20
back
5 / 06
Image of birds flying. Image of birds flying.

#591 Whence Moral Duties?

August 12, 2018
Q

Hi Dr Craig,

I just wanted to start my question off by assuring you of just how revered and appreciated you and your work is in the UK. Your work is considered of the utmost standard by those of us living across the pond!

Recently there has been rather a lot of online hullabaloo regarding a new series of videos on morality (in which the presenter frequently cites your moral argument) by the atheist YouTuber "cosmic sceptic". I'm only bringing this to your attention because of his rather substantial following, especially here in the UK, but in the U.S. as well. His first video was the most controversial. In it he claimed that even if there were a god it would still be impossible to infer objective moral duties. After rather a lot of rambling he eventually reduces his queries to one question, which would seem to be the crux of his argument. "Why ought we do that which is good"? I admit, his question had me a little bamboozled. "Of course we ought to do that which is good", I thought to myself, "there would be no ought if there were no good, ought is just defined that way"! But I soon realized that this would be begging the question. Didn't I need some kind of external reason other that the definition of ought that I ought to do that which was good? In case this becomes a popular slogan/question for sceptics to charge theists with, how might we answer such a query? Your help won't go unnoticed Dr Craig.

Amos

Flag of United Kingdom. United Kingdom

Photo of Dr. Craig.

Dr. craig’s response


A

I haven’t seen Cosmic Sceptic’s critique, Amos, but if your representation of it is accurate, then this poor chap hasn’t even begun to understand the view he criticizes. But because you say that his critique is influential, it’s worth taking the time to correct the mistake.

It seems that he is willing to concede that the theist can plausibly ground moral values, at least, in God. As the greatest conceivable being, God is the paradigm of goodness, and things are good insofar as they resemble God. So far, so good (pun intended)!

But, he asks, “Why ought we do that which is good?” This is a question about the basis of moral duties (our obligations and prohibitions).  Well, why do you think a Divine Command Theory of ethics is called “Divine Command Theory?”  Precisely because it grounds our moral duties in God’s commands! The genius of this theory is that it provides a plausible grounding, not just for moral values, but also for moral duties. Obligations arise as a result of imperatives issued by a competent authority (QoW#165). As the Good itself, God is supremely competent to issue moral commands to us, thereby constituting our moral duties.

So you’re right that “there would be no ought if there were no good.” That’s moral nihilism. But it doesn’t follow that nothing more is needed for moral duties than the Good. Cosmic Sceptic’s question highlights one of the major weaknesses of Atheistic Moral Platonism, which posits an objective Good, all right, but lacks any basis for objective moral duties because the Good is an impersonal, abstract object. On Atheistic Moral Platonism moral vices are just as real and objective as moral values, and there is nothing that obligates us to align our lives with one set of these abstract entities rather than the other.

So the challenge for the atheist is really acute: he has to account for the objectivity not only of moral values but also of moral duties. Even if he postulates a Platonic Good, he has no adequate answer to the question why we ought to do what is good. By contrast, on theism we ought to do what is good because the Good itself has commanded us to do so.

The question then becomes, is a Divine Command Theory of ethics plausible? Here I want to refer you to my recent debate with Erik Wielenberg on “God and Morality: What Is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties?” In this debate, Wielenberg agrees that divine commands can be a source of objective moral duties (in effect, opposing Cosmic Sceptic), but he presses three objections to Divine Command Theory: (1) DCT arbitrarily singles out divine commands as the only possible source of moral obligation; (2) DCT implies that non-believers have no moral obligations, since many people are unaware of God’s commands and authority; and (3) DCT makes morally wrong acts inexplicable, since God inexplicably commands people to do what He knows they won’t do. These are more substantive objections than Cosmic Sceptic’s, which is based merely on a misunderstanding. Watch the debate to see how I handle these objections.

- William Lane Craig