#-888 A Myriad of “Possible Me’s”
April 19, 2018Hi Dr. Craig,
I am a pastor of a small congregation in Rural Wisconsin. I never went to Bible college, but have been blessed by the innumerable resources available both online and in book form. Your Defenders Series has been one of those God-given blessings to me.
When I discovered your teachings on Molinism, it was like the light turned on and God's harmonious loving and sovereign nature became beautiful to me.
While I have had no difficulty in comprehending the theological, philosophical, and biblical arguments for Molinism, I've lately been increasingly disturbed with some of the ontological conclusions that Middle Knowledge implies.
I completely understand that I am a uniquely created being (soul) who "could" have been born in any other setting (i.e. possible world). I also understand that I am still the same person even if I "would" have chosen something differently in the past (i.e. feasible world).
However, because my understanding of who I am today is solely related to what I have experienced so far (i.e. the divine decree), I cannot come to grips with the idea of a "me" known by God in other possible/feasible worlds. The "me" in a counterfactual world, with a completely different future, seems more like a clone of me written in a fictional book! Also, if I were born in a different setting, I cannot possibly fathom how it would be "me" at all, for all my experiences would be totally different from day one! Would not the same mustard seed planted in a different spot on earth look totally different in at least the direction of its branches?
Dr. Craig, I feel that the Molinist perspective is making my every decision a terrifying fork in the road whereby I enter into a myriad of "possible me's"!
How can I find ontological peace over this issue of an infinite number of possible/feasible existences?
Thank you and many blessings to you and your family.
Alex
United States
Dr. craig’s response
A
I’m thrilled, Alex, to hear from a pastor who has found Molinism to be of practical benefit in the ministry! Therefore, I’m anxious to relieve you of your ontological worries occasioned by Molinism.
You say that you have a clear grasp of trans-world identity across various possible/feasible worlds! Good! That’s the key to your “com[ing] to grips with the idea of a ‘me’ known by God in other possible/feasible worlds.” I suspect that your difficulty arises from the fallacy of thinking of trans-world identity as looking into other possible worlds and finding someone there similar enough to you to merit being called you. But that is not at all the way trans-world identity works. Rather it is a matter of just stipulating that in other worlds you were, for example, born in China in the Ming Dynasty, or were crippled as a child in a terrible automobile accident, or lived a life just like your actual life up until now and then decided to enlist in the Ukrainian army to fight against the Russian invasion (where in some worlds you then die in battle while in others are decorated as a war hero). Do you get the point? Trans-world identity isn’t about finding “me” in some other possible world. It’s just that it’s logically possible that you do different things or experience different things than you actually do, and so there are logically possible worlds like that with you—however unrecognizable—in such worlds.
Your question, “Would not the same mustard seed planted in a different spot on earth look totally different in at least the direction of its branches?” shows that you are laboring under the fallacy of trying to find someone who looks like you in another possible world. If you want, you can simply dispense with the heuristic device of possible worlds and ask yourself, “Is it logically possible for me to be born in China or to be crippled as a child or to enlist in the Ukrainian army or . . . .”
The notion that there are merely clones or counterparts of you in other possible worlds has the outrageous implication that everything about you is logically necessary, that it is logically impossible, for example, for you to have one less hair on your head! That’s fatalism! But, of course, it is possible that as a newborn you could have been kidnapped from the hospital and so, as you put it, had totally different experiences from day one!
So in no sense does the Molinist perspective (or, really, just possible worlds talk in general) imply that “my every decision [is] a terrifying fork in the road whereby I enter into a myriad of ‘possible me's’!” There is only one you; it’s just that it’s logically possible for different things to be experienced by you, so that in some such possible worlds you look vastly different.
- William Lane Craig