#857 Servitude in Ancient Israel (Pt. I)

Dr. craig’s response

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Occasionally I will invite a specialist to write a guest Question of the Week to address a specific question. In order address Juan’s questions, I’ve invited Paul Copan, who has studied thoroughly the nature of servitude in the ancient Near East and written extensively on this fascinating subject to write a guest column. His answer, divided into two parts over two weeks, begins below.

Dear Juan,

Thank you for writing. I appreciate very much your honest searching to get to the bottom of these perplexing questions. Over the past fifteen years or so, I devoted much time to addressing these kinds of concerns about Old Testament ethical challenges in my “trilogy” (all with Baker):

Is God a Moral Monster?

Did God Really Command Genocide? (coauthored with Matthew Flannagan);

Is God a Vindictive Bully?

While we encounter various challenging texts in the Old Testament, I do think that we can make good headway in seeing the goodness and patience of God along with justifiable reasons for his severity (Romans 11:22).

In my Vindictive Bully book especially, I face head-on the most troubling Old Testament texts—including the questions you ask below. I devote a good deal of space to Leviticus 25 (acquiring foreign servants in Israel) and also to Numbers 31 (the Midianite women). Since my responses are lengthy, I’ll first address your questions regarding servitude and then offer a separate response on the Numbers 31 passage.  I here address the matter of servitude in Israel.

You ask, “Why could slaves be bought from nations outside of Israel, were they hereditary, and could be brutalized as long as they did not die as a direct result?” There is a lot to unpack here, and this will include looking at certain background and contextual considerations.

First, you rightly acknowledge that “Hebrew servants could leave after 7 years, even with a gift, and that their servitude was voluntary.” Yes, this was like a temporary contract of indentured servitude, as texts like Exodus 21:2, Deuteronomy 15:12-18 and Jeremiah 34:12–22 indicate. One might “sell himself” and even parcel out his family members to work for someone else in their tribe or clan simply because they were poor (e.g., Leviticus 25:39). Servitude in Israel was generally the result of poverty—not because the law of Moses institutionalized it. In fact, it often made provision to keep people out of poverty through gleaning laws, temporal limits to length of servitude, and so on.

Second, you refer to the servant who “could be brutalized as long as they did not die as a direct result.” The text you appear to have in mind is Exodus 21:21-22, which isn’t actually referring to a foreign servant but a fellow Israelite. Exodus 21:1 mentions a “Hebrew” servant, which most scholars take to be an Israelite, and we have no reason to think that the servant later in the chapter is a foreign one.

Moreover, if an employer of the indentured servant strikes him so that he dies, then there is punishment: “he shall be avenged [naqam]” (v. 21.) The word used here is a term commonly used for lethal punishment (e.g., Genesis 4:15; Leviticus 26:25). Note that “vengeance” does not apply to property damage in Israel. Clearly, the servant is not property but has rights as a human being, including judges’ calling for lethal punishment to the servant’s employer if he “strikes him so that he dies.”

But what if he dies only after one or two days? Keep in mind that this passage is in the context of accidental injury (Exodus 21:18-27), which indicates unintentional death. Furthermore, the immediate context refers to the payment of a medical fee of someone who has been injured, as argued by Hittitologist Harry Hoffner Jr. (University of Chicago): “it [the medical fee] is his silver” (v. 21). This set of “accidental injury” texts makes clear that all of these injuries are unintentional—hence, its mention of walking around for one or two days after being struck. This text in no way serves as justification to abuse a servant. That would certainly be reading the text uncharitably. Indeed, later in that same chapter, one’s permanently injuring a servant (knocking out a tooth, gouging out an eye) calls for release of the servant without any lingering debt (v. 27). I’ll say no more on this here, but please look at further comments on this text in my book Is God a Moral Monster?  

Third, the term “slave” in the Old Testament is an unfortunate translation of the Hebrew word ebed (the female equivalent is amah—“handmaid”). This word—better translated “servant” or “worker”—is related to the verb abad (“work” or “serve”); it is used, say, of Adam’s cultivating the garden (Gen. 2:15). Also, the Hebrew term is far removed from what we today think of when we hear the term “slave”—namely, an evocative term that reminds us of the antebellum South with all of its brutality and dehumanization.

Unfortunately, unlike earlier translations like the King James Version, where the term “slave” appears only once in the Old Testament, many modern translations, strangely, have adopted the emotionally-loaded rendering “slave” or “slavery.” This term becomes something of a “trigger word” to modern ears even though the word meant something far different in its original setting in Israelite law.  In light of our inherently negative associations with the modern practice of slavery, to translate ebed as “slave” (and we could add the term “master” as well) creates a host of unnecessary barriers that often undermine a fair-minded reading of servitude texts.

Fourth, the word ebed is a neutral term—not an inherently negative term as the word “slave” is today. In the Old Testament, the word simply indicates a dynamic dependency relationship, whether positive, negative, or neutral. The context will typically indicate which it is. For example, ebed is an honorific title in places: one could be a “servant [ebed] of the Lord” like Moses (Deut. 34:5) and Joshua (Josh. 1:1; 24:29).

Furthermore, to serve one person may be oppressive; to serve another might be a joy. For example, God told Moses to instruct Pharaoh to let Israel go “that they may serve [abad] Me in the wilderness” (Exodus 7:16). God was rescuing them from an oppressive servitude under Pharaoh and bringing them into a liberating one under himself. Later, God warned his rebellious people that they would become “slaves [ebedim]” to Shishak of Egypt in order to learn the difference between positive and negative service—between “My [God’s] service [abodah]” and “the service [abodah] of the kingdoms of the countries” (2 Chronicles 12:8). Indeed, an Israelite king could even “serve” his own people by creating conditions that allow them to flourish (1 Kings 12:7; cf. 2 Chronicles 35:3, where Levites are called to “serve” the Lord and his people Israel).

Fifth, I point out in several chapters in my Vindictive Bully book that Israel’s own worldview is far more morally elevated than that of surrounding ancient Near Eastern nations—especially regarding the marginalized, who could easily be taken advantage of. God repeatedly expresses great concern for the orphan, the widow, and the alien—the most vulnerable in Israelite society. In fact, the Lord reminds the Israelites three dozen times to care for the “alien,” and no doubt this includes foreign servants. What was the reason for this concern? The Israelites had been aliens enslaved as foreigners in Egypt: “So show your love for the alien, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt” (Deuteronomy 10:19). In light of all this, would Leviticus 25 truly justify the abuse of foreign servants in Israel? The question answers itself!

Sixth, let’s explore the chief text you appear to have in mind about “foreign slaves” is Leviticus 25, which you suggests reveals a “tribal” attitude and treats these foreigners as “property.” I spend three chapters on this text in my Vindictive Bully book, but let me summarize a few points here:

Let me add a final point about servitude in Israel for your consideration, Juan. The late Old Testament scholar of note David Clines rightly argued that two passages undermine and “deconstruct” any suggestion of institutionalized servitude in Israel. The first one has to do with a foreign runaway slave who comes to Israel for refuge. Rather than sending him back to his harsh master as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi required—on pain of death—and as extradition treaties of the Hittites and Egyptians also required, Israelites were commanded to let this runaway settle in any of Israel’s cities. And this foreigner was not to be mistreated (Deuteronomy 23:15-16). Clines argues that this would also apply to any Israelite servant who was being treated harshly. What is amazing about the law of the fugitive slave is that it enables a slave to acquire his or her own freedom by the relatively simple expedient of runaway. A slave can choose not to be a slave.”^[4]

A second text that undermines any institutionalization of servitude in Israel is Exodus 21:6, where a servant who loves his employer (“master”) freely chooses to attach himself permanently to that household. Clines observes: “Slavery is in a sense abolished when it ceases to be a state that a person is forced into against his will.”^[5]           

This extraordinary provision for foreign runaway slaves undermines any institution of servitude altogether. Clines continues: “If a slave can choose not to be a slave,” then “the concept of slavery does not exist as it once was thought to exist.”^[6] Thus, with this blurring of the lines between freedom and “servant” (or “slave”), the institution has “lost its conceptual force.”^[7]

Juan, I hope you find some of these comments helpful. I would encourage you to explore further what I have to say on Leviticus 25 and other servitude texts I’ve addressed, especially in my Vindictive Bully book.

 

Paul Copan
Pledger Chair of Philosophy and Ethics
M.A. Philosophy of Religion program at Palm Beach Atlantic University (West Palm Beach, Florida)