Doctrine of Man (Part 3): Systematic Summary

Systematic Summary

Having looked at the biblical data on the image of God, we now want to look at various attempts to systematize this data.

Let's talk first about the Roman Catholic view. The traditional Roman Catholic view differentiates between the image and the likeness of God. You'll remember that Genesis says that man was created in God's image according to his likeness. For Roman Catholics these are two different things in man. In man's original state of righteousness in which man was created, man had the likeness of God. So the likeness of God consists in man's original righteousness that he had prior to the Fall. But man in that original state was also in God's image as well. This is usually understood in terms of man's having a rational soul. But then comes the Fall, and with the Fall that original righteousness is lost. Therefore, man in his fallen condition no longer stands in the likeness of God. The image of God, however, though impaired and disrupted by the Fall, still exists even in the fallen state and so is not entirely lost. Finally, in the state of grace insofar as we are in Christ the likeness of God is restored because we now have Christ's righteousness, and the image of God is also healed and restored from the disruption that it experienced.

We can illustrate this difference by drawing two lines concerning the image and likeness of God. In the state of original righteousness man exists in God's image. Then with the Fall this image is distorted and impaired. But then as one is in Christ in a state of grace the image is healed and restored. The likeness of God, which is man's original righteousness, is, however, just lost in the Fall. Man no longer has it. But then insofar as one is in Christ the original righteousness that Adam and Eve had is restored. On the traditional Roman Catholic view there's a distinction drawn between the image and the likeness of God in man. The image is distorted by the Fall into sin and then repaired in the state of grace, but the likeness of man to God (that original righteousness that he possessed) is lost in the fallen state and then restored in Christ.

By contrast to the traditional Roman Catholic view, the Protestant Reformation theologians did not distinguish between the image of God and the likeness of God. They held that the image of God just is the likeness of God. These are not two different aspects of man. So in that original state of righteousness man was in the image or likeness of God. It means the same thing.

The key difference between the Protestant Reformers and the Catholic view emerges with respect to the question whether fallen man is still in the image of God. The Reformers’ view implied that fallen man is no longer in God's image. They identified the image of God with the likeness of God, which was man's original righteousness, and since that original righteousness was lost, so was the image of God. Nevertheless, they did try to affirm some sense in which fallen, sinful human beings are still in God's image by differentiating between a general image and a special image of God. They said that only the special image of God is lost and that in a sort of general sense even fallen man would still be in God's image. Luther, for example, said that man almost lost the image of God in the Fall. Calvin says that a relic of the image of God remains in this fallen condition. He says, “we can trace some remains of the divine image distinguishing the whole human race from other creatures.” The question, I think, here is whether the Reformers are consistent in seeing the image of God as lost because of the identity of that image with the likeness of God (man's original righteousness), and yet they're still wanting to preserve some vestige of God's image in man.

The Reformers and the Catholic theologians are united in seeing God's image as rooted in ontology or in man's constitution. Sometimes this is called a substantial view of the imago dei. Man is structurally different than other animals. Only he has or is a rational soul. God is the supremely rational being. Similarly, our being in God's image means that we, too, are rational creatures. This view is in line with Aristotle's view of the nature of humanity, which is that human nature is to be a rational animal. Our physical bodies are shared with the animals. We have bodies that are very similar to the great apes and other primates. But our soul or our mind makes us godlike. It is our reason that distinguishes us from mere animals. So on both the Catholic view and the Reformation view, the image of God is something that is constitutional in humanity. It is a substantial aspect of human being.

Some modern theologians on the other hand have interpreted the image of God relationally. We stand in I-thou relationships, or to use contemporary parlance, I-you relationships. First-person relationships with one another – both with other persons (other human beings) and also with God. We stand in an I-thou relationship with God as well as with other human persons. So man is in God's image not in being structurally different from the beasts but by his standing in personal relationships.

Yet a different view of the image of God in man is the so-called functional interpretation. Rather than God's image being due to an ontological component in man's being or man standing in relationships, the image of God is thought of functionally. It's a way in which humanity functions or exists. So, for example, some have suggested that the image of God consists in man’s having lordship over the Earth and its creatures. To be in God's image means to have the God-given duty and role of governing the Earth and its creatures. We are functioning on the Earth as God's royal representatives. This is a functional understanding of God's image rather than an ontological one.

As you can see, there are quite a wide variety of interpretations of what it means to say that man is created in the image of God and according to his likeness.

Assessment

I think, first of all, that we have to agree with the Protestant Reformers that there is no difference between the image and likeness of God. I already indicated that when we looked at the biblical material from Genesis that these words are used in parallel and synonymously. To say that man is created in God's image and according to his likeness is just an example of Hebrew parallelism. The terms have virtually the same meaning. So they are not meant to indicate two different aspects of human being. Rather, these are synonymous ways of designating man as in some way reflecting God in a special way that sets him apart from the rest of creation.

But then I think we have to say, contrary to the Reformers, that the image is not lost in the Fall because fallen man clearly is in the image of God. As we saw in Genesis 9:6, fallen man is referred to as being in God's image. Therefore the image of God is not the original righteousness or something of that sort which could be lost in the Fall. We shouldn't think of the image of God as something that is given up or lost as a result of man's fall into sin. So the first point is that the image and likeness of God are identical. They refer to the same thing. And they are not lost in the Fall.

Man, then, is in the image of God even as a sinner. His relationship with God may be broken because of sin. He finds himself estranged from God, spiritually alienated from God, condemned by God's justice, and under God's wrath, but nevertheless he still is in God's image. What does this mean then? This is a question which comes down to whether you take the image of God to be an ontological term or a relational term or a functional term. Is it specifying some aspect of human being that resembles God's nature or is it merely a way in which we relate or function?

The stubborn fact of the matter is that Genesis never defines what is meant by “the image and likeness of God,” so as to specify in what way man resembles God, leading to wide-ranging speculation on this matter. We may distinguish four alternative ways of understanding the divine image: (1) the substantial/structural model, which highlights certain ontological aspects of man, such as the intellect and will, that serve to distinguish us from other animals; (2) the relational model, which construes the divine image as consisting in our standing to God and other persons in “I-Thou” relations; (3) the functional model, which focuses on the unique roles that God has assigned to human beings; (4) the Christological model, which points to Jesus Christ as the one true image of God, which we are called to approximate.

With all due respect to Christian theologians, we may dismiss the Christological model as irrelevant to our anthropological concern. The NT texts speaking of Christ as the visible image of the invisible God (II Cor 4.4; Col 1.15) or of our being conformed to Christ’s image (Rom 8.29; I Cor 15.49; II Cor 3.18) or of Christ’s taking on human likeness (Phil 2.6-7; Heb 2.17) belong to different universes of discourse and are only verbally similar to man’s creation in the image and likeness of God.

There are two devastating criticisms of the Christological model. First, it implies that people are not truly human unless and until they are united with Christ, which subverts the teaching of Gen 1.26-27 and which implies, not merely the worst kind of anti-semitism, but an anti-human view according to which people who are not Christians are subhuman and so can be treated as such.

Second, it implies, again contrary to the teaching of Gen 1.26-27, that throughout the entirety of human history no one has been truly human because we will not be in Christ’s image until his kingdom comes. Eschatology trumps creation. Despite the good and pious intentions of its advocates, the Christological model is odious and should be firmly repudiated. 

Although Genesis does not tell us wherein that image and likeness consists, still we are not altogether clueless about the question, for Genesis tells us that it consists in some similarity of man to God, in virtue of which human beings are distinguished from all the other animals in creation. Such similarity is implicit in the word “image” and explicit in the term “likeness,” for “likeness” means “resemblance.” Thus some sort of resemblance to God is entailed by man’s being created in God’s image and likeness. That implies a substantial model of the image of God.

So in what way does man resemble God that is not shared by the other animals? It obviously cannot be in virtue of being embodied, since God is not embodied, whereas other animals are. Traditionally, it was in virtue of man’s being or having a rational soul that man was thought to be created in the divine image. That suggests the soul as that in virtue of which man resembles God, specifically a rational soul, which serves to differentiate man from any other ensouled animals. It is plausible, then, that in virtue of having or being a rational soul, man can be truly said to be created in the image and likeness of God. That is not to say that man’s soul is the image and likeness of God. Rather, man as a whole is created in God’s image and likeness, but it is in virtue of his rational soul that man as a whole is like his Creator.

Richard Middleton acknowledges that that “the vast majority of interpreters right up to recent times, have understood the meaning of the image in terms of a metaphysical analogy or similarity between the human soul and the being of God,” but he reports that today there is virtual unanimity among OT scholars in favor of the functional interpretation. Rather than finding the image of God in some ontological similarity between God and man or in man’s capacity to stand in “I-Thou” relations with God and other persons, on a functional interpretation “the imago Dei designates the royal office or calling of human beings as God’s representatives and agents in the world, granted authorized power to share in God’s rule or administration of the earth’s resources and creatures.”[1]

What is key to Middleton’s case for the functional interpretation is the ANE ideology of kings in Mesopotamia and Egypt that describes their function as the images of the gods. Especially significant in Middleton’s judgement is the practice of Egyptian pharaohs of setting up images of themselves in distant lands as representing the absent king in some way. Middleton thinks that since this representative notion is intrinsic to the understanding of images in the ANE, it seems quite plausible to regard the kings’ practice of setting up images of themselves in distant lands as a legitimate parallel to the creation of humans in the image of God. Man is God’s image and represents God and his authority on the earth.

While this kingly practice is interesting, it is not clear that it is, in fact, a legitimate parallel to man’s being created in God’s image and likeness. Genesis does not portray the Earth as being like a distant land from which God is absent. Quite the contrary, God is himself active in the world. He does not need some surrogate to stand in his place. Moreover, notice that the king’s statue in a distant land does not really function in the king’s place. It does not, in fact, do anything. It just represents the king’s authority over the land. The king’s statue is rather like the pictures of the President on the walls of our police stations and post offices. They represent his authority. But humans are living images of God. They are not images of God in the ANE sense of a statue.

Middleton contends, however, that the best ANE parallels to the imago Dei are texts that describe the various kings and priests as themselves images of a god. This is the most widely cited set of parallels for Gen 1.26–27. To give just a few examples: Pharaoh Ahmose I is described as “the image of Re.” Queen Hatshepsut is described as “superb image of Amon; the image of Amon on earth; the image of Amon-Re to eternity, his living monument on earth.” Amenhotep II is described variously as “image of Re,” “image of Horus,” “image of Atum,” “holy image of the lord of the gods,” “foremost image of Re,” “holy image of Re,” “holy image of Amon,” “image of Amon like Re,” and so on.[2]

Middleton comments on these texts,

To understand the meaning and function of this idea, we need to grasp something of the wider ideology of kingship in Egypt. Central to this ideology was the divinity of the pharaoh, by which he was set apart from all other human beings. . . . The notion of the pharaoh as an image of a god must be understood in this context. In one sense, the notion of image is but one among many other ways of expressing the pharaoh’s divine origin and kinship to the gods. . . . The pharaoh was thought, in a fairly strong sense, to be a physical, local incarnation of deity, analogous to that of a cult statue or image of a god, which is also such an incarnation. . . . ‘The king as the living image of god was,’ Curtis explains, ‘like the cult statue, a place where the god manifested himself and was a primary means by which the deity worked on earth.’[3]

These texts are said to support a functional interpretation of the image of God in Genesis.

There are, however, two major flaws that undermine Middleton’s case. First, Middleton admits that a functional interpretation does not preclude, and even presupposes, a substantialistic interpretation. He writes, “Both functional and . . . relational interpretations of the image are, like substantialistic interpretations, strictly speaking metaphysical, in that they also make ontological assumptions about human nature. . . . A functional interpretation might be seen as consonant with some version of action theory. . . . [The] focus is on persons as agents who act responsibly (or irresponsibly). Action, on this model, includes all that an agent does, including thinking, as an integral unity.”[4] This admission undermines Middleton’s case for a purely functional interpretation, for he recognizes that humanity’s function is rooted in ontology. More than that, it is rooted in personal agency, and personal agency is not a function. It is a property of personal agents—that is to say, personal, causally effective beings. Notice as well that the relation between ontology and function is asymmetrical. Functions are grounded in ontology, not vice versa. The substantialist is quite happy to recognize that human persons have been created by God to carry out a function. They can carry out that function, however, because of what they are—namely, personal agents. So the functional interpretation actually presupposes the substantialistic interpretation in grounding function in the ontology of human beings as personal agents.

The second flaw in the argument is that the Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts cited do not in fact support a functional interpretation but rather a different, unmentioned interpretation. As Middleton convincingly shows, when the ANE texts speak of an idol or of the pharaoh as a god’s image, what they mean is that the idol or the pharaoh embodies or incarnates the god. The deity is present in and lives through the idol or the king. The problem is, this is not a functional interpretation. It is a metaphysical view of the relation between the idol or king and the god. It is more accurate, therefore, to call it an incarnational interpretation. The king is the incarnation of the god; the idol is the embodiment of the god. But then this interpretation is irrelevant for the interpretation of the Genesis texts, for those texts do not think of human beings as incarnations of God, through which he lives and acts in the world. An anti-iconic religion like Judaism would have recoiled at the idea that human beings are embodiments of God.

So it seems that a substantialist interpretation is practically unavoidable. In order to function as God’s co-regent on this planet, man must have certain faculties like rationality, self-consciousness, freedom of the will, and so forth. So we should not play off functional versus substantialistic understandings of God’s image. The reason we can function as God has commanded us to is that we are created in God’s image; that is to say, we have some ontological similarity to God that enables us to serve as his representative and co-regent. Gen 1.26–27 treats man wholistically as created in God’s image. While that precludes identifying God’s image as the rational soul alone, it is consistent with maintaining that the reason a human being as a whole is in God’s image is that he incorporates a rational soul, which makes him a person. On this view, the reason that we can serve as God’s co-regents and representatives on this planet is that we are in the image of God; that is to say, we are persons in the same way that God is personal and thus have the attributes of personhood.

To have a rational soul is to be a person, a being endowed with the capacity for self-consciousness, a first-person perspective, freedom of the will, and rational thinking. It is in virtue of being a person, then, that man resembles God, who is likewise personal, and is thereby differentiated from the rest of animal creation.  

Even if having a hominin body is essential to being a human being, so that the disembodied dead, pending their reception of a resurrection body, can no longer be truly said to be human except in the sense that they had hominin bodies, nonetheless they are still persons and so divine image-bearers. Angels, being unembodied, are likewise non-human persons, and there could theoretically be other extra-terrestrial beings in the universe who are also non-human persons and therefore created in God’s image and likeness. This understanding of the divine image and likeness elevates personhood and underlines the crucial importance of the soul as that in virtue of which we bear the divine image.