^ It still does not follow to only that particular conclusion.
..that life as improbable still even with fine-tuning occurred, and that consciousness (a deep mystery that we don't understand) evolved on earth? Sure.
Obviously God has provided enough evidence of His existence.
.. you and Spero are brothers separated at birth..
Is it epistemically possible that there was a brute fact that just happened to be something instead of nothing, that a universe happened to have the properties necessary for expansion, that the laws are complex enough (e.g., matter, dark matter) to develop into galaxies, that the fine-tuning parameters for galaxy formation was "just so," that life was in principle possible despite the "just so" fine-tuning, that life as improbable still even with fine-tuning occurred, and that consciousness (a deep mystery that we don't understand) evolved on earth?
Hahaha, same old Harvey. It is just that we don't all have to jump to a "just so" God explanation.
But, then you are contradicting Wolfram who provided an elaborate structure as a necessary "just so" structure. Necessity is the only thing that epistemically allows for just-so-ness having a reasonable explanation.
I don't think he said that it is a necessary "just so" structure.
Then, looking at all possible ways a given rule can update these hypergraphs, we form what we call a multiway graph. The transversals of this graph define what we call branchial space, in which we can see the pattern of entanglements between quantum states.
Anyway there are those who postulate a self-organizing Turing mechanism, in fact it is argued that it is implied by how it functions. Digital physics is perfectly compatible with quantum information. And we then steer back to those same old debates that we've had way too many times. I don't think we should go through that again.
It turns out that there’s a nice mathematical characterization of rulial multiway graphs for Turing machines: they’re just Cayley graphs of groups that we can call “Turing machine groups”. Why is this? Basically it’s because the possible configurations of a Turing machine have a direct correspondence with transformations that can act on these configurations.
It is not to say mathematics per se is a fundamental property, or divinely encoded. If you believe that our space-time universe is fundamental, well then you might have a point. I don't.
PS. And you seem to have missed Dennett's point completely.
Don't confuse quantum mechanisms with the need for mathematical theorems, and such. That is not what Wolfram was saying, afaik.
By now you get the picture and we end up where we always do. The problem with your thinking though is that you insist on a mind and an already ultra high level of complexity at the start, whereas Carroll does not think that is necessary .. and whereas Dennett puts the mind at a much higher level Turing mechanism .. after having been repeatedly copied and enhanced .. and possibly just an intermediate stage in itself to the next level, AI.
The reason I put a mind at the start is because when we consider necessity as all possible rules or all possible patterns we are discussing a semantic theory of truth which requires a concept of satisfaction which surely implies a mind that is satisfied by that truth.
No, we don't require a "mind". You anthropomorphize nature. Think of it as a quantum (informational) schema. The above is your theory and it is not something that everybody agree on. If we have this kind of copy and enhance process on top of a quantum informational state of affairs, we are all good. Nowhere does Wolfram mention the need for a mind.