#837 Molinism and Abiogenesis
May 28, 2023Dear Dr. Craig,
Thank you so much for your work and ministry. I've benefitted greatly from studying your books, articles, and debates. I am very excited to hear about your ongoing project to complete a systematic philosophical theology! My question relates to some of the comments you've made on abiogenesis in your newsletters and recent podcasts.
You've described one of the options for a Christian to approach the origin of life as "supervisionism," according to which "God, as the creator and providential governor of the universe, supervises the sequence of secondary causes so that they naturally produce life under his supervision." (RF Podcast 1/22/23). This seems to me to be a plausible view, but I was surprised to hear you say that the most plausible way to understand supervisionism is Molinism (or, in a recent newsletter, that we should understand supervisionism as a molinist view).
Now, your work has convinced me that Molinism is true, so I suppose that in one sense every other part of God's creative decree is "best understood" through Molinism. But I don't see why the Molinist as such has a leg up on the Calvinist or the Arminian or the Open Theist when it comes to a supervisionist view of abiogenesis. As I understand it, Molinism's distinctive contribution to the doctrines of divine providence and foreknoweldge are that it posit's God's knowing prior to creation the truth of subjunctive conditionals concerning free agents. But why would this middle knowledge have any peculiar relevance to God's creating physical laws and natural conditions that contingently result in abiogenesis? It seems to me that God wouldn't need to account for creaturely free choices in the lead-up to the creation of life itself. Even on a Calvinist view, one could believe that God decreed natural laws that would contingently produce life, right?
Am I missing something about Molinism, or is there something else to your supervisionist proposal that the Molinist should feel more comfortable with than adherents to other views of providence?
Thank you,
Kolten
United States
Dr. craig’s response
A
Aha! There is something about Molinism that you’re missing, Kolten, and it is that God’s middle knowledge comprises more than just “subjunctive conditionals concerning free agents,” but all true subjunctive conditionals. Alfred Freddoso, the philosopher who did so much to bring Molinism to the attention of contemporary philosophers, used that fact to explain God’s providential control over indeterminate quantum physical reactions by means of what he called “counterfactuals of quantum physics.” God knew, for example, that if a certain radioactive isotope were placed in certain circumstances it would decay at precisely a certain time, despite the indeterminacy of that event.
The chemical reactions leading up to abiogenesis would similarly be objects of divine middle knowledge. God knew that if certain chemicals were combined under just the right conditions at the right time and place, life would originate. (If that sounds absurd to you, then you are inclined to a creationist explanation involving miraculous intervention.) But given that abiogenesis does have natural causes, these would be under the supervision of a God endowed with middle knowledge of all true subjunctive conditionals.
If abiogenesis is deterministic, then it would also be under the control of the God of Calvinism, Arminianism, or Open Theism, since He could causally determine what reactions take place. But that would seem more akin to theological necessitism, not what I’m calling supervisionism. What your question really raises is the nature of divine concurrence, an aspect of the doctrine of providence. According to Molinism, God merely concurs with the secondary causes in producing their effects, whereas on these non-Molinist views God acts on the secondary causes to determine what their effects will be. The Molinist view of divine concurrence allows God to control the secondary causes without determining them. Based on His middle knowledge God puts in place all the secondary causes that He knew would lead to abiogenesis and then, so to speak, He takes “hands off” and allows them to produce their effects, concurring in their operation without determining them. So I think that supervisionism is more naturally associated with Molinism.
- William Lane Craig