Maxximiliann

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Re: Why is goodness necessarily a property of God?
« Reply #15 on: June 15, 2019, 12:29:39 pm »
If you want them to love you back, they have to know you love them and they are much more likely to know that if they feel it.

So all the philosophizing in the world about God's goodness is meaningless to people who don't feel God's goodness.
You baffle me, because you state that it is possible to “feel” another’s love for you, but I find no such powers or apprehensions within myself. I can feel love for another, but I have no experience of their love for me. If they love me in return there may be occasional subtle signs, but my role in the relationship is to stoke my own love fires. Love isn’t an exchange. I have no power over the love of the other, nor experience of it. It looks like you are going with the historical notion here that love is a form of exchange. But, what are you doing as you wait for the other to love you? Isn’t that laziness or inattentiveness?

Additionally, if one wishes to be loved, one should bends one’s efforts into making oneself worthy of love. Then all rational people will respond with love, and not just in the family. Unfortunately the religions are not of much help here, offering the easy excuse of an inherently sinful nature and failing to present any plan for remaking oneself into a good companion for the other created souls. One has to wonder especially if repeated choruses of “I am a sinner,” would be more pleasing in God’s ears, than, “Let me help.”

If I may, have you ever been diagnosed with ASD?
May the “God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory . . . give you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the accurate knowledge of him." -Ephesians 1:17

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jayceeii

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Re: Why is goodness necessarily a property of God?
« Reply #16 on: July 18, 2019, 06:05:23 pm »
Say we acknowledge for the sake of argument that a malicious Creator/Designer exists. Seeing as this being is evil, that signifies he does not carry out his moral responsibilities. But then exactly where do those come from? Just how can this evil god receive obligations to execute which he is violating? Who prohibits him to do the immoral things that he does? Without hesitation, we discover that such an evil being simply cannot be supreme: there needs to be a being that is even higher than this evil god which is the source of the moral duties which he prefers to shirk, a being that is unqualified goodness Himself. Hence, if god is evil well then there must necessarily exist a maximally splendid, incomparable God that is all powerful, all good as well as all loving; One who is actually the very paradigm of good.
 
Which means that we don’t shower Him with affection for performing His duty. Really He is to be adored for His moral identity as He is fundamentally loving, just, kind, and so on. It is simply because God is that way that all these traits count as virtues to start with. In effect, God Almighty is good the very same way rain is wet, diamond gemstones are hard, photons tear across space at luminous speeds or cerulean suns blaze. Therefore if we envision God’s goodness in terms of His possessing definite virtues as opposed to fulfilling selected duties, we get an infinitely more exalted and correct notion of God.
mm: Say we acknowledge for the sake of argument that a malicious Creator/Designer exists.

jc: It would be more relevant to say for the sake of argument that a Creator/Designer who appears malevolent to human purposes exists. What man is calling good, God may call evil. For instance God may see pollution as a bigger issue than men are able to see, piling the landfills high with barely used consumer goods.

mm: Seeing as this being is evil, that signifies he does not carry out his moral responsibilities.

jc: In the second scenario I’m proposing, humans would think God needs their morality, instead of accepting God’s morality as the standard for themselves. This would be in ignorance of the fact God has the best interests of all souls in mind all the time. In other words, their idea of goodness turns out to be something that will be harmful to them in the long-term.

mm: But then exactly where do those come from?

jc: In the original scenario a fallacy is committed here. Who is going to force God to take on moral responsibilities? God has to choose to be moral. Asking, “Where is he going to get his moral responsibilities” shows the questioner hasn’t understood God stands Alone.

mm: Just how can this evil god receive obligations to execute which he is violating?

jc: The argument begs the question, presuming there to be a higher God, than God. It appears to stem from a certain type of ignorance that presumes God will be under human control, that the creatures can define what God is. The mind appears to be more or less looking over at other humans, then making a facile presumption God is in there too. There is no one above God, to defined God as a “violator.” He must choose to be moral.

mm: Who prohibits him to do the immoral things that he does?

jc: Indeed, there is no one. The argument is circular, presuming a greater God than God.

mm: Without hesitation, we discover that such an evil being simply cannot be supreme: there needs to be a being that is even higher than this evil god which is the source of the moral duties which he prefers to shirk, a being that is unqualified goodness Himself.

jc: First year logic students should be able to pick up the flaw here. It’s a facile comprehension of the word “duty,” as if duty hangs in the air, to settle on anyone’s shoulders, even God. Instead very obviously, the supreme being has no externally derived duties. The discussion of duty is an important one. Humans have duties but these are always from perceived threats or benefits among others of their kind. Angels have duties but these are self-selected, a bit like God’s though God sometimes informs them. Duties are burdens to humans, but blessings to the angels, who rejoice in righteousness.

mm: Hence, if god is evil well then there must necessarily exist a maximally splendid, incomparable God that is all powerful, all good as well as all loving; One who is actually the very paradigm of good.

jc: The flattery is poured on thickly here, but no real being was identified and the actual God is ignored, particularly as He’d oppose the human idea of goodness as this interferes with the long-term good of these same souls. Throwing in “all powerful” and “all loving” are outside the scope of the shallow argument, fallacious as it already was. Only goodness is within the scope, as the discussion began about moral duties. Clearly were there an evil god operating under a maximally splendid God, this latter one could not be all powerful. Nor could he be all loving, since an aspect of goodness is to hate evil.
 
mm: Which means that we don’t shower Him with affection for performing His duty.

jc: I’d dispute that God craves human affection, since what humans love is antithetical to God’s purposes. This argument goes in circle after circle, again insisting this “higher God” is getting His duties from somewhere else. The argument does reflect the general attitude in religion, that the God who is flattered will be one that is under human control.

mm: Really He is to be adored for His moral identity as He is fundamentally loving, just, kind, and so on.

jc: Humans remake God in their own image, in this case forcing God to accept the human definition of goodness, which includes love for the wicked and support for destruction. They adore God while God toes their line, including a larger GNP every year as the definition of progress.

mm: It is simply because God is that way that all these traits count as virtues to start with.

jc: See, why couldn’t the “lesser God” have been this way? No argument has been presented for why God must be good and not evil. He admits the “greater God” is what He is, but why couldn’t the “lesser God” be what He is also, if there really is no “greater God”? I’m not saying God is evil, but that men would define Him as such could they see His true purposes.

mm: In effect, God Almighty is good the very same way rain is wet, diamond gemstones are hard, photons tear across space at luminous speeds or cerulean suns blaze.

jc: I guess our yellow Sun isn’t good enough, the chap has to cite the blue stars! What does he know about blue stars, or the right way of life around yellow ones? These are red herrings, physical analogies where no connection has been shown to what God is like, in invisibility and mystery! He’s found goodness in material objects, he hasn’t found goodness in human life, and he hasn’t found goodness in God, against whom he’d react with hostility and hatred, in a direct encounter with the smallest steps in greater virtue.

mm: Therefore if we envision God’s goodness in terms of His possessing definite virtues as opposed to fulfilling selected duties, we get an infinitely more exalted and correct notion of God.

jc: “Infinitely more exalted” is clearly hyperbolic, where he’s only mentioned diamonds and photons, failing to prove he possesses this exalted view! Again, human won’t be able to define God’s virtues, in fact the angels are constantly nonplussed and amazed that God is not where they’d expect Him to be. He is in a better place, and they have to learn why.

This closing part of the argument annuls the antecedent part, for it is admitted God’s attributes are contained within Himself, where the antecedent proposes God has moral duties. Both sides of the question are being argued. My point is that God’s attributes might not appear virtuous in human terms, but rather inimical to what they define as goodness.