#51 Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

Dear Dr Craig,

This is an extension to an e-mail I sent you about the ontological argument a while back. My first question concerns the soundness of the argument in general. The second, however, concerns its theological implications.

Firstly, then, the soundness of the argument.

I’m thinking particularly about the version of the OA you propose in To Everyone An Answer [Inter-Varsity Press, 2004] together with what you write about the argument in Philosophical Foundations [Inter-Varsity Press, 2003] (though my rendering of the argument below isn’t an exact quote):

The problem I have with this argument it that we seem able to take the general form of the key premise (i.e. It’s possible that X exists) and then plug-in various different definitions of X in order to arrive at absurd answers.

Obviously, defining X as something like an all-surpassingly great island doesn’t work, since, as you and others rightly point out, islands are, amongst other things, inherently material (and are therefore contingent on the existence of space and time); moreover, it’s far from clear as to what properties make an island great (for some it might involve plenty of palm trees; for others, it might involve no palm trees at all). So defining X in such a way doesn’t seem to work.

But what if we define X as a being that necessarily exists but isn’t, say, necessarily all-knowing? The argument you give against this idea (if I understand you correctly) is that God must be such that nothing can exist independently of his power, meaning there must be a possible world where God alone exists. You then argue that the existence of God is therefore logically incompatible with the existence of X, meaning X is an incoherent concept.

But I have two problems with this argument.

Firstly, for God to be able to actualise a world where X doesn’t exist seems to be asking God to do the logically impossible (since X exists necessarily). So why should we think God must be capable of doing such a thing? Secondly, even if we grant that the existence of God is incompatible with the existence of X, why should it follow that GOD exists as opposed to X? That is, if the proponent of the OA in its original form can argue that, since God’s existence entails there being possible worlds where God alone exists, the concept of X is incoherent, why can’t the skeptic argue that, since X’s existence entails there being NO possible worlds where God alone exists, the concept of God is incoherent? This looks like a mexican stand-off to me.

I’ve considered appealing to factors like simplicity or likeliness at this point; but this seems misguided. Simplicity can be important in deciding on the most likely explanation for a given body of facts. But I’m not sure this is relevant here, since the OA isn’t an inference to the most likely explanation. Rather, the OA starts from the premise that God’s existence is either possible or it isn’t, and then tells us what logically follows as a result. If God’s existence is possible, then it’s necessary, meaning God exists; if it isn’t, God obviously doesn’t exist.

The OA is therefore different from something like the teleological argument, where we might want to argue that God is a simpler and more elegant explanation for the universe’s apparent fine-tuning than the extravagant ontologies posited by many-worlds-hypotheses. The OA is a question of metaphysical fact. From what we have said about X, it therefore seems to follow that either God exists or X exists (together with any number of other necessarily-existent beings; for if a modified OA works for X, why can’t it work for any other similarly-defined X? It might, I guess, be argued that to simply tack ‘necessarily-existing’ onto a being is somewhat gratuitous. But I don’t see why this would be any more gratuitous than tacking ‘all-surpassingly great’ onto a being, or why gratuity would even be important here. In any case, couldn’t X be a necessarily-existing number or a necessarily-existing set or something like that? Granted, the existence of such entities is problematic for the same reasons Platonism as a whole is problematic. But the existence of such entities doesn’t seem logically impossible; nor do the entities in question seem conceptually gratuitous or incoherent).

I therefore have concerns about the soundness of the OA.

But I also have concerns about its theological implications. For, in light of the OA, doesn’t it follow that God’s actions are a necessary consequence of his nature, since, given any set of conditions, an all-surpassingly great being will necessarily react in the ‘greatest’ possible way. Creating the universe, for instance, gives God opportunity to lavish his love and grace on other creatures, meaning only a lesser being would choose not to create the universe. It therefore follows that God’s creating the universe is necessary--which logic can be extended to God’s answering of prayers, and, worse still, Christ’s dying on the cross. In fact, on this view, the only thing that makes our world contingent is man’s free will; and, whilst this may be so, it seems wrong to me, since it leaves so little scope for the action of God’s grace and freedom and sovereignty. The OA therefore appears to eliminate God’s free will in the same way physicalism eliminates man’s free will.

As always, I’d be extremely grateful if you could spare the time to address these issues. (Though I don’t have a philosophical background, so I’d be grateful if you could assume a low level of technical knowledge as your starting point -- especially when it comes to the nature of necessity!). I get the impression you’ll be addressing the ontological argument in your forthcoming revision of Reasonable Faith. If so, I look forward to reading it. (That said, I look forward to reading it either way...).

Thanks,

James