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More on Something From Nothing

April 02, 2012     Time: 00:16:26
More on Something From Nothing

Summary

Is the great question "why is there something rather than nothing" a conversation stopper or a conversation starter? Dr. Craig takes a look at an Internet Infidels article.

Transcript More on Something From Nothing

 

Kevin Harris: This is Reasonable Faith with Dr. William Lane Craig. I’m Kevin Harris joining Dr. Craig in the studio. We've been talking a lot, Bill, about why is there something rather than nothing? And that might be the rock-bottom of all philosophical questions. I'm sure that that's been asked many times before Leibniz. In fact, this article that we're looking at says that the argument itself dates back to Plato. But before we get into this article, some argue that it's impossible for there to be nothing, just nothing; that there just has to be something. [laughter]

Dr. Craig: Right, that's the theist's position, Kevin; we believe that. God is a metaphysically necessary being, and therefore it's impossible for there to be nothing. So that's actually correct, there must be a necessary being.

Kevin Harris: They do this to try to undercut the question itself, and that is, since it's impossible for there to be just nothing at all, then why ask it?

Dr. Craig: Well, because that implies there must be a metaphysically necessary being. So if they agree with that, you see, they already have agreed with 90% of the argument. The person who says it's impossible for there to be nothing agrees, then, I think, that there's a metaphysically necessary being, and then the question is, well, what is it? Is it the universe? Is it matter and energy? Is it something in the universe or is it a transcendent reality beyond the universe?

Kevin Harris: James R. Henderson who is Professor of Mathematics and Philosophy wrote this article for the Internet Infidels. [1] He says that you run into this question as if it's a conversation ender, that it ends the conversation when this comes up, the YouTube-type “Seven Questions All Non-believers Must Answer” postings and things like that. But he says that even more sophisticated philosophers like Janet Soskice, Professor of Philosophical Theology at Cambridge, says this:

I was once invited to take part in a radio program about miracles and was asked whether I believed in them, "Yes, of course," I said. And the researcher replied that she had recruited a leading humanist to put the contrary case. "What would you say to him?" I answered, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" ... That's still a big problem, and believe me cosmology hasn't answered it, astrophysics hasn't answered it. It isn't any more logical to say, with Aristotle, that the universe has simply always existed than it is to say that there's a Creator, Bertrand Russell's reply to the Jesuit philosopher Frederick Copleston—that there's no answer to this question—doesn't seem terribly satisfactory either.

Now, I think you would agree with the article and the writer here that asking that question is not a proof of God.

Dr. Craig: Absolutely, I agree with that. I don't think it is a proof of God. It's not a conversation stopper. As he said, it's the beginning of a conversation, and I think Henderson's quite right about that. But I would say that he just mischaracterizes what Janet Soskice has said here. I know her, and I had no idea she was so sympathetic to natural theology. I'm really proud of Janet for saying what she said. Now, this fellow in response to her says that she is not offering an argument but just a conversation stopper. Now, why does he say that? Well, he gives two reasons. He says, “nowhere in the entire article is there any explicit or implicit mention of the cosmological argument, no mention of a first cause, of an unmoved mover, or even any oblique reference to other elements of the cosmological argument.” Well, I think that's simply not true. The debate between Russell and Copleston that she references on the BBC was a debate about the cosmological argument, and she notes the inadequacy of Russell's reply to Copleston. Similarity, Aristotle's argument was for a prime mover, an unmoved mover, and she says that simply saying the universe has always existed doesn't explain why there's something rather than nothing. And of course Leibniz's question was in the context of a cosmological argument. So it's in the background here all the way through.

Now, secondly he says, “any ‘leading humanist’ could instantly counter the cosmological argument by citing any number of well-known objections.” So she couldn't possibility be offering this argument because it's so full of holes and any leading humanist would see that. Well, I would beg to differ. I think that what she's offered is clearly an argument. Notice how she identifies the question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” She says that's still a big problem. And that's exactly what this Henderson characterizes it as later in his article as well. [2] It's a problem to be solved. And then she deals with attempts to answer this problem, and dismisses them. She says astrophysics hasn’t answered why there's something rather than nothing. She says it's inadequate to say with Aristotle the universe has simply always existed. And she says Russell's response to Copleston – namely, just saying, “Well, there's no answer” – doesn't seem satisfactory. So it seems to me she's clearly engaged in an argument here. She's posing a question and then she's trying to block off certain ways of answering that question, leaving theism as the best answer. So I was very pleased to see Janet Soskice's defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument. I think Henderson has just missed the point completely.

Kevin Harris: Well, he has if he doesn't see that she sees this as a conversation starter rather than a conversation stopper. And when I was reading this article, Bill, I was trying to think, well, wait a minute, have I ever heard anyone use just that phrase from Leibniz as a conversation stopper? And you know what, yes I have. In fact, someone who's quite well-known, he says, “I'll ask the atheist one thing: why is there something rather than nothing? There it is, right there.” Well, I think, wow, he must be treating it as kind of a conversation stopper as well. But I happen to know him and know that he can also give reasons for why anything outside of theism, outside of God, is inadequate in this. So maybe Henderson here has just run into this as some kind of an apologetic in and of itself and he's trying to point that out.

Dr. Craig: There certainly are lazy Christian apologists who aren’t interested in really exploring the problems deeply but just having 'gotcha' objections or questions. Someone might well have misused this in this way. But if you'll look at, for example, my chapter in On Guard on Leibniz's argument you can see that this is just the beginning of the discussion, and then we go on to talk about the principle of sufficient reason, whether or not the universe could be the metaphysically necessary being, reasons to think the universe is contingent, and so forth. We need to do our homework on that.

Kevin Harris: He says,

In this venue I will ignore the fact that this non-cosmological “Why is there something rather than nothing?” gambit is plainly an argument from ignorance (to this point, theists would do well to heed the words of Dietrich Bonhoeffer: “We are to find God in what we know, not in what we don't know”). I will further ignore that it poses a false dilemma (surely there are more possibilities . . .

Okay, well, yeah, there you go. Again, that's why it's a conversation starter, why we need to do a conceptual analysis of why there is something rather than nothing, what those are. And I like what Dietrich Bonhoeffer says here, Bill, because he kind of dispels the god of the gaps argument by saying we can argue for God in what we know, not in what we don't know.

Dr. Craig: Exactly. So many atheists misconstrue arguments for God's existence as god of the gaps sorts of arguments, when they're not that at all. Leibniz's argument, being purely metaphysical, has absolutely nothing to do with empirical or scientific evidence or gaps in our knowledge.

Kevin Harris: Where did Leibniz go after asking that question? Did he go to there can only be two types of being?

Dr. Craig: What he said was that the sufficient reason, as he put it, for the existence of the universe can neither be found in past states of the universe, even if these regress infinitely, nor in any thing in the universe, nor in the universe itself, and therefore the sufficient reason for the existence of the universe must be found beyond it in a transcendent being.

Kevin Harris: Henderson brings out a problem of what accounts for the paper printing out of the copier when I push the button. And he says,

The presence of monks does, in fact, explain it, but many explanations are possible. However, evidence supporting my monk-claim, or any proposed hypothesis, must be of a novel, non-new-copy-making kind.

And so, again, when I look at this I see a road to comparing God as a not very plausible kind of a make-believe explanation that, okay, it may serve as an explanation but it sure ain’t very good.

Dr. Craig: That's a good point, Kevin. The analogy is very prejudicial, isn't it? [3] Although the point of the analogy is quite different, he could have used the internal mechanisms of the Xerox company to explain why the copy comes out of the machine, and would still be able to make the same point, namely, you need more evidence than just the copy spitting out to support your explanation of why the copies are being made. But he does choose a very prejudicial explanation, I think, which poisons the well against the God hypothesis. But, again, I think we will agree with him when he says,

The existence of the universe is what is to be explained, and the god hypothesis is invoked to explain it. . . . we must seek other kinds of evidence: evidence that goes beyond the simple (and uncontroversial) existence of the universe. Other hypotheses will also be put forward for testing, but these, too, can only be supported by evidence of a different sort than the very existence of the universe.

That's exactly what Leibniz does, that’s what I do in presenting the cosmological argument, and that's exactly what Janet Soskice did, too. Take her point about the eternality of the universe. If the universe began to exist then it follows logically that it cannot be a metaphysically necessary being, because an essential property of anything that is metaphysically necessary is that it's eternal, it has to exist, its nonexistence is impossible. So if the universe is not eternal in the past I think that just puts the nails in the coffin of the hypothesis that the universe is the metaphysically necessary being. And that is clearly evidence of a different sort than the very existence of the universe. So it meets exactly the desideratum or the desired evidence that he would want us to bring forth. So I completely agree with him that the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is not a discussion-killing rhetorical device, rather it is the identification of a problem that must be solved. That's exactly what Janet Soskice said. It is still a big problem, she said, and God is the best solution.

Kevin Harris: You're lovely wife, Jan, uses the cosmological argument, the kalam, when she's encountered students and things like that, and it serves as a conversation starter for her. And she goes through one, two, three: whatever begins to exist has a cause, and number two, the universe began to exist, therefore the universe has a cause, and that's kind of a jumping off point. So how would we proceed with “Why is there something rather than nothing?” because you don't stop there?

Dr. Craig: Right, that's a different argument than the kalam cosmological argument. Here the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” isn't even a premise in the argument. That's just a question; it's a question to motivate inquiry. The argument goes like this:

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or else in an external cause.

2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence that explanation is God

3. The universe exists.

Now from those three premises it follows that the explanation of the existence of the universe is God. So the question is, are those three premises true? And then you're involved in a good discussion with your unbelieving friend.

Kevin Harris: I think we're helping a lot of people here, a lot of budding apologists as well, who may be doing what Henderson accuses them of doing. I've heard at least one person do it, and that is to say, “Why is there something rather than nothing? See? There.” And then you're gone. Turn on your heel and let them think about it. No. If you were to ask that question of someone or you use that as a starter than that argument would follow as kind of a starting point, in the same way that if you were to use the kalam as a way to start a dialogue you would do what Jan did. That was my point there. Not that they're the same argument, but that this is only a conversation starter.

Dr. Craig: Yes, you might motivate a discussion of the kalam argument by saying something like this: “Well, where do you think the universe came from?” That's not a conversation stopper, that's a conversation starter.

Kevin Harris: Before Henderson ends this article in a positive way with which we'd agree he takes one more dig, I think, because he says,

The important point is that "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is not a discussion-killing rhetorical device, an unanswerable question that carries all the weight of proving god's existence, but rather it is the identification of a problem that must be solved. It's not a conversation stopper; it's a conversation starter, and all the heavy lifting is still in front of anyone taking part in that conversation.

Amen. [4] I'd agree with that. But he does make a little dig here. He says, okay, when we're considering “Why is there something rather then nothing?” and we get to God, what sort of evidence would we bring to bear for a God. He says we could, for instance, look at a controlled prayer experiment to find out if there is any therapeutic value in praying for patients in hospitals. That would be to test whether God exists. Well, he says, this has been done on several occasions and they all fail. There is no therapeutic value in praying for patients. So that smells like just another dig to me about what kind of things you would offer in evidence of the God hypothesis, when this kind of stuff . . . [laughter]

Dr. Craig: Right, that's sort of a cheap shot. I mean, it's totally irrelevant to the premises of the Leibnizian cosmological argument. I already illustrated what sort of evidence you might appeal to for closing the door, for example, on the hypothesis that the universe is the metaphysically necessary being that exists by a necessity of its own nature, and it wouldn’t be things like he's suggesting.

Kevin Harris: I mean, come on James!

Dr. Craig: Yeah, that's right. Get with the program, James! Come on. [laughter] Interact with the arguments. They're out there; they've been offered. [5]