#912 New Work on the BGV Theorem
November 03, 2024Dear Dr. Craig,
I hope you're doing well.
An atheist freind sent me the following quotes of physicits who apparently argue that the BGV theorem does not prove the begining of the Universe. What do you think of these quotes?
"In a Letter by Borde, Guth and Vilenkin (BGV) [8], it was subsequently argued that inflation cannot likewise be eternal into the past; although, we have countered this belief [9, 10] and present further evidence that inflation can, in fact, be eternal into the past in the current work."
Damien A. Easson. Eternal Universes. 2024
"The solutions presented necessarily violated traditional energy conditions within the context of pure GR; although it is possible, such solutions may exist within non-canonical scalar field theories in a stable way as discussed above. Again within the context of GR the solutions may suffer from quantum considerations, as discussed in [22], leading to the possible exclusion of this class of classical monsters from the domain of discourse for physically reasonable scale factors; however, a deeper understanding of quantum gravity is needed to definitively make such a statement. For the time being, the question of the
viability of eternal inflation, and the controversy of Havg is far from settled, leaving many possibilities for future work."
J. E. Lesnefsky. Past-completeness of inflationary spacetimes. 2023
Thanks for your help!
God Bless,
Matthieu
Dr. craig’s response
A
The articles your friend refers to are:
J. E. Lesnefsky, D. A. Easson, and P. C. W. Davies, “On the past-completeness of inflationary spacetimes,” Physical Review D 107, 044024 (2023), arXiv:2207.0095v2[gr-qc] 25 Jan 2023
Damien A. Easson and Joseph E. Lesnefsky, “Eternal Universes,” arXiv:2404.03016v1 [hep-th] 3 April 2024.
These articles are so recent that it will take some time for the physics community to digest and assess them. Nonetheless, on the basis of personal conversations with some prominent physicists, I think that your atheist friend has misunderstood the significance of these articles.
By way of background, the Borde Guth Vilenkin Theorem is now widely accepted within the physics community. As of today, it has gone largely unchallenged. In order to avoid its implications, cosmologists attempt to craft models of the universe based upon possible exceptions to the theorem’s one condition that the universe has, on average, been in a state of cosmic expansion throughout its history. Since in these proposed models the universe does not satisfy that one condition, the BGV Theorem does not apply to them. So the fact that there are exception classes of models to the theorem is nothing new.
In our article “The Kalām Cosmological Argument” in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, James Sinclair lists four such exception classes of models:
(i) Models involving an infinite cosmic contraction prior to our current expansion phase, so that the average expansion Hav< 0 (e.g., de Sitter model).
(ii) Models involving a past eternal, static initial state followed by an inflationary expansion, so that on average Hav = 0 (e.g., Emergent models).
(iii) Models involving a series, perhaps past eternal, of cosmic expansions followed by contractions, such that the contractions and expansions cancel out one another and Hav = 0 (e.g., Penrose Conformal Cyclic Cosmogony).
(iv) Models involving two mirror-image, inflationary expansions, where the two arrows of time point away from the same cosmological boundary (e.g., Aguirre-Gratton model).
The articles quoted by your friend aim at refining the exception classes of models to the BGV Theorem. By redefining the way in which the average expansion rate Hav is defined or calculated, the authors argue that one can have past-eternal asymptotically emergent models according to which Hav > 0 by having the universe’s expansion rate approach 0 at -∞. (It will be interesting to see what Borde, Guth, or Vilenkin think of the proposed re-definition). Granting for the sake of argument the legitimacy of this redefinition, Carballo-Rubio et al. arrive at a three-fold classification of models which are exceptions to the BGV theorem (Raúl Carballo-Rubio, Stefano Liberati, and Vania Vellucci, “Geodesically complete universes,” arXiv:2404.13112v2 [gr-qc] 29 August 2024). They lump all models featuring a contracting phase, including Sinclair’s (iv), into the same category, so that all viable, singularity-free, classical geometries must feature either (i) a bouncing universe, (ii) an emergent universe, or (iii) an asymptotically emergent universe.
The significance of these studies is that they show that in order to avoid the implications of the BGV Theorem for the finitude of the past, you have only these three options to choose from. Thus, if you want to defend the possibility of a past eternal universe, your options are extremely restricted.
Now these three model classes are based on a purely mathematical analysis. Nothing has been said of the models’ physical tenability or evidential credibility. Carballo-Rubio et al. therefore rightly advise that these mathematical findings pave the way for now refining cosmological models based on observational data and theoretical considerations. They state, “Efforts to reconcile these theoretical studies with empirical observations and astrophysical data would be instrumental in refining and validating cosmological models” (“Geodesically complete universes,” p. 28).
These models face an array of problems which render them unlikely to be physically realistic, including violating not only the so-called strong energy condition, but also the weak energy condition, the null energy condition, and, in many cases, the averaged null energy condition, which serves to prevent time-like loops and time machines, along with the Generalized Second Law of Thermodynamics. Sinclair shows that these speculative models are all either in contradiction to observational cosmology or else wind up implying the very beginning of the universe they sought to avert.[1] Thus the papers cited by your friend do not even aspire to show that models belonging to these classes are physically tenable or credible but serve merely to narrowly limit the exception classes to the BGV Theorem to but three options. So what is the atheist to do?
[1] Craig and Sinclair, “Kalām Cosmological Argument,” pp. 143-58; cf. “On Non-Singular Spacetimes and the Beginning of the Universe” in Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Yujin Nagasawa (London: Macmillan, 2012), pp. 95-142. See also the many publications by Alexander Vilenkin cited in our work. I am more than a little surprised that Daniel Linford, “Big Bounce or Double Bang? A Reply to Craig and Sinclair on the Interpretation of Bounce Cosmologies,” Erkenntnis, (June 2020), doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00278-5, alleges that Sinclair and I have misinterpreted various cyclic or “bounce” models as all belonging in class (iv). Obviously, Sinclair does not lump cyclic cosmogonies indiscriminately into class (iv), and in the class (iv) models he considers it is the authors of the models themselves (e.g., Aguirre-Gratton, Carroll-Chen) who interpret a reversal of the entropic arrow to be a reversal of time’s arrow. Only in the case of Penrose’s Conformal Cyclic Cosmogony do we suggest that the model could be interpreted as implying, while not affirming, a reversal of time’s arrow, and that interpretation is not germane to our critique. Linford draws attention to the fact that in some bounce models, features of one universe causally explain features of the other universe, which Linford rightly sees as implying a single (non-reductionistic) arrow of time, on pain of positing some form of backward causation. Any class (iv) model exhibiting such causally connected features seems metaphysically impossible, since it must affirm backward causation. Those bounce cosmogonies that do not posit a reversal of time’s arrow at the bounce are plagued with problems, as Sinclair and Vilenkin have shown. N.B. that Linford is focused exclusively on questions of interpretation, explicitly “setting aside. . . questions about bounce cosmology’s plausibility.” Linford reiterates his misrepresentation of our interpretation of bounce cosmogonies in Dan Linford, “The Kalām Cosmological Argument Meets the Mentaculus,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming***) https://doi.org/10.1093/ bjps/axaa005.
- William Lane Craig