#973 Theological Fatalism and the Best of All Possible Worlds
January 04, 2026In conversation with my unbelieving son, this conundrum was presented:
If the 'best of all possible worlds' idea is true, then God's foreknowledge actually DOES remove my free will.
If God knows all things, including counterfactuals, and chose to create the world that best served His purposes, then He knew every person's decisions ahead of time. He chose THIS world over every other, so He chose the world in which I would do P.
Because He chose this world, I have no choice but to do P... which means my choice isn't free, but determined by God's foreknowledge, which eliminated all other possibilities.
In some other universe I might have done Q, but God did not choose that universe. He chose the one where I do P, and I cannot do otherwise.
How would you respond to my son? Are we truly free? Is this really the best of all possible worlds? Is this equation missing something crucial?
Thank you for your ministry, Dr. Craig!
Tony
United States
Dr. craig’s response
A
I selected your question this week, Tony, for the sake of your son, even though I have already addressed this issue numerous times. It appears that your son has been misled by the fallacious, old argument for theological fatalism based on divine foreknowledge.
As stated, the argument has nothing to do with the idea of a best of all possible worlds. That controversial notion plays no part in the argument. Whether or not there is a best of all possible worlds, it remains the case that God has chosen this world over every other and so knows every person’s decisions ahead of time.
But then what justifies the inference: “Because He chose this world, I have no choice but to do P”? Where did that come from? Your son seems to be presupposing the argument for theological fatalism:
1. Necessarily, if God foreknows P, then P.
2. God foreknows P.
3. Therefore, necessarily, P.
The problem is that this argument commits a fallacy in modal logic. From (1) and (2) all that follows is
3*. Therefore, P.
From God’s foreknowing that P will happen, all that follows is that P will happen, not that it will happen necessarily. P could fail to happen; but it won’t. So you have a choice in this world to bring about P or not, and you are perfectly free to bring about Q instead. Through our free choices we help to determine which world is actual; we co-actualize the world along with God.
But here is an interesting wrinkle concerning your son’s argument! He seems to assume that (i) there is a best of all possible worlds, and (ii) if there is a best of all possible worlds, then God must choose to actualize that world. If both of these assumptions are true, then it follows that this is really the only possible world there is! All modal distinctions collapse, and everything becomes necessary. In that case premise (2) must be revised to
2*. Necessarily, God foreknows P.
and the argument for theological fatalism becomes valid! Then we must inquire after the truth of the premises.
In volume IIa of my Systematic Philosophical Theology in the chapter on divine goodness, I explore at length the questions of whether there is a best possible world, and whether God must choose the best. It is very dubious that there is a best possible world, since worlds may be incommensurable in their value and, hence, incapable of being ranked in a single hierarchy, since there may be multiple worlds tied for best, and since the hierarchy of worlds may simply go on endlessly with no best world. Neither is God plausibly obligated to choose the best possible world; all he need do is choose a good world that meet certain standards. In other words, the validity of your son’s argument will depend upon highly controversial assumptions, which no one need accept.
- William Lane Craig