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05 / 06
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The Problem of Suffering and Evil

William Lane Craig at Aalborg University, Denmark

Time : 03:33:00

The problem of innocent suffering--usually called 'the problem of evil' by philosophers--is the most important argument against the existence of God. Dr. Craig differentiates between the emotional and intellectual problems of evil in order to help keep our thinking about this controverted subject clear. He further differentiates between internal and external versions of the intellectual problem of evil, arguing that while the former is generally thought to have been resolved, the latter remains a subject of debate. During his morning lecture Dr. Craig sets up the problem and discuss the internal version; during the afternoon lecture he addresses the external version.

This playlist contains 4 parts.

Organizers: Mogens Pahuus and Peter Øhrstrøm, Applied Philosophy, Aalborg University


INTRODUCTION: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. It is a pleasure to see you and it is a pleasure, on behalf of the Studies of Applied Philosophy to welcome all of you to this seminar on the Problem of Evil. In particular, it is a great pleasure to welcome Professor Dr. William Lane Craig. I have personally been looking forward to your visit and to your lectures here today at Aalborg University.

Dr. Craig received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Communications from Wheaton College in Illinois in 1971 and two summa cum laude Masters Degrees in 1975 in Philosophy of Religion and Ecclesiastical History. He earned his PhD at the University of Birmingham in 1977 and a doctoral degree in theology at the University of Munich in Germany in 1984. Dr. Craig has worked at various universities and since 1996 he has held a position as Research Professor of Philosophy at Biola University, California. Dr. Craig has written a number of books and scientific papers – the list of publications is very, very long. In particular, he has contributed significantly to the philosophy of time and also to the philosophy of what he is doing today. William Lane Craig is going to lecture on one of the most important problems within the philosophy of religion – the problem of evil. Dr. Craig, we are looking forward to your lectures.

[Prior to beginning his lecture, Dr. Craig gives a salutation and some logistics information to his audience. This transcript skips that introductory material.]

DR. CRAIG: To begin, the problem of innocent suffering, or as it is known among philosophers as the problem of evil, is certainly the greatest obstacle to the belief in the existence of God. When I ponder the extent and the depth of human suffering in the world, whether due to man’s own inhumanity to man, which has certainly been in the news recently, or due to natural disasters, then I have to confess that I find it hard to believe in God, and perhaps many of you have felt the same way. Maybe we should just all become atheists.

But, that would be a pretty big step to take, wouldn’t it? Maybe it all fits in to some sort of grand scheme of things. Maybe there is a good reason for why God permits the evil and suffering in the world. How can we be sure that God does not exist, after all? Maybe the suffering for the world is part of God’s plan for humanity which we can only dimly discern if at all. How can we be sure?

As a Christian theist, I am persuaded that the problem of evil, as terrible as it is, does not in the end constitute a disproof of the existence of God. On the contrary, in fact, I think that Christian theism is man’s last best hope of a solution to the problem of evil.

In order to explain why I think this, it will be helpful to draw some distinctions to help keep our thinking clear. First and foremost we need to distinguish between what is called the intellectual problem of evil and the emotional problem of evil. The intellectual problem of evil concerns how to give a rational explanation of the coexistence of God and evil. By contrast, the emotional problem of evil concerns how to dissolve people’s emotional dislike of a God who would permit terrible suffering in the world. The intellectual problem of evil lies in the province of the philosopher. The emotional problem of evil lies in the province of the pastor or the counselor. And I think it is very important to distinguish between these two versions of the problem because the solution to the intellectual problem of evil is apt to appear dry and uncaring to someone who is actually going through terrible, emotional pain. On the other hand, the solution to the emotional problem of evil may appear superficial and inadequate to someone who is contemplating it as an abstract philosophical question. So I think it is quite important that we distinguish between the intellectual problem of evil and the emotional problem of evil. And I suspect, frankly, that for most people the problem of evil is really an emotional problem, not really an intellectual problem. I think that most people have not really thought very deeply about this question but simply react emotionally to the suffering that they experience or see in the world and react negatively against God.

You might say then, why deal with the intellectual problem of evil? Well, simply because unless we can deal with people’s intellectual objections or questions the emotional problem of evil will not come to the surface or will not be solved. People will think the question is intellectual, and therefore it needs to be addressed squarely.

So let’s talk first about the intellectual problem of evil. And as you can see there are two versions of this problem, and these are differently labeled by different philosophers. Usually they are called the logical version of the problem of evil versus the probabilistic version of the problem of evil, or the logical version versus the evidential version of the problem of evil. I have differentiated them sometimes by calling them the internal problem of evil versus the external problem of evil. What are these different versions?

According to the logical version of the problem of evil, it is logically impossible for God and evil to coexist. If God exists then evil cannot exist. If evil exists then God cannot exist. They are like the irresistible force and the immovable object; they cannot both exist in the same world. So, on this view, there is no possible world in which God and the evil and suffering in the world coexist. And since it is obvious that evil and suffering do exist it, therefore, follows that God does not exist. So this would be an argument for atheism based upon the incompatibility of the existence of God and the existence of the suffering and evil in the world. And the reason why I have called this the internal problem of evil is because the belief that evil exists is part and parcel of classical theism, particularly Christian theism. Christians believe that evil is real, that sin is real, that people actually do evil things. And so Christians are committed by their worldview to the reality of evil unlike, for example, Hindus, who believe that evil is merely illusory – the distinction between good and evil is part of the realm of Maya or the realm of illusion; that ultimately evil is not real. Christians believe that evil is real, all too real. And so this is an internal problem, in a sense, for Christian theists because we are committed to the reality of evil, and if evil and God are logically incompatible with each other then our worldview has a contradiction at its very heart – our worldview is logically incoherent, we affirm two logically incompatible things; namely, that God exists and that the evil in the world exists. So, this logical version of the problem of evil can also be understood as, as I say, an internal problem for Christian theists.

As for the probabilistic problem of evil – this would say that it is improbable that God and the evil in the world coexist. This is to say, yes, there may be a logically possible world in which God and evil coexist but nevertheless given the evil in the world it is highly unlikely that God exists, it is highly improbable that God exists. The evil and suffering in the world is such that it is highly improbable God could have morally sufficient reasons for allowing it to occur. And so, given the evil and suffering in the world, it is improbable – if not impossible – that God exists. And, as I say, I call this sometimes the external problem of evil because, although the Christian is committed to the reality of evil, he is not committed to the reality of unnecessary or pointless evil, or as it is sometimes called gratuitous evil. Gratuitous evil would be evil that is unnecessary and pointless, evil for which God has no morally sufficient reason to allow. The Christian is not committed to that. So that is not an internal problem; the Christian is not committed as part of his worldview to the reality of gratuitous evil or pointless, unnecessary evil. So, this probabilistic version could be seen as an external challenge to Christian theism. Given the apparently gratuitous evil in the world it is improbable that God exists.

So those are the two versions of the problem: the logical version and the probabilistic version.

Now, before we discuss these, let me ask if there is any question of a comprehension type concerning these distinctions. Are there any questions that you have about understanding these distinctions that you would like to ask, any clarification? OK, then these distinctions are clearly understood, I take it.

Let’s talk then, first, about the logical version of the problem of evil. The question is: is there a logical contradiction or incompatibility between the two statements:

A. An all-loving, all-powerful God exists.

and

B. The suffering in the world exists.

Are these two statements in fact logically incompatible with each other as the atheist claims who presses the logical version of the problem of evil? Well, the difficulty for the atheist here is that there is no explicit contradiction between A and B; B is not the negation of A, it is not the contradictory of A. So there is no explicit contradiction between affirming that an all-loving, all-powerful God exists and that the suffering or evil exists. So if the atheist is to maintain that A and B are logically incompatible, he must be making some hidden assumptions that would serve to bring out the implicit contradiction and make it explicit. He must be saying that even though A and B are not explicitly contradictory, there is an implicit contradiction between A and B, and that means there must be some hidden assumptions that he is making that would bring out this contradiction and make it explicit. And the question is: what are those hidden assumptions?

Well they seem to be the following:

1. If God is all-powerful then He can create any world that He wants.

and

2. If God is all-loving then He prefers a world without suffering.

Now since A affirms that God is all-powerful and all-loving, it means that God both can create a world without suffering and evil and that He would prefer such a word. Since God both can create such a world and He would prefer such a world it follows that if A is true then suffering or evil does not exist. So if (1) and (2) are true then that would seem to be the hidden assumptions that would render A and B contradictory. So the question is: are assumptions (1) and (2) necessarily true?

Notice that to prove that there is no logically possible world in which God and suffering coexist, (1) and (2) both have to be necessarily true. For there to be no logically possible world where God and suffering both exist (1) and (2) would have to be necessarily true. But are they necessarily true?

Well, let’s think about them. What about (1)? If God is all-powerful, is it necessarily true that He can create any world that He wants? Well it seems to me that this is not necessarily true. Let’s let circles represent various possible worlds that God could have created. Let’s call them W1, W2, W3, and W4, and so on:

These are various possible worlds that are logically possible for God to create. And let’s suppose that in one of these worlds [W2], if Peter were in a certain set of circumstances he would do some evil act. But, in W3, he is in identically the same circumstances, but since it is logically possible for him not to do that act, in W3, in the same set of circumstances, he freely refrains from committing that evil act. So in W2, in one set of circumstances he does the evil act. In W3, in the same set of circumstances, he refrains from doing that evil act. Now, is it true that God can just actualize any possible world that He wants? Well, no. Because it may be the case that if Peter were in those circumstances then he would freely do the evil act, and the only way that God would be able to prevent him from freely doing that evil act would be to change the circumstances, to interfere to prevent him from doing that evil act. Because it is Peter, not God, who determines what he freely does, W3 will not be actualizable by God. It is Peter who determines whether or not the evil act occurs, not God. Given that He grants to Peter significant freedom in those circumstances to do what he wants, W3 is not actualizable by God.

So philosophers will often refer to these worlds [W1, W2, W3, W4, and so on] as possible worlds – these worlds are logically possible – but that does not mean that every logically possible world is feasible for God.  So we can imagine another set of possible worlds and this will be a subset of the set of all possible worlds.

These are often called feasible worlds – worlds that are feasible for God to actualize given the way human creatures would freely choose. And as you can see W3 drops out of the set of feasible worlds. Although W3 is a logically possible world, it is not a feasible world for God. Why? Because if Peter were in exactly those circumstances he would freely choose to do what is evil and therefore W2 would be actual. So W3, though logically possible, is not a world which is feasible for God.

Therefore it follows that (1) is not necessarily true. It is logically impossible to make someone freely do something. That is as logically impossible as making a round square or a married bachelor. So omnipotence or being all-powerful does not mean the ability to do logical impossibilities. So even though God is all-powerful, that does not imply that He can create any world that He wants. There are worlds which are logically possible but they are not feasible for God given the way human creatures would freely choose in various sets of circumstances. So the first assumption is simply not necessarily true. It is not true that in virtue of being all-powerful God can simply create any world that he wants.

Now, let me just say one other thing about this. If you do have a very radical understanding of what it means to be all-powerful and you say, well, if a being is all-powerful then he should be able to make contradictions come true, he should be able to actualize someone’s freely doing something or make that person freely do something. Well then the problem of evil dissolves immediately because, if God can make logical contradictions true then He could bring it about that there is a world in which He exists and in which evil exists even though evil is logically incompatible with His existence. So that would hardly be a good way for the atheist to try to escape this problem of defending assumption (1). If you adopt a definition of omnipotence whereby God can do anything, even logical contradictions, then the problem of evil just vanishes. But if you agree, as virtually all theologians and philosophers do, that omnipotence does not mean the ability to do the logically impossible then it is logically impossible to make someone freely do something. So, given that human agents would freely choose differently in different circumstances, there is going to be a significant difference between worlds that are possible and worlds that are feasible for God. And so assumption (1) is not necessarily true.

Any question about that point with regard to assumption (1)?

===

QUESTION: Could God create a world in which everyone would freely choose to do something right?

DR. CRAIG: There is certainly a possible world somewhere where everybody always chooses to do the right thing, because that is logically possible, right? That is logically possible, that everyone in every moral situation in which he finds himself chooses to do the right thing. And so there would never be evil in such a world, it would be a sinless world. Yes, that is possible. But you see, it may not be feasible. It may be that in every world of moral agents in which people find themselves in moral circumstances that someone would go wrong at some point and not do the right thing. So it may be that even though a sinless world is possible in and of itself it is not feasible for God. And, if that is the case, then (1) is simply not necessarily true.                                                                    

FOLLOWUP: The concern is that people make their choices within certain circumstances and so I think you're saying that by fiddling with the circumstances God could bring it about that the person would always choose the right thing.

DR. CRAIG: The important thing to remember here is that these are freedom-permitting circumstances. We must not think of the circumstances as causally determining how people would choose. In other words, this distinction is assuming the reality of libertarian freedom, that one is not determined, and it is saying that if libertarian freedom is possible (and that certainly seems to be the case) then this distinction between possible worlds and feasible world comes into play, and then there is just no guarantee that there is any feasible world in which God fiddles with the circumstances so that everybody always would freely do the right thing. Now certainly He could make a deterministic world in which everybody did what He determined them to do but then that would not be a morally significant world, that would be a puppet world or a robot world in which good or evil don’t even really exist.

QUESTION: We are making the assumption that God is all-powerful. But is this assumption really necessary in the sense that God may be powerful in a way that, in the end, He may prove his own omnipotence differently? But, as it is now, we are still in the process [of understanding what it means]. It seems to me that sometimes we have an assumption and even in the Bible perhaps sometimes it is a bit confusing whether the omnipotence factor is clear . . .

DR. CRAIG: I am working here with the classical conception of God, according to which God is all-powerful or omnipotent and He is all good. Now certainly one could try to escape the problem of evil by compromising on classical theism and denying A and saying, no, God is limited in his power or He is limited in His goodness (which would really be radical) and that would escape the problem. And there have been some thinkers who have done that. I can think of one author for example who, under the pressure of the problem of evil, denies divine omnipotence. But I don’t think there is any reason to make that compromise myself. It seems to me that classical theism which affirms God’s omnipotence and all-goodness is logically compatible with evil. And if classical theism is, then a fortiori so will be some weaker theism that denies omnipotence or God’s being all-good. So I think it is best to start with the strongest conception of God and then work from there.

QUESTION: I assume that you will elaborate more on the whole issue of free will since I think you took a standpoint from the beginning where you talk about free will as a certainty.

DR. CRAIG: Well, I hadn’t intended to. My assumption is that we’re working on the problem of evil with classical theism which affirms things like God’s omnipotence and all-goodness, and then I am assuming that human beings are logically possibly free – that it is logically possible for human beings to be free. And actually this would be available even to the determinist, say a person who is a strong Reformed theologian or a Calvinist. As long as the Calvinist is willing to say that it is possible that human beings are free then this will still answer the logical version of the problem of evil. The Calvinist could say, I don’t in fact believe that human beings are free, I think that everything is determined by God, but, nevertheless, insofar as it is logically possible that human beings have freedom then it will follow that assumption (1) is not necessarily true, and that is all you need to do to dissolve the logical version of the problem of evil. So I am just going to assume that it is logically possible that human beings are free. And if the atheist wants to deny that then he is going to have to expose some logical incoherence in the idea of libertarian freedom and I’m not sure how he can do that. Then he is really having to take a radical line if he is going to maintain that it is logically impossible to have freedom of the will.

===

Alright, well that means that the logical version of the problem of evil is already invalid because it assumes that (1) is necessarily true and it is not. But what about assumption (2), that if God is all-loving then He prefers a world without suffering? Is that necessarily true? Well, again, as I think about it, that seems to me that that is not necessarily true. We all know cases in which we permit suffering because of some greater good that we have in mind, some end. Every parent knows this. With your children, you cannot save them from every mishap, or scrape, or accident otherwise they would never learn to be mature, responsible adults. They would be permanently infantile if you were constantly intervening all the time. So, we all know situations in which we allow suffering and evil to take place because we have some justifying end in mind that allows us to permit that.

And similarly, God might have justifying ends in mind for why He would prefer a world that has suffering in it. C. S. Lewis, the British author, once remarked, “What do people mean when they say, ‘I am not afraid of God because I know that He is good.’ Have they never even been to the dentist?”[1] Of course when Lewis wrote that, when you went to the dentist they didn’t have Novocain in those days, they just drilled on your teeth. I remember those days myself! And yet the dentist is not evil, he has some greater good in mind by which he permits this suffering in your life. And similarly, God might have some greater end in mind in permitting the suffering in the world. So, again it is just not necessarily true that in virtue of being all-loving God would always prefer a world that is free of suffering and evil.

So neither of these assumptions seems to be necessarily true.

Is there any comment or question anyone has on that second assumption, before we proceed?

===

QUESTION: Would it then be possible for Adam, pre-Fall, to fall and break a leg?

DR. CRAIG: That’s a good question; I don’t see any incompatibility with that in God’s goodness. The question was, could Adam, in the Bible, prior to the fall into sin, could he have stumbled on a root and fallen down and broke his leg? It seems to me that it is not at all unlikely that in a natural world Adam would have to contend with the problems that working in a physical world involve. The fire that he might use to cook his food could burn him; the water that he drinks, if he falls into it, could drown him. It does seem to me that, living in a natural world, it is not inconsistent with the goodness of God to say that there would be that kind of natural suffering or natural evil, as it is sometimes called.

QUESTION: Could God have created a physical world without any physical suffering?

DR. CRAIG: Well, perhaps. That would depend on, again, the choices that people make because I do think that your free choices are affected by the physical circumstances that you find yourself in. I think it is not at all improbable that God sometimes may permit physical suffering in our lives, like disease, or accidents, or mishap, because He knows that it is only in those circumstances that we would freely choose some end which He desires in our lives. So, you are right, He could make a deterministic world that would be free of suffering without directly affecting the evil in the world. But it might indirectly affect the evil in the world in that it might be only in the context of physical suffering that agents would freely choose certain ways. And so, freedom of the will could even affect so called natural evil, or natural suffering, because those go to help make up the circumstances in which people make their free choices.

===

So, it seems to me that the logical version of the problem of evil is doubly invalid. Neither of the crucial assumptions made by the atheist is necessarily true and therefore the argument is simply an invalid argument.

More than that, however, I think that we can actually prove that God and evil are logically compatible. That is to say, not only can we show that the atheist has failed to show that they are inconsistent; we can give a positive argument to show that they are consistent. All we have to do is find some third statement which is compatible with A and entails B. If we can find a third statement C that is logically consistent with A – that God is all-powerful and all good – and it entails B – that evil exists – then we have shown that A and B are logically consistent. And C seems to be just such a proposition:

C. God could not have created a world with as much good but less suffering than the actual world, and God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering that exists.

That is consistent with A and it entails that suffering exists and therefore proves that A and B are logically consistent.

Now, you might say, well that seems pretty improbable; that seems pretty unlikely. Ah, but then you’d be confusing the logical version of the problem of evil with the probabilistic version. C does not need to be probably true, it doesn’t need to be plausible, C doesn’t even need to be true. C could be a false statement. But as long as C is possibly true and consistent with A then it will entail B and show A and B to be consistent. So, don’t confuse the logical version of the problem of evil with the probabilistic version. As long as C is consistent with A and possibly true, then it entails B and therefore shows A and B to be consistent.

And therefore it seems to me that we have a good argument for showing that, in fact, God and the evil and suffering in the world are consistent.

Any questions about C, then, and how this dissolves the logical version?

===

QUESTION: My question is not really about C, but what if you changed B to include pointless suffering.

DR. CRAIG: Yes, if you change B to pointless suffering then you no longer have an internal problem to Christian theism. The Christian theist could just deny B. He could agree, yes, A and B are incompatible but I don’t believe that pointless suffering exists. See that then turns it into an evidential problem. So, in that case, the theist could admit that A and B are incompatible. But he doesn’t believe B is true because he thinks that God has sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering. Now that is controversial in the sense that there are Christian theists who do believe that there is pointless suffering, or gratuitous suffering. Peter van Inwagen would be an example of one of these, and if they are right then A and B are not incompatible with each other if B is “gratuitous evil does exist.” But I am assuming that the theist would say, no, gratuitous evil does not exist. So there could be a variety of ways to respond to that.

QUESTION: Could you elaborate a little bit on suffering. Peterson says that suffering is pain plus something more. What do you mean by suffering? Is that a part of sin?

DR. CRAIG: Well, I was taking the term very broadly to mean what C. S. Lewis called the problem of pain. So I am not sure what the “something more” is that you are referring to. Whether this is evil in a moral sense, such as when someone does a terrible wrong, or if we’re just talking about physical pain (such as when you hit your thumb with a hammer trying to drive a nail, or you stub your toe, or you have a terrible, horrible accident where you are terribly burned or you break your limbs). These would be examples of suffering – you feel pain. And the question would be: is that kind of pain compatible with the existence of an all-loving, all-powerful God. And I am suggesting that, not only has the atheist failed to show that that is incompatible with an all-loving, all-powerful God, but that, on the basis of C, we can actually prove that they are compatible as long as C is possibly true.

QUESTION: Could you please draw a Venn diagram of suffering and evil because sometimes you seem to equate the two and sometimes you seem to distinguish between them.

DR. CRAIG: Right, that’s true, I am not equating suffering with evil.

Maybe it would look like that.

We talk about, broadly, the problem of evil, and this would be composed of either moral evil or natural evil, and then there would be some subset that would be natural evil but would not be moral evil. I don’t know how to draw those proportions – which is greater, I couldn’t say.

FOLLOWUP: I just wanted you to clarify whether there is a distinction between suffering and evil.

DR. CRAIG: Right, so what would we call it here? The terminology is not very happy here, because “evil” sounds to me like a moral quality so that in one sense I think that it is a real misnomer to call natural suffering “evil.” I mean when I fall down and hurt my knee, there is nothing evil, I don’t think, about that, even though it is suffering. So, the whole name Problem of Evil is not a great terminology and so that is why I sometimes call it the Problem of Suffering.  And there are two types of suffering: there might be suffering that is due to natural pain, but then there is also suffering that is the result of bad moral choices, as when we sohurt someone else by doing a sinful action.

QUESTION: What about things like natural disasters? It is not like we’re doing moral evils but they just come out of the blue.

DR. CRAIG: Well that is what I drew as the circle for natural evil. That would be floods, tornadoes, diseases, accidents – all of those things would be in what we call natural evil.

FOLLOWUP: But couldn’t we have just argued it is pointless evil?

DR. CRAIG: Well, now, the question is, is either the natural evil or the moral evil pointless? That will take us over to the evidential problem of evil and suffering, not the logical version. In the logical version, insofar as that is an internal problem, we are simply asserting that there is evil and suffering in the world. And the Christian theist is committed to that. But the minute you add to B “gratuitous suffering or pointless suffering exists,” then it is no longer an internal problem. The Christian theist can simply deny the truth of B and say “I just deny that that is true.” So, the Christian could actually admit that there is a logical incompatibility between the existence of God and pointless evil, but he would deny that there is pointless evil.

===

I am very pleased, actually, to be able to report to you that it is widely recognized by philosophers today, both theists and atheists, that the logical version of the problem of evil has been solved. There are very few atheist philosophers today who would defend the logical problem of evil any more. It is just too easy to show, as with something like C, that it is logically possible that God and the evil and suffering in the world could coexist. So this is one of those cases where there has been genuine advance in the field philosophy. Compared to ages past where the version of the problem of evil that is stated in Epicurus and David Hume and as recently as J. L. Mackie is now widely regarded as solved. Therefore the debate today is raging around the probabilistic version of the problem of evil; the logical version finds very few defenders anymore.

Any final comments that you would like to make about the logical version of the problem of evil?

===

QUESTION: Is a world where all human beings would do morally good decisions possible, but not feasible? What about heaven?

DR. CRAIG: Okay, very good question. He says, what about heaven, is not heaven a world in which you have free agents who always choose to do the right thing? I think there are a couple of ways one might respond to that. I think one might say that heaven is not itself a possible world. Rather, heaven is part of a possible world. Heaven is the final state of those who, during their lifetimes, have made free decisions to believe in God, or believe in Christ, and then they are given this immortal and eternal life as a result of being related to God. So, that presupposes a pre-heavenly veil of decision-making, so to speak. But God could not just create heaven de novo without that pre-heavenly veil of free decision-making. It is also possible, I think, that the Christian might say that in heaven the freedom to sin is effectively removed. I find this to be a quite plausible option. That God during this veil of decision-making has created us at a sort of distance, a kind of epistemic distance, or arms length where we are not overwhelmed by His glory and beauty and goodness, and that enables us, in effect, to reject Him and His grace if we should so choose. But for the blessed in heaven who are given the vision of God in all His beauty and majesty and loveliness, it may well be the case that the freedom to sin is effectively removed, that they no longer have the freedom to do evil. It may well be like iron filings that are being drawn to a gigantic electro-magnet. The attraction is so great that the filings just cling to it. And it may be that for those who receive the vision of God in His beauty and majesty and goodness, that it is such an overwhelming experience that the ability to do evil is no longer present. And so, that would reinforce the idea that during this period of decision-making God’s goodness and glory is veiled, it is concealed, so as to allow the freedom to choose for or against Him, but for the blessed in heaven, then, there is no possibility of falling away and doing evil. And it seems to me that that is quite consistent because they have freely chosen that state, they have chosen to do that, they are not like robots or puppets.

QUESTION: Just a point of support from the Scriptures, from the Bible. What you just said is confirmed by the place that says, “We shall be like Him for we shall see Him as he is.”[2]

DR. CRAIG: Yes, and where St. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13, “now we see as through a glass darkly, but then, face to face.”[3] And you can imagine – well, perhaps we can imagine – what that would be like: when the dim mirror would be removed, and instead of seeing this poor reflection, we would see face to face with Christ or with God. I think it does support this idea, you are right. And medieval philosophers often talked about the beatific vision that would be given to the blessed in heaven, they would see the essence of God. And I can well imagine that for those who see the essence of God in that way that the ability to do evil would just disappear in the face of so attractive a vision.

QUESTION: Why would Satan fall, then?

DR. CRAIG: Well, that is a very good question. Why would Satan or the angels fall away? I think it would suggest that they had to be created at this epistemic arms distance as well, otherwise an angelic fall would be impossible. So it may well be the case that these beings were also created at an epistemic distance to allow significant freedom to reject God but that maybe their decision now has already been sealed by a vision of God so that there could be no further angelic fall. Here we are getting into questions of Christian theology, obviously, that are important but are related indirectly.

QUESTION: This notion of epistemic distance. That sounds like there is some sort of fine-tuning, that at the point where there is freedom to act, that suits God’s plan. But doesn’t God know that if He had given just a little more of a revelation of himself then I would have acted rightly. Maybe there is this kind of spectrum.

DR. CRAIG: Well, certainly there is a spectrum, or a point at which the circumstances are no longer freedom-permitting. And it is undoubtedly true that there is a spectrum leading up to that point. But so long as there is a point at which these circumstances would no longer be freedom-permitting then you are going to have this distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds. And I think we can say some more when we get to the evidential version about the degree to which God fine-tunes these circumstances. Because I think it is possible that God may, in fact, providentially order the circumstances so that there is no one who could stand before Him on the judgment day and say, “If only you had given me a little bit more then I would have believed and been saved.” I think God might well say to that person, “No, I knew that even if my revelation to you had been clear you still would not have believed.” Now that presupposes a theory of divine knowledge into which maybe we can go later on, but let’s hold that question off. But you are right, that is a very interesting and significant question. But in terms of the logical version at least, as long as we have this distinction between possibility and feasibility it is going to show that this atheistic version of the problem is just invalid; it is not going to work.

QUESTION: Does prayer really make a difference?

DR. CRAIG: I think it does, in exactly the way you said; namely, if one were to pray then God would have done something different than if one were not to pray. That God, in His providence, wants to encourage the practice of prayer and so there are things He would do were someone to pray that he would not have done were they to refuse to pray. So, prayer really makes a difference. It doesn’t mean that it changes God’s mind but it does mean that, as you say, different worlds may be actual based upon whether or not God knew someone would pray or not. Yes, I think that that is correct.

QUESTION: Is God’s suffering Himself as a consequence of evil?

DR. CRAIG: Does God Himself suffer? Theologically, one of the attributes of God is impassibility, and to say that God is impassible means to say that He cannot suffer. Many of the classical medieval theologians thought that God was impassible because He is pure actuality; He has no passivity, and therefore cannot be affected by anything. I think there are very few modern theologians who would accept the idea of divine impassability. It seems to be incompatible with the biblical revelation of God as a God who is compassionate, who hurts along with His creatures, who shares their suffering, and I think this will be relevant when we get to the emotional problem of evil, that God shares our suffering with us. Far from diminishing the greatness of God, this actually enhances God’s greatness. So the question of divine impassibility will come up again when we talk about the emotional problem, as we think of God not as cool and distant and unaffected, but as sharing our suffering with us. So let’s wait on that until later.

 

[1] C. S. Lewis, A Grief Observed, Chapter 3

[2] cf. 1 John 3:2

[3] cf. 1 Corinthians 13:12