Another way to think about the question:Do value-bearers require value-makers?
Is there anything we value without it having instrumental value, and if not, how would one tell it had intrinsic value?
Perhaps, I didn't answer entirely, but how we tell whether a thing has intrinsic value, or not, is by looking how well it coheres with our experiences. When one says that excessive eating is wrong(has negative value), then we see that it coheres with our experience: it leads to increased immobility, risk of death and so on. And increased mobility is good, because it increases the means to achieve other good things, as well as less risk of detrimental states and so on.So, the system that can best explain our experiences in life, and matches up to them, I would say is the system that has most accurately described the value of things.This is why as of late I argue against all non-Christian positions on the basis of presuppositions(=more systematic way): that the worldview they describe paints things that are good evil and things that are evil good and that doesn't match to our experiences.
To me kravarnik's comments recall the concept of Arisotelian eudaimonia, or the "good life," not in the hedonistic sense but in the virtuous sense. The upshot is we can determine virtues through experiencing and understanding the consequences of our actions. This is essentially the same as acquiring wisdom. We learn that gluttony may be enjoyable in the short term but causes misery in the long term. So, moderation becomes a virtue. Still, this begs the question of whether healthy outcomes themselves have intrinsic value. They have value to me, because I want to be healthy for as long as I live, in order to get the most enjoyment out of life. But that isn't the same as saying healthy outcomes in general have intrinsic value, or that our species continuing to live has intrinsic value. From the point of view of some other life form, we may be seen as insignificant vermin. Self-value doesn't equate to intrinsic.