Also, I'm dividing the first argument into two different but similar arguments:
1. Most creators want the best for their creations.
2. God is a creator.
3. Therefore, most probably, God wants the best for his creations.
I'll formulate three objections to your argument :
1) One argument against the problem evil doctor Craig used is that we cannot rely on observational evidence to conclude that God is not omnibenevolent. Doctor Law used the same reasoning to argue that in that case neither can we rely on observational evidence to conclude that God is not omnimalevolent. If we accept those arguments, then we cannot draw any conclusion about God's morality from observational evidence. Yet that is exactly what you are doing.
2) Here is a word of wisdom : do not trust statistics you do not understand.
You are drawing a conclusion about God's morality based on statistical evidence. The argument is too vague to have any scientific value, but I will elaborate. I'll assume the set of creators and creations from which statistical information is drawn consists of all biological lifeforms that are the product of evolution. Inanimate objects are excluded because if someone makes e.g. a missile, then he doesn't want that missile to be happy. Furthermore, the creators and creations you use as statistical evidence have a parent-offspring relation.
Clearly the set of entities and relations from which you drew information is not representative for God and our relation with him : God is not a biological lifeform and we are not his offspring. If most graduates of Oxford University are intelligent, then that does not allow you to conclude that Richard, a graduate from Cambridge, is probably intelligent.
3) Someone or something wanting the best for their children does not make them morally good in general. They may just be good to their children and evil in other ways.
1. Most fathers want the best for their children.
2. God is a father.
3. Therefore, most probably, God wants the best for his children.
This argument is irrelevant as God does not have any children, except perhaps Jezus. I doubt you can come up with definitions for father and child that can make your argument work. It is hard to defend that God behaves like a good father towards his human 'children'.
Second answer:
1. To do good is preferable than to do evil.
2. Anyone who is aware of what is preferable and is able to do what is preferable does what is preferable.
3. God is aware and able.
4. Therefore God is good, since He does good.
The argument is invalid because the concept 'preferable' is undefined. I don't think there is a defintion that makes the argument work. I'll try one as an example : preferable is what most increasses the well-being of the world. Clearly premise 2 is false.
I undestand too little of Randy Everest's argument to join that debate. For instance, I don't know what a defeater is and I suspect most people don't.
I think I can formulate another argument:
1. If god is evil we can't rely on reason.
2. It is false that we can't rely on reason.
3. Therefore, God is not evil.
You admitted later that premise 1 could be false. Hence you would have to reformulate your argument to take that into account.
If God is good, then we have good grounds to believe that the tools of reason and moral intuition are adequate to reach some kind of truth and we can trust them, of-course we have to learn to use them correctly and it is worth the effort of trying to reason and trying to distinguish good from evil.
If god is evil, the tools of reason and moral intuition may not be adequate to reach any kind of truth and there is no point in trusting them. Even if we are able to reach some truth, in the end, this god will deceive us, since knowledge is good and he is evil.
We are being told by Christians that the mysterious ways in which God operates are beyond our understanding. If that is a valid argument then so is the argument that evil God's diabolical plans are beyond our understanding. They may well include knowledge. I can think of some expectations I have of good God that he is not meeting and can also think of some expectations of evil God that he is meeting.
1. If god is evil we can't rely on moral intuition.
2. It is false that we can't rely on moral intuition.
3. Therefore, God is not evil.
Sound deductive arguments rely on premises that are accepted by the audience. I agree with premise 1, but I do not accept it, and I disagree with premise 2.
1. If god is evil, to be, is not preferable then not to be.
2. To be is preferable than not to be.
3. Therefore, God is not evil.
Please define 'preferable'. You can't prove both 1 and 2. Which one will you let go ?
Or in another form:
1. If god is evil, life, isn't worth it.
2. It is false that life isn't worth it.
3. Therefore, God is not evil.
You can't seriously believe that is a sound argument.
1. If god is evil we can't rely on reason.
2. It is false that we can't rely on reason.
3. Therefore, God is not evil.
You can of-course say that premise 2 is false and hold that we can not rely on reason but I don't think many people would want to take that road.
That's because not many people believe in evil God. I think people follow the following reasoning, rather than yours :
1. If God is evil we can't rely on reason.
2. God is not evil.
3. Therefore, it is false we can't rely on reason.
