Doctrine of God (Part 15): Middle Knowledge

ii.  Middle Knowledge

The next subject that we want to broach is the question of how God knows future events. When handling this question, it is helpful to distinguish two models of divine cognition:  the perceptualist model and the conceptualist model. The perceptualist model construes divine knowledge on the analogy of sense perception:  God “looks” and “sees” what is there.  Such a model is implicitly assumed when people speak of God’s “foreseeing” the future. Indeed, I should say that the implicit assumption of a perceptualist model of divine cognition underlies virtually all contemporary denials of the possibility of divine foreknowledge of future contingents. The perceptualist model of divine cognition does, indeed, encounter difficulty concerning God’s knowledge of future contingents, given the objective reality of temporal becoming, for if future events do not exist, there is nothing there to perceive.

By contrast on a conceptualist model of divine knowledge, God does not acquire His knowledge of the world by anything like perception.  His knowledge of the future is not based on His "looking" ahead and "seeing" what lies in the future (a terribly anthropomorphic notion in any case).  Rather, God's knowledge is intrinsic; it is more like a mind's knowledge of innate ideas.  As an omniscient being, God has essentially the property of knowing all truths; there are truths about future contingents; ergo, God knows all truths concerning future contingents. So long as we are not seduced into thinking of divine foreknowledge on the model of perception, it is no longer evident why knowledge of future contingents should be impossible.

Now it might be asked, "But how can God have innate knowledge of all truths, including truths about future contingents?"  But it is difficult to make sense of this question.  The very point of calling such knowledge innate is to deny that there is any means by which God acquires His knowledge, or, indeed, that it is appropriate to speak of God's acquiring knowledge at all.  Rather, as a perfect being, the greatest conceivable being, God simply possesses essentially knowledge of only and all truths; future contingent propositions are among the truths that there are; therefore God possesses essentially knowledge of future contingents.  To ask how He can do so is just an expression of incredulity, as if one were to ask, "How can God be omnipotent?" or "How can God be morally perfect?" or "How can God be eternal?"  He just is that way, and nothing more needs to be said.  So long as we are not seduced into thinking of divine foreknowledge on the model of perception, it is no longer evident why knowledge of future contingent propositions should be impossible.  A conceptualist model furnishes a perspicuous basis for God's knowledge of future contingents.

Nonetheless, there is a version of the conceptualist model appealing to God's hypothetical knowledge which does allow us to say considerably more about the basis of God's foreknowledge of future contingents.  The doctrine of so-called middle knowledge is so intriguing and theologically important that it deserves to be discussed separately. This is God’s knowledge of subjunctive conditional statements like “If you had been in Pilate’s place, you would have condemned Jesus.” How would you have acted had you been in that situation? That is not foreknowledge because you never are in that situation.

This kind of knowledge is beautifully illustrated in Charles Dickens’ classic story, A Christmas Carol. You will remember at the end of that story Scrooge is confronted by the Spirit of Christmas Yet to Come. He is shown horrifying visions of his own death and people laughing about Scrooge’s death. Horrified by these visions, Scrooge implores the Spirit, “Are these shadows of things that will be or shadows of things that may be only?” The Spirit does not answer Scrooge. Why? Scrooge had failed to exhaust the alternatives. We know from the story’s end that the Spirit was not showing Scrooge visions of things that will be. We know that Scrooge reforms and repents. As a result, the horrible things that the Spirit showed him don’t actually happen. So it wasn’t foreknowledge. But the Spirit wasn’t showing him merely things that may be – mere possibilities. After all, Scrooge might sell his business and become a florist in Covent Garden. That is possible. But why worry about mere possibilities? No, what the Spirit was showing Scrooge is what would happen if Scrooge were not to repent. He was imparting to Scrooge knowledge of subjunctive conditionals. Scrooge’s question didn’t take that into account, so the Spirit does not answer Scrooge.

The question then is: does God have this kind of knowledge? Does he have knowledge of these subjunctive conditionals? In particular, does he have this kind of knowledge logically prior to his decree to create a world? Does he have logically or explanatorily prior to his decree of a world hypothetical knowledge of what creatures in that world would freely do if they were in various circumstances, or what those same creatures would do if they were in other circumstances, or what would happen in still another possible world in which different creatures were created in different circumstances? Does God have this kind of knowledge logically or explanatorily prior to his decree to create a world?

This is a subject of considerable theological controversy. Proponents of middle knowledge follow the Catholic Counter-Reformer Luis Molina in the late 16^th, early 17^th century in maintaining that God does have this kind of knowledge. But a good many contemporary theologians would say no – God doesn’t have this kind of knowledge. So the previous question about what you would do if you were in Pilate’s place couldn’t even arise for these theologians because God didn’t know what you would do if he were to have you born at another time and place in history.. Granted, he has simple foreknowledge of the future. He does foreknow whatever will happen, but it is not as though logically prior to that he knew, If I were to create these people in these circumstances, this is the way the world would turn out. He would just have simple foreknowledge of what will happen, but he didn’t have this kind of middle knowledge.

It seems to me there are powerful theological reasons for affirming that God does have this sort of knowledge. The Bible teaches divine sovereignty and providence over the whole of human history. The Bible says that nothing happens simply by accident outside of the plan and providence of God. Let me read you a very interesting passage from the book of Acts. The church in Jerusalem is gathered together in prayer. In Acts 4:27-28, this is how they pray:

for truly in this city there were gathered together against thy holy servant Jesus, whom thou didst anoint, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever thy hand and thy plan had predestined to take place.

According to this verse specific persons are named – King Herod, the procurator Pontius Pilate, as well as all the Gentiles that were there and the Jews that were there. This all unfolded according to God’s plan and providence. God is over everything that happens. Everything that happens does so either by God’s direct will or at least his permission in the case of sinful actions.

This kind of providential planning requires middle knowledge. Even the opponents of middle knowledge recognize that you cannot have a robust doctrine of divine providence and sovereignty along with human freedom without middle knowledge. But according to middle knowledge, God knew what every free creature would do under any circumstances in which that creature might be placed. That includes freedom-permitting circumstances. We are not always determined by our circumstances to do what we do. In certain circumstances we have a measure of freedom within those same circumstances to act in different ways. By creating certain persons in certain circumstances God can bring it about that his ultimate ends are achieved through the free decisions that people make.

When you think of this, you can see this would be unimaginably complex. Only an infinite mind could direct a world of free creatures toward his previsioned ends. Just think, for example, of what it would take to providentially arrange the success of the Allied invasion on D-Day without abridging the freedom of the people involved. You would need to have a Winston Churchill on the scene. In order for that to happen, Lord and Lady Churchill had to have sexual intercourse at just a certain time and place so that that sperm would unite with that egg that would eventually be Winston Churchill. Think of the innumerable contingencies that went into that single event – whether Lady Churchill turned her ankle on a clod in the flower garden that day and so maybe wouldn’t have been in the mood for sex, and whether that clod was there was due to whether the gardener did a faithful job in hoeing and raking the garden that morning, and maybe he didn’t do that because he was feeling depressed and didn’t do his work as energetically. That is just one thing – that’s just Churchill. Think of all of the rest of the people – the free agents – involved, and the multitude of circumstances on both the Allied and Axis sides in order to bring about such an event. Truly only an infinite, omniscient mind could employ his knowledge of subjunctive conditionals to bring about even a single event in human history.

Middle knowledge, I think, therefore provides the key to the mystery of divine sovereignty and human freedom. By knowing how creatures would freely behave in certain circumstances and putting them in those circumstances, God can ultimately bring about his ends without abridging the freedom of persons but actually allowing them to do as they please knowing that ultimately his ends will be accomplished.

Obviously, creatures (free persons) will make a lot of bad decisions that God doesn’t directly will. In any moral situation God always wills that you do the right thing. He never wills that you should sin. Sin is contrary to the will of God. So God knows that creatures will often not do what he directly wills. Instead they will rebel against him. They will sin. They will choose to act immorally. But given his middle knowledge, even allowing these sins and evils to occur  in this infinitely complex scenario, God’s ultimate purposes will be accomplished.

When you look at our world and wonder how could God have created such a messed up world as ours with so much suffering and evil, the proponent of middle knowledge could say God’s options may have been limited. It may be that given human freedom and given God’s desire that creatures are free, it may be that they would have messed up any world of free creatures that God might have created. Perhaps in any world that was feasible for God to actualize or realize which involves as much good as the actual world, there would have also been this much suffering and this much evil. So God’s options may be significantly limited by human freedom to worlds that involve a good deal of suffering and evil. God would, in every circumstance, will that people do the right thing but he will permit them to sin if that is what they will to do.

On the Molinist view, then, one needs to make a distinction between possible worlds (worlds that are possible for God to actualize) and what we could call feasible or realizable or actualizable worlds. For example, a world of free creatures involving this much good in which everybody always does the right thing (no one ever sins) is a possible world. That wouldn’t be a robot world. This would be a world in which everybody has freedom, but they all always do the right thing. They always freely do the moral thing. So there would be no sin in that world. But given human freedom, it may be the case that such a world isn’t feasible for God because if God were to create those creatures in those circumstances, even though it is possible for them to do the right thing, they wouldn’t. They would go wrong, and they would mess up the world. So God’s options of feasible worlds may be limited with respect to the suffering and the evil that must be permitted in order to accomplish his will.

Nevertheless, as a good God, in his providence he has selected a world which on balance has more good than evil. Ultimately his will will be accomplished. It will win out. His purpose will be achieved. There will be a multitude of persons in heaven from every tribe and tongue and people and nation who have come to know God and his salvation and have freely come into a relationship with him.

We can be confident that God’s choice of a world is right. Despite the evil and the suffering in the world, we can have trust and confidence in God that he has chosen a world which was a wise choice and a good choice. The onus for messing up the world is on us. It is not on God. It is we who, through our free choices, turned the world into such a decadent and evil place. God allows that, to be sure, but only with the view toward accomplishing his ultimately good purpose.

That would be a defense of the doctrine of middle knowledge. I think it is the only way to give a reconciliation of divine sovereignty and human freedom which affirms libertarian freedom but also God’s providence over everything that happens in the world. That gives powerful theological motivation, I think, for adopting a doctrine of middle knowledge.