#744 Is Ought-ness Closed under Entailment?
August 08, 2021Hello Dr. Craig,
I have a question regarding the nature of good and evil. From my understanding, good is often times defined as the way things "ought" to be, and evil is defined as the way things "ought not" to be. In other words, evil is a deprivation of what is good. However, I wonder how this can be this can be the case whenever certain "greater goods" necessarily require evil to occur in order to be actualized? While there are many everyday examples I could give that show how evil and suffering often times lead to goods that likely would not have come about otherwise, I think the ultimate example would be Christ's forgiveness for our sins. Had we not first committed evil, we would not be able to received the gift of Christ's forgiveness. How can this be the case, though, with my current understanding of good and evil? If evil is a deprivation of what is good, then how can evil, in some cases, be necessary in order to achieve a greater good? In other words, how can an "ought" necessarily require an "ought not" in order to be actualized? Thank you for all of the work you have done Dr. Craig. You have helped me tremendously in my faith.
Ryan
United States
Dr. craig’s response
A
In responding to the problem of evil, Alvin Plantinga has suggested that perhaps the self-giving sacrifice of Christ to atone for our sins is a good of such greatness--perhaps even an incommensurable good, a good to which nothing else could be compared--that it justifies God’s permission of the moral evils in the world. For Christ’s dying for our sins entails that moral evil exists. So any possible world that includes this great good will be a world stained with moral evil. Thus, as you say, “certain ‘greater goods’ necessarily require evil to occur in order to be actualized.”
So accepting that “good is . . . defined as the way things ‘ought’ to be, and evil is defined as the way things ‘ought not’ to be,” the question we face is “how can an ‘ought’ necessarily require an ‘ought not’ in order to be actualized?”
I think that part of the answer, at least, is that ought-ness is not closed under entailment. That is to say, a truth about the way something ought to be may entail another truth without the ought-ness being carried over to the implied truth. To give an illustration: the ability to bring something about is similarly not closed under entailment. I have the ability to bring it about that a rocket ship is painted red. The fact that the rocket ship is painted red entails that the rocket ship exists. But, not being Elon Musk, I certainly don’t have the ability to bring it about that a rocket ship exists!
Similarly, ought-ness does not seem to be closed under entailment. Suppose we accept that Christ’s atoning death ought to occur. The occurrence of Christ’s atoning death entails that sins occur. But it doesn’t follow that sins ought to occur. Quite the opposite! So if ought-ness is not closed under entailment, there’s no problem with “an ‘ought’ necessarily requir[ing] an ‘ought not’ in order to be actualized.”
Years ago, I read a statement by a theologian concerning sin that the fact that something ought not to be does not imply that it ought not to be permitted. I puzzled long and hard over that paradoxical statement. But I think what helps us to understand it is realizing that ought-ness is not closed under entailment. Sin ought not to be despite its being entailed by something that ought to be, and if that greater “ought” is great enough, it may justify God’s permitting the “ought not” to be.
- William Lane Craig