#982 Molinist Views of Sin
March 08, 2026Hi, Dr Craig.
I've been looking through your views on soteriology and hamartiology and I'd like some clarification on something.
if we maintain libertarian freewill and reject the classic doctrine of original sin (inheritance of guilt and a corrupted nature), instead believing that the inclination to sin is due to a combination of our animalistic self-preserving instincts and exposure to a morally corrupt social environment, sinlessness still appears to be metaphysically possible for any individual, given that they are still free to choose to do good or evil at any point. Does this mean that, due to the sheer frequency and power of temptation, the universality of sin is a matter of statistical inevitability rather than theological necessity, or in other words, that sinlessness for any individual is metaphysically possible, but has a probability of 0%?
Also, in your Molinist framework, would you say that a world where some humans remain sinless is metaphysically possible but not feasible for God to actualize (with the assumption that these humans have libertarian freewill, exist after the fall, and do not posses superadded grace), or that it is feasible and that God prefers a world in which no person remains sinless (perhaps for reasons pertaining to the optimal balance of saved individuals)?
(As an aside, your teaching materials have been incredibly helpful and formative in my own theological views, and you've made me a recent convert to Molinism after being long undecided on the nature of God's sovereignty and predestination. I had previously disagreed with the notion of imputed guilt in original sin, but I hadn't considered rejecting the corrupted nature part, so I needed to think through the implications.)
Blessings,
Rowan
United Kingdom
Dr. craig’s response
A
I don’t suppose that you are the former Archbishop of Canterbury, are you, Rowan? Your theological acumen is evident in the question you ask. You have ably summarized my view and drawn out its implication that while it is theoretically possible to live a sinless life, it is practically impossible.
In thinking about these matters in a Molinist framework, it’s important to understand that one is not claiming to know how things actually are, but to suggest how, for all we know, things may be. So both of the alternatives that you suggest are open to the Molinist. For all we know, in every world feasible for God, no one would live a sinless life. That seems to be what Alvin Plantinga means by transworld depravity: every creaturely essence has the property that its instantiation would sin if actualized. But Plantinga has also suggested that even if sinless worlds are feasible, God may actually prefer a sinful world over a sinless world because a sinless world would be bereft of the incomprehensible good of Christ’s self-sacrificial, atoning death for sin. God may allow sin to occur for the sake of actualizing this great good. It would be a very short step to say that God would prefer a world in which everybody sins rather than only some so that Christ is the unique means of salvation. “For God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all” (Romans 11.32). Or perhaps, as you suggest, worlds in which some people remain sinless would be worlds with a less optimal balance between saved and lost and so less preferable. All of these are viable options for the Molinist.
- William Lane Craig