#684 Divine Command Theory and Penal Substitution
May 31, 2020Hello Dr. Craig!
A huge fan of yours and proudly the second chapter director certified in Mexico. I am thrilled to share with you the growth and impact apologetics is having in Latin America and it is mainly because your work is now being published in Spanish. So praise the Lord!
I had a question on the compatibility of Penal Subtitutionary Atonement (PSA) and Divine Command Theory. On page 67 of your book of the atonement, you formulate the objector's argument based against Penal Substitution:
1. God is perfectly just.
2. If God is perfectly just, He cannot punish an innocent person.
3. Therefore, God cannot punish an innocent person.
4. Christ was an innocent person.
5. Therefore, God cannot punish Christ.
6. If God cannot punish Christ, penal substitution is false.
It follows that if God is perfectly just, then penal substitution is false.
With respect to premise (2) you mention as a response that we need to contextualize this objection in a metaethical theory about the grounding of Objective Moral Values and Duties. You embrace divine command theory, in which moral duties are constituted by divine imperatives, so there is no external moral law that God must follow. He does not have moral duties to fulfill. He can act in any way consistent with his nature. On your response to the Euthyphro dilemma you’ve stated that “God’s commands to us are not arbitrary, nor based upon something independent of God. Rather, God himself is the paradigm of goodness.” On another place, you state “Moral duties are grounded in his will or commands… His will is not independent of His nature but must express his nature.” His will and commands must reflect his nature, but PSA, if true, implies that it is consistent with the nature of God to inflict punishment to an innocent person (if it wouldn't be consistent, PSA would be false).
You’ve quoted Hugo Grotius saying, “Even if God has established a system of justice among human beings which forbids the punishment of the innocent (and, hence, substitutionary punishment), He Himself is not so forbidden.” We’ve established that that system of justice reflects the nature of God, since his divine commands and will are that, a reflection of his nature.
It seems you want to have your cake and eat it too. On the one hand, PSA implies that it is consistent with his nature to punish the innocent. But on the other, given his commandments to humanity, it is consistent with his nature to forbid punishing the innocent person. How is it not contradictory that the nature of God is consistent to punish the innocent person (given PSA) and at the same time, (given the system of justice for humans/His commands) his nature is inconsistent with punishing the innocent person?
This reminds me of C.S. Lewis’ quote: "If God’s moral judgement differs from ours so that our ‘black' may be his ‘white’, we can mean nothing by calling him good, for to say ‘God is good’, while asserting that his goodness is wholly other than ours, is really only to say ‘God is we know not what.’" Our black being, "punishing the innocent is wrong", while his white is "punishing the innocent" is right (in at least some instances). Am I missing something?
God bless you and Jan!
Raul
Mexico
Dr. craig’s response
A
Thank you for your letter, Raul, and the tremendous work you are doing in Spanish-speaking Latin America! This has been an unexpected blessing.
The relevance of a Divine Command Theory of ethics to the oft-repeated objection to the justice of penal substitution struck me forcefully as I reflected on this objection. Who says that it would be unjust of God to punish the innocent? Just as God was free to command Abraham to kill his innocent son Isaac, so God could punish an innocent person. Since God has no moral obligations to fulfill and Himself determines what is right or wrong, just or unjust, this standard objection to penal substitution can’t even get off the ground without addressing the meta-ethical basis of moral obligations. So what theory is presupposed by the objector? This question is never addressed by contemporary critics.
Suppose that God has commanded that human persons should not punish one another if innocent, just as He has commanded human persons not to kill one another if innocent. Just as God Himself may choose on some occasion to take a person’s life, so He may choose on some occasion to punish the innocent. He isn’t Himself bound by the rules He has set up for human beings. Is there a contradiction here? You say, “On the one hand, PSA implies that it is consistent with his nature to punish the innocent. But on the other, . . . it is consistent with his nature to forbid punishing the innocent person. How is it not contradictory that the nature of God is consistent to punish the innocent person . . . and at the same time. . . his nature is inconsistent with punishing the innocent person?” You’ve set up a false dichotomy. By analogy, it is consistent with my nature to prohibit my little children from going to the park alone, but also consistent with my nature that I myself go to the park alone. Even more closely analogous, it is consistent with my nature that I prohibit my children from punishing each other, but also consistent with my nature that I (or Jan) punish them. There is no contradiction in God’s not being bound by the rules He establishes for human beings.
Now Lewis is certainly right that we want our affirmation that “God is good” to mean by “good” what we normally mean by that word. So the non-voluntarist Divine Command Theorist holds that while moral duties are constituted by God’s commands or will, moral values are determined by God’s essential character. God is necessarily loving, kind, generous, etc. So is there something in God’s essential character that would prevent Him from punishing an innocent person? Let’s concede for the sake of argument that God’s essential goodness will not permit Him to punish an innocent human person. But what about punishing an innocent divine person? That is far from obvious! As I write in The Atonement, “What could be more consistent with our God’s gracious nature than that He should condescend to take on our frail and fallen humanity and give His life to satisfy the demands of His own justice? The self-giving sacrifice of Christ exalts the nature of God by displaying his holy love” (p. 70). I don’t see anything in God’s nature that would prevent His making such a self-sacrifice for us.
- William Lane Craig