Can AiL kill the KCA?

[searcherman]

Maybe, I can't wait to read.

I submit it is unknowable, hidden behind the veil of the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB). We are limited by our technology. There is no design, the CMB has random fluctuations. To assert mind preceded matter is incapable of proof.

[lucious]

Why are you reposting my thread in here? This forum has next to no traffic.

[Atheist in Louisiana]

Copied and pasted from the thread over in the CYOT section:

This is Craig's latest version:

(1) If the universe began to exist, then its beginning has a cause.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) The beginning of the universe has a cause.

Well, if that's the chosen form of the argument you'd like me to debunk, so be it.

The short version:

A. In order for premise 2 to be remotely sound, premise 1 would be unsound.
B. In order for premise 1 to be remotely sound, premise 2 would be unsound.
C. In order for both premises to be remotely sound, an equivocation is committed.


The longer version:

Concerning A.:

Based on current human understanding, the only way in which the universe can be said to have "began to exist" is in that it likely had a prime temporal point.  In order for premise 2 to be somewhat sound (read as probably more likely true than false), it would have to read "(2) The universe had a prime temporal point."  In order for the syllogism to be valid, it would have to be reworded as follows:

(1) If the universe had a prime temporal point, then the beginning of the universe had a cause.
(2) The universe had a prime temporal point.
(3) The beginning of the universe had a cause.

Unfortunately, upon doing this, (1) becomes pure speculation and is less likely to be true than its previous form of "If the universe began to exist, then its beginning has a cause." which is itself very controversial.  A syllogism with a premise that has not been established as true (as opposed to just more likely true than false) cannot be said to yield a true conclusion.

Concerning B.:

Premise 1 is basically a version of the PSR.  It's pretty uncontroversial to say that something which changed from a state of not existing to a state of existing, had a cause for that change.  Other meanings are far more controversial, but that one is pretty obvious and what is meant by (1) in the argument.  That meaning makes the first premise pretty uncontroversial, so we can rewrite premise 1 as the following:

(1) If the universe went from a state of not existing to a state of existing, then the beginning of the universe had a cause.

In order to have a valid syllogism with that premise, the argument would have to be rewritten as follows:

(1) If the universe went from a state of not existing to a state of existing, then the beginning of the universe had a cause.
(2) The universe went from a state of not existing to a state of existing.
(3) The beginning of the universe had a cause.

Unfortunately, upon doing this, (2) becomes pure speculation and beyond the current abilities of humans to figure out.  Humans are still incapable of piercing the Planck time to figure out if (2) is even a coherent statement.  Humans are completely incapable of demonstrating that (2) is true or false.  For it to be sound, it must be demonstrably true.  It doesn't meet that criteria, and therefore unsound.

Concerning C.:

From B. above, we have a relatively uncontroversial version of (1), so I'll address that first.  Going from a state of not existing to a state of existing, is beginning to exist.  (1) can be rewritten as "(1) If the universe began to exist, then the universe's existence had a cause."  Under that meaning of "began to exist" (1) is easily accepted as being sound.

From A. above, we have a relatively uncontroversial version of (2), so I'll address that now.  Having a prime temporal point can referred to as beginning to exist.  (2) can be rewritten as "(2) The universe began to exist."  Under that meaning of "began to exist" (2) is easily accepted as being sound.

When we put the "new" versions of (1) and (2) together, we get the following syllogism:

(1) If the universe began to exist, then the beginning of the universe had a cause.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) The beginning of the universe had a cause.

As you can see we're left with the original syllogism.  It even makes use of uncontroversial versions of both (1) and (2).  Unfortunately, it uses two different meanings of the phrase "began to exist".  This is the fallacy of equivocation.  If we rewrite the syllogism using the uncontroversial meanings, we're left with:

(1) If the universe sent from a state of not existing to a state of existing, then the universe's existence had a cause.
(2) The universe had a prime temporal point.
(3) The universe's existence had a cause.

With this version, using the uncontroversial versions of the two premises, you can clearly see that the syllogism is invalid.

When people agree to premise 1, they are agreeing that something going from a state of not existing to a state of existing had a cause.  When people (that are adequately informed) agree to premise 2, they are agreeing that the universe had a prime temporal point, not that it went from a state of not existing to a state of existing.  That's the equivocation that can allow two true premises to lead to a false conclusion.  The problem is sloppy language allowing for the equivocation.

[searcherman]

Why are you reposting my thread in here? This forum has next to no traffic.

You're actually making me wish it had even less traffic.

[searcherman]

AiL,
Here's my crude interpretation of your response:

KCA proponents keep two sets of books, time wise. Besides the Planck time we all know and love in the present moment, there's also "divine-time". "Divine-time" is the moment up to and including the moment of the "causing". They invoke the divine-time in one premise, but don't, or can't, in the other, hence the fallacy.

Am I close to getting it?

[lucious]

Why are you reposting my thread in here? This forum has next to no traffic.

You're actually making me wish it had even less traffic.

What is this, apart from a seemingly off-the-cuff attack?


I've given substantive responses to Ail in other threads. His responses, ultimately, are not injurious.

[searcherman]

Why are you reposting my thread in here? This forum has next to no traffic.

You're actually making me wish it had even less traffic.

What is this, apart from a seemingly off-the-cuff attack?


I've given substantive responses to Ail in other threads. His responses, ultimately, are not injurious.

I just want. I want constructive engagement, not old unsubstantiated complaints.

[Atheist in Louisiana]

AiL,
Here's my crude interpretation of your response:

KCA proponents keep two sets of books, time wise. Besides the Planck time we all know and love in the present moment, there's also "divine-time". "Divine-time" is the moment up to and including the moment of the "causing". They invoke the divine-time in one premise, but don't, or can't, in the other, hence the fallacy.

Am I close to getting it?

I'm not sure I follow your description well.  I think you're suggesting that the divine time extends beyond the actual time in order to create time for the causing to happen.  I hadn't considered two instances of time like that, but if that is what the theists are doing, it would explain some thing.

What I was trying to get at, is that the way science establishes a beginning to the existence of the universe isn't the way that people establish a beginning to the existence of anything else.  People hear that science shows a beginning to the universe, and they think it means the same thing as a table beginning to exist.  That's just not true, and results in an equivocation between p1 and p2.

Defining "begins to exist" rigorously always ends up making either of those premises false, so there doesn't seem to be a way to make the argument work.

[lucious]

AiL,
Here's my crude interpretation of your response:

KCA proponents keep two sets of books, time wise. Besides the Planck time we all know and love in the present moment, there's also "divine-time". "Divine-time" is the moment up to and including the moment of the "causing". They invoke the divine-time in one premise, but don't, or can't, in the other, hence the fallacy.

Am I close to getting it?

I'm not sure I follow your description well.  I think you're suggesting that the divine time extends beyond the actual time in order to create time for the causing to happen.  I hadn't considered two instances of time like that, but if that is what the theists are doing, it would explain some thing.

What I was trying to get at, is that the way science establishes a beginning to the existence of the universe isn't the way that people establish a beginning to the existence of anything else.  People hear that science shows a beginning to the universe, and they think it means the same thing as a table beginning to exist.  That's just not true, and results in an equivocation between p1 and p2.

Defining "begins to exist" rigorously always ends up making either of those premises false, so there doesn't seem to be a way to make the argument work.

I'm ultimately at a loss as to why you keep insisting on equivocation. Craig gives a rigorous and unambiguous analysis of the notion of 'begins to exist'.


You, and many others, confuse the accidental how of a beginning to exist, in some cases, with the metaphysical that of becoming. Begins to exist means that it becomes--it is not concerned with the material genesis of that becoming.


I may make a table by rearranging matter, but does this necessitate the locution 'begins to exist' must refer to a prior, material rearrangement? That be how I make a table--but the table doesn't actually begin to exist until the first, tensed moment of its existence.


There will always be some difference between the universe itself and its contents--namely a first moment of time, as opposed to an embedded one--but this is completely harmless until there is a sufficient argument as to why this difference matters. As of now, there is none.

[Atheist in Louisiana]

See my many other responses to you.  I don't feel like rehashing this again.  Go do your homework.

[searcherman]

AiL,
Here's my crude interpretation of your response:

KCA proponents keep two sets of books, time wise. Besides the Planck time we all know and love in the present moment, there's also "divine-time". "Divine-time" is the moment up to and including the moment of the "causing". They invoke the divine-time in one premise, but don't, or can't, in the other, hence the fallacy.

Am I close to getting it?

I'm not sure I follow your description well.  I think you're suggesting that the divine time extends beyond the actual time in order to create time for the causing to happen.  I hadn't considered two instances of time like that, but if that is what the theists are doing, it would explain some thing.

What I was trying to get at, is that the way science establishes a beginning to the existence of the universe isn't the way that people establish a beginning to the existence of anything else.  People hear that science shows a beginning to the universe, and they think it means the same thing as a table beginning to exist.  That's just not true, and results in an equivocation between p1 and p2.

Defining "begins to exist" rigorously always ends up making either of those premises false, so there doesn't seem to be a way to make the argument work.

Thanks, that distills it better for me. My sense of "divine-time" is that it is superseded by Planck time at the moment of the "causing". Since the deity wasn't also created at the causing, the time before was divine-time. Sounds confusing, which tells me that the KCA needs better explanation than just pointing to a WLC YouTube video.

[UnreasonableFaith]

This is Craig's latest version:

(1) If the universe began to exist, then its beginning has a cause.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) The beginning of the universe has a cause.

What't the difference between this version and the old one? To me it's just unnecessarily more complex. Beginning in this case is, I guess, first moment when object X exists. But I don't see how does it change anything.

[lucious]

See my many other responses to you.  I don't feel like rehashing this again.  Go do your homework.

Such a lazy and ill-informed response. Seems as if you've become upset that the reports of your destruction of the KCA were greatly exaggerated, which you would have learned to avoid had you carefully studied Craigs written work and not get carried away with your own hubris.

[searcherman]

See my many other responses to you.  I don't feel like rehashing this again.  Go do your homework.

Such a lazy and ill-informed response. Seems as if you've become upset that the reports of your destruction of the KCA were greatly exaggerated, which you would have learned to avoid had you carefully studied Craigs written work and not get carried away with your own hubris.

Please don't rile up the Fallacy Ref, I'm trying to give him a rest. He finds repeated violations of Appeal to Authority and Personal Incredulity especially tiresome.

[Atheist in Louisiana]

See my many other responses to you.  I don't feel like rehashing this again.  Go do your homework.

Such a lazy and ill-informed response. Seems as if you've become upset that the reports of your destruction of the KCA were greatly exaggerated, which you would have learned to avoid had you carefully studied Craigs written work and not get carried away with your own hubris.

The person who has been reporting a destruction of the KCA has been you.  If those reports are exaggerated, stop exaggerating.  As for the ad-homonym charge of hubris, you'll have to do better.  That was an exceptionally poor attempt. I wonder if I can post a Red Foreman meme pic, or if that would be considered swearing.  Heck, for lucious, it might be worth the warning...