personal nature of the cause as well, since the only way the counterfactual scenario where the universe doesn't exist, and the cause exists sans the universe, is if the cause is personal. That is the only ontological condition where the cause and effect can be counterfactually disentangled.

That leap from cause to creator is where I think the argument is at its weakest. So Craig points out that the causal relationship here must be object-event causation. But why think the object must be a person? He seems to assume that persons are the only sort of thing that can stand in that sort of relationship, but why should anyone think that?

Edit: In fact, to motivate agent causation in the first place as a form of LFW, don't incompatibilists have to point to examples of impersonal objects standing in object-event causal relationships? If object-event causation must be unique to persons, then it is a very queer sort of causation that we have no reason to believe in other than a very roundabout argument from LFW. That's a very tenuous thing to base the Kalam on.

Why this object-event causation must be personal? The way I see it is that an impersonal cause has its explanation externally. A personal cause has its explanation internally, i,e. is self-initiating by an act of will based on reason. An impersonal cause without an external explanation has no explanation at all.

I find Aquinas' explanation quite helpful. A stick can either be potentially on fire or actually on fire. The explanation why it may be on fire is external, i.e. set on fire by another stick for example.
A person raising her arm does not have an external explanation, but an internal one, i.e. she has a reason to raise her arm and decides freely to do it.

Of course, a deterministic mind cannot be the case as this would have an external explanation (its actions are determined by natural forces outside itself). Therefore, the mind we are talking about must possess libertarian freewill. You can't get much more personal than that :)

The problem is libertarian free will is implausible. Or least I don't see any way how it could work.

1. A decision is either a determined or undetermined event(law of excluded middle)
2. Events that are undetermined are random  (If you disagree, give an example of a non random but undetermined event)
3. A decision is either determined or random (from 1&2)
4. A determined event is not a freely chosen event, because the causal chain necessarily stretches back beyond anything the choosing agent can control.
5. An undetermined event is not a freely chosen event. (This seems self-evident)
6. A decision is not a freely chosen event.

Where does this argument go wrong? In order for the causal chain for an event to be initiated within a sentient being the initiation of that causal chain would have to be itself uncaused. That's just trivially true.  Uncaused causes are not contingent, which means they are necessary in the ontological sense.

Hmmm. OK, I think i see that there is an ontological sense of "necessity." However, i would argue that most of the time the term is being used it is being used in an epistemic sense and this causes all kinds of confusion in arguments over ontology, IMO.  It seems the ontological sense just mean not contingent, and or uncaused.

I'm not sure how to argue for it, but it seems to me that there can be only one uncaused cause and that would be the first cause, everything else must be contingent upon that, unless of course quantum, or some other sort of indeterminacy exists, but I fail to see how that helps the case for LFW.

So, how do imagine LFW works?

I mean I agree that the proximal cause of any of our decisions is some kind of faculty proper to ourselves. However, tha does not make the decisions made undetermined. The decisions are determined by the circumstance pertinent to the decision and the nature or character of the faculty involved. However, what determined the nature and/or character of that faculty. It's not self-determined. It's determined by causal chain that necessarily reaches back to the first cause.

So again, how do you make sense of the concept of LFW? Nobody so far has ever given me an adequate explanation.

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jayceeii

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The problem is libertarian free will is implausible. Or least I don't see any way how it could work.

1. A decision is either a determined or undetermined event(law of excluded middle)
2. Events that are undetermined are random  (If you disagree, give an example of a non random but undetermined event)
3. A decision is either determined or random (from 1&2)
4. A determined event is not a freely chosen event, because the causal chain necessarily stretches back beyond anything the choosing agent can control.
5. An undetermined event is not a freely chosen event. (This seems self-evident)
6. A decision is not a freely chosen event.

Where does this argument go wrong? In order for the causal chain for an event to be initiated within a sentient being the initiation of that causal chain would have to be itself uncaused. That's just trivially true.  Uncaused causes are not contingent, which means they are necessary in the ontological sense.

Hmmm. OK, I think i see that there is an ontological sense of "necessity." However, i would argue that most of the time the term is being used it is being used in an epistemic sense and this causes all kinds of confusion in arguments over ontology, IMO.  It seems the ontological sense just mean not contingent, and or uncaused.

I'm not sure how to argue for it, but it seems to me that there can be only one uncaused cause and that would be the first cause, everything else must be contingent upon that, unless of course quantum, or some other sort of indeterminacy exists, but I fail to see how that helps the case for LFW.

So, how do imagine LFW works?

I mean I agree that the proximal cause of any of our decisions is some kind of faculty proper to ourselves. However, tha does not make the decisions made undetermined. The decisions are determined by the circumstance pertinent to the decision and the nature or character of the faculty involved. However, what determined the nature and/or character of that faculty. It's not self-determined. It's determined by causal chain that necessarily reaches back to the first cause.

So again, how do you make sense of the concept of LFW? Nobody so far has ever given me an adequate explanation.
This is one of the most important questions, and it hasn’t been addressed in religion before now. The reason it hasn’t been addressed is that to fully understand the question and its answer requires self-awareness as created soul. Though Christians, for instance, recite in their liturgies that God made them, in fact they remain in deep rebellion against the Creator. One sign of this is that they have outlawed the appearance of more prophets.

The reason the question and answer cannot be understood without self-awareness as spirit, is that one has to know what one is, in essence, before statements about what one is can be comprehended. If you talk about the soul to one who has not seen the soul, he thinks about a bag of gas or perhaps a chart he saw on a Hindu website (Christians have no theories about the soul). Furthermore, those who are not aware of the soul are not fully self-determining, their lives dictated by the push and pull of the senses. They are not free.

Presuming someone with self-awareness reads this (which may not be possible on this world), the question resolves to whether God can make a fully self-determining entity. Another way to put the question is whether the entity could do things and not find God smiling knowingly, saying, “I knew you’d do that.” The question goes to a high level, because in a way it might seem good that God could predict all that could or would be done. To find the Maker smiling that you had done the good He intended, might be gratifying or fulfilling. The trouble is that the entity is not different from a machine.

The question can then be put, whether it is possible to truly be God’s friend. Has God made friends, or machines? A friend cannot be predicted, where a machine can be. It can be added here that without contact with God, the creatures have no way of knowing directly whether God knew all that they could or would do. The Christians theorize that the Lord has contact with God, and if so then He knows whether He is truly free, and may be able to state the case of the creatures too. Between themselves, the creatures cannot predict one another except in general ways, yet this has no bearing on the relation to God.

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Tom Paine

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The problem is libertarian free will is implausible. Or least I don't see any way how it could work.

1. A decision is either a determined or undetermined event(law of excluded middle)
2. Events that are undetermined are random  (If you disagree, give an example of a non random but undetermined event)
3. A decision is either determined or random (from 1&2)
4. A determined event is not a freely chosen event, because the causal chain necessarily stretches back beyond anything the choosing agent can control.
5. An undetermined event is not a freely chosen event. (This seems self-evident)
6. A decision is not a freely chosen event.

Where does this argument go wrong? In order for the causal chain for an event to be initiated within a sentient being the initiation of that causal chain would have to be itself uncaused. That's just trivially true.  Uncaused causes are not contingent, which means they are necessary in the ontological sense.

Hmmm. OK, I think i see that there is an ontological sense of "necessity." However, i would argue that most of the time the term is being used it is being used in an epistemic sense and this causes all kinds of confusion in arguments over ontology, IMO.  It seems the ontological sense just mean not contingent, and or uncaused.

I'm not sure how to argue for it, but it seems to me that there can be only one uncaused cause and that would be the first cause, everything else must be contingent upon that, unless of course quantum, or some other sort of indeterminacy exists, but I fail to see how that helps the case for LFW.

So, how do imagine LFW works?

I mean I agree that the proximal cause of any of our decisions is some kind of faculty proper to ourselves. However, tha does not make the decisions made undetermined. The decisions are determined by the circumstance pertinent to the decision and the nature or character of the faculty involved. However, what determined the nature and/or character of that faculty. It's not self-determined. It's determined by causal chain that necessarily reaches back to the first cause.

So again, how do you make sense of the concept of LFW? Nobody so far has ever given me an adequate explanation.
This is one of the most important questions, and it hasn’t been addressed in religion before now. The reason it hasn’t been addressed is that to fully understand the question and its answer requires self-awareness as created soul. Though Christians, for instance, recite in their liturgies that God made them, in fact they remain in deep rebellion against the Creator. One sign of this is that they have outlawed the appearance of more prophets.

The reason the question and answer cannot be understood without self-awareness as spirit, is that one has to know what one is, in essence, before statements about what one is can be comprehended. If you talk about the soul to one who has not seen the soul, he thinks about a bag of gas or perhaps a chart he saw on a Hindu website (Christians have no theories about the soul). Furthermore, those who are not aware of the soul are not fully self-determining, their lives dictated by the push and pull of the senses. They are not free.

Presuming someone with self-awareness reads this (which may not be possible on this world), the question resolves to whether God can make a fully self-determining entity. Another way to put the question is whether the entity could do things and not find God smiling knowingly, saying, “I knew you’d do that.” The question goes to a high level, because in a way it might seem good that God could predict all that could or would be done. To find the Maker smiling that you had done the good He intended, might be gratifying or fulfilling. The trouble is that the entity is not different from a machine.

The question can then be put, whether it is possible to truly be God’s friend. Has God made friends, or machines? A friend cannot be predicted, where a machine can be. It can be added here that without contact with God, the creatures have no way of knowing directly whether God knew all that they could or would do. The Christians theorize that the Lord has contact with God, and if so then He knows whether He is truly free, and may be able to state the case of the creatures too. Between themselves, the creatures cannot predict one another except in general ways, yet this has no bearing on the relation to God.

Sorry, I don't see how any of that actually addressed the issue of whether LFW is a coherent concept. It seems you are saying it is a mystery that can only be solved through divine revelation. OK, but I don't believe in divine revelation and I also do not believe in LFW. If God ever chooses to reveal the mystery of LFW to me, then I will be glad to consider it, but until then it seems mere speculation that it may exist in some mysterious way. OK, but that doesn't in any way increase my confidence that it does actually exist.