#923 The Chosen and Theological Fatalism

Dr. craig’s response

While I haven’t seen the particular episode you’re referring to, Charlie, I can comment on the issue you’re raising. The critics you mention seem to have fallen into the fallacy of theological fatalism, which holds that divinely inspired prophecies of future events are incompatible with those events’ being free and avoidable. They reason as follows:

That is to say, given Jesus’ prophecy, Judas’ betrayal of Jesus is necessary. So there’s no use telling Judas to search himself and choose differently.

This fatalistic reasoning commits a fallacy in modal logic that has been known since the Middle Ages. From (1) and (2) it does not follow that (3). All that follows is:

       3*. Therefore, Judas does not betray Jesus.

It is perfectly possible for Judas, despite Jesus’ prophecy, to freely decide not to betray Jesus; only were he to decide differently, then Jesus would not have made the prophecy. The infallibility of divine prophecy warrants the truth of a “backtracking” counterfactual in this case, according to which the past would have been different than it was if the prophesied event did not occur. From the fact of Jesus’ prophecy it follows only that Judas will betray Jesus, not that he must betray Jesus. Therefore it’s perfectly reasonable trying to persuade him not to, although one knows that such efforts will fail (not “must fail”). 

Medieval theologians rightly distinguished between necessity in the composite sense (in sensu composito) and necessity in the divided sense (in sensu diviso). In the composite sense it is impossible that (Jesus prophecies Judas’ betrayal & Judas does not betray Jesus). That conjunction is impossible. But in the divided sense it is possible that Judas does not betray Jesus. That conjunct is possible.

Now the critics you mention refer, not to divine foreknowledge, as is exhibited in prophecy, but to divine foreordination. Here your question is crucial: “What are the critics saying when they claim that Judas was foreordained to betray Jesus?” Are they saying that God had causally determined Judas to betray Jesus? If so, then they are right that Judas’ betrayal was inevitable and that it was futile trying to persuade him to choose otherwise. This view makes God the author of evil, since it is God who caused Judas to sin. God then punishes the hapless Judas with eternal perdition for doing something that God made him do.

Fortunately, biblical foreordination does not imply causal determinism. The verb proorizō (foreordain) means simply to specify some end in advance. Foreordination is no more deterministic than foreknowledge. In the composite sense it is impossible that (Judas’ betrayal of Jesus was foreordained & Judas did not betray Jesus), but in the divided sense it is still possible that Judas not betray Jesus. Of course, if he were not to betray Jesus, then he would not have been foreordained (another backtracking counterfactual). So it is not true that “Judas was destined to betray Jesus no matter what and that Judas was ‘locked into’ fulfilling the prophecy.” He was perfectly free to refrain from doing what God foreordained and foreknew he would do; but if he were to refrain, then God’s foreordination and foreknowledge would have been different.

So, yes, prophecies often concern “free will decisions of people like Judas” that God knows will be freely chosen. And, yes, these same events “God will bring to pass in his divine sovereignty over human affairs,” but not by causally determining them. Rather God knows how any person would freely choose in any circumstances in which God might place him, so that God can providentially govern a world of free creatures without abridging their freedom.

For more on this fascinating subject see my little book The Only Wise God (1987; rep. ed.: Wipf & Stock).