#801 Inconsistency concerning Moral Platonism
September 18, 2022Dear Dr Craig,
In you debate with Wielenberg, you mention that one of the problems of Wielenberg's view is "that he is postulating causal connections between physical objects and abstract objects, where none seems to exist." (P. 64)
However, in your written work on abstract objects you recognize that physical objects can cause abstract objects:
1-In regards to the Earth's equator. In God over All you write: "the Equator is a geometrical line which girdles the Earth and therefore exists in space. You can actually step over this abstract object! More-over, it depends on the Earth for its existence and so exists only so long as the Earth exists." (P. 5)
The Earth (a physical object) seems to be causing an abstract object (the Earth's Equator).
2-In regards to literary and artistic compositions, you write: "many contemporary Platonists think that literary and musical compositions are abstract objects, not to be identif i ed with any particular exemplar of those works. For example, Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony cannot plausibly be identif i ed with some printed score, lest we be compelled to say that, if that score were destroyed, Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony would no longer exist! But since literary and musical works are plausibly the creations of their respective authors, most Platonists hold them not to be metaphysically necessary in their existence." (P. 18).
Hence, art works would be abstract objects caused by concrete (physical?) objects (i.e. human beings).
Even if we take the cause of artworks to be the "immaterial mind" of the authors (and hence not something purely physical), it is still the case that something "concrete" is causing abstract.
In fact, you mention the latter example as an objection to Van Inwagen's view that abstract objects don't stand in causal relations. You mention the latter example as an example of abstract objects being "effects" of something else.
My question is: Do the examples mentioned above (above all, the Earth's Equator example) undermine your objection against Wielenberg's view? If not, which is the relevant difference between Wielenberg's thesis and the above two examples mentioned by you?
Thank you very much for your work!
Agustin
United States
Dr. craig’s response
A
This is a very good question concerning an apparent inconsistency on my part. I think that the inconsistency can be shown to be merely apparent by keeping in mind the difference between abstract moral values and the sorts of objects you mention.
First, the Equator, even if such a thing exists, is not plausibly caused by the Earth but by geographers who have decided to plot the surface of the Earth with mathematical lines of latitude and longitude. It is thus the same sort of object as the literary and artistic creations you mention next. As for these, even if such things do exist as abstract objects, they are, as I say, creations of their respective authors.
As such, they are radically different from the independent, timeless, spaceless, abstract moral values posited by the moral Platonist. These are not creations of human beings (lest we be landed in moral subjectivism). They exist wholly apart from us. Therefore it is mysterious how physical states of affairs, like two persons’ loving each other, could reach out and cause one such object, like goodness, to be exemplified. This is especially mysterious given Wielenberg’s naturalism, for physics knows nothing of such causal powers on the part of physical entities.
All this is said by way of concession to the Platonist, of course. I am speaking here as if these abstract objects exist, which I doubt. But if they do exist, then there is a profound difference between objects which are human creations and objects which are wholly separated from us.
- William Lane Craig