#966 A Mother’s Struggle with Gratuitous Evil
November 16, 2025Hello Dr. Craig,
My name is Maricarmen, and I am writing to you from Mexico with a question.
I have three adult children, two of whom are believers and one who is not. He is my middle son, Abiram, who is 30 years old and currently pursuing a PhD in molecular biology in Germany. Although he cites many reasons to justify his atheism (including scientific ones), one of the main reasons is the problem of evil.
In fact, I believe my son began the process of losing his faith when I became gravely ill with peripheral neuropathy, which caused damage to my nervous system and even led to episodes of psychosis. That stage of our lives affected the whole family, but he never recovered from it. He was only 14 at the time.
Eliezer, my oldest son, is a careful student of your work and often debates with Abiram, trying to show the rationality of his faith. He is the one who has helped me write this question.
In their most recent debate, my son Abiram asked: “If God exists, why is there so much evil in the world that seems pointless?” My oldest replied that, as human beings, we are not in a good position to judge with confidence whether such evil truly has no point, since God could have reasons for permitting it. Therefore, even though it does not appear that much of the evil in the world has a point, one cannot infer from this that evil is actually pointless.
However, my son Abiram disputed: “If we are not in a position to judge with certainty that evil in the world is truly pointless, then we are also not in a position to judge with certainty that it is not.”
I have no clue on how to answer his objection, and I thought perhaps you might be able to help us.
My oldest son, who is familiar with your work, has helped me put Abiram’s argument in the following form:
1. If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist.
2. Gratuitous evil exists.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
He explained to me that he tried to argue that (2) is not justified—that given our epistemic limitations (his words), we cannot know whether gratuitous evil exists. But then his brother tries to turn the argument around, replying that, for those very same epistemic limitations, we also cannot know that it does not exist. In other words, that “in reality” (or in my older son’s words, “ontologically”) it very well could exist—even if we can never know whether it does—and if it does, then God does not exist.
But is that really the case? Wouldn’t the most logical step then be to question the truth of (1)? If so, how would you argue that (1) is not obviously true?
Maricarmen
Mexico
Dr. craig’s response
A
Thank you so much for your heartfelt and thoughtful letter, Maricarmen! You’re a courageous woman. I believe that I may have actually met your son Eliezer in my Defenders class.
As Eliezer discerns, Abiram’s argument is the argument against God’s existence on the basis of gratuitous evil in the world:
1. If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist.
2. Gratuitous evil exists.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
Now as the proponent of this argument, it is Abiram who bears the burden of proof. He needs to show that both premises are true, if the conclusion is to be established. In particular, he must prove that gratuitous evil exists. As Eliezer notes, given our cognitive limitations, it is impossible for us to prove that any incident of evil is gratuitous. We may not see the point or necessity of it, but if God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting it, there is no reason at all to think that that should be evident to us. Therefore, Abiram’s argument fails.
Now the failure of this argument is in no way affected by Eliezer’s inability to prove that gratuitous evil does not exist. Generally speaking, there are two types of defeater of a premise of an argument: rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters. A rebutting defeater tries to show that the premise in question is false. An undercutting defeater simply tries to show that we are not justified in thinking that the premise in question is true. In order to refute an argument, you do not need to show that one of its premises is false, but simply that we have no sufficient reason for thinking it true. Eliezer is offering an undercutting defeater of (2) of Abiram’s argument.
Moreover, it has been said that one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens. (Ask Eliezer to explain these logical rules of inference if you’re unfamiliar with them.) So suppose that we retain Abiram’s premiss
1. If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist.
But then suppose that we add a new second premiss
2*. God exists.
Now what follows logically? Lo and behold,
3*. Gratuitous evil does not exist.
Suddenly, the argument is turned on its head! That’s why the philosopher Daniel Howard-Snyder says that if you’ve got good reasons for theism, then the problem of evil is not a problem! We have no good reason for Abiram’s (2), but we have good reasons for (2*), indeed, in my studied opinion very considerable reasons. So even though one does not need to prove that (2) is false to defeat Abiram’s argument, we do, in fact, have good reasons to think that (2) is false.
Now you are very perceptive, Maricarmen, to realize that (1) might also be challenged. The philosopher Peter van Inwagen denies this premise. He thinks that even though any particular evil might be eliminated by God without overall damage to the world, nevertheless He could not eliminate all of them without damage. Some gratuitous evil must therefore be permitted by God, in van Inwagen’s view.
Now I realize, Maricarmen, that your mother’s heart must be breaking for your son Abiram and that my logical disquisitions may seem cold and uncaring. But then we are dealing with the emotional problem of evil, not the intellectual problem of evil, which is what you asked about. I strongly suspect that Abiram, like most unbelievers troubled by the suffering in the world, is really wrestling with the emotional problem of evil, not the intellectual problem. So continue to love and pray for him and hope that he will come around.
- William Lane Craig