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#81 Fictionalism and the Two Natures of Christ

November 03, 2008
Q

Mr. Craig,

I heard you lecture on the topic of abstract objects, and defend Fictionalism over Platonism. I am inclined to agree with you that abstract objects are just useful fictions, having no mind-independent reality. But how do you apply Fictionalism to Christology?

I am thinking in particular of the Chalecodian formulation of Christ as one person in two natures. Unless I am mistaken, natures are abstract objects. As such, saying Christ is one person subsisting in two natures is a useful fiction. This raises a few questions:

1. How should we understand "nature?" Is it best to understand it as an idealized set of capacities that demarcate one type of thing from another? On this definition, a nature would be understood, not as some archetypical abstract entities existing in the realm of Ideas or mind of God, but as a useful fiction to describe what unites common entities, and differentiates them from other groups of common entities.

2. What exactly does it mean to say Christ subsists in two natures?

3. Most hold that Christ's human nature was anhypostatic, being personalized only by the divine person who assumed it (enhypostatic). This is necessary to safeguard the singular personhood of Christ without the expense of denying His genuine humanity. But if natures are useful fictions, what does it mean to say God "hypostasized" human nature? Is it a fiction, useful for affirming the simple truth that the divine person assumed all the capacities peculiar to humans so that He Himself might exist as a human, without creating an ontologically separate human person in the process?

I am interested in your insights. Thank you.

Jason

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Dr. craig’s response


A

These are excellent questions, Jason, because a Fictionalist interpretation of the doctrine of Christ's two natures is apt to be misunderstood. Since very often in the history of thought a person's views have helped to spawn movements quite unlike the views of the original person, it's important to do everything we can to correct misunderstandings or tendencies before they take off.

Fictionalism is the view that statements containing words that apparently refer to abstract objects are literally false (at least according to the typical semantical theory governing such words). By an abstract object one means an object which is causally effete, that is, it has no causal power. Abstract objects are therefore immaterial entities and are often regarded as existing beyond time and space. Typical examples include mathematical objects like numbers, propositions expressed by sentences, and properties.

Now we use sentences containing words apparently referring to abstract objects all the time. Indeed, I think most of us would be shocked at how thoroughly our discourse is permeated with such expressions. For example, we say things like, "The number of people who perished in the Rwandan massacre was over 800,000" or "Wisdom is more precious than silver." The Fictionalist doesn't think that there are objects like numbers or virtues existing beyond space and time, so he regards such statements as literally false, since there is no referent of "number" or "wisdom." Nonetheless he regards such statements as useful and harmless in ordinary discourse. It's only when some philosopher shows up and starts pressing such statements by demanding, "So you think that the number 800,000 actually exists?" that the Fictionalist demurs. He might paraphrase the literally false statement with one not containing any words which would refer to numbers, for example, "Over 800,000 people perished in the Rwandan massacre." (Here "800,000" is an adjective, not a noun, and so doesn't involve a reference to any object.) But many times such paraphrases may not be possible and are difficult and awkward anyway, so we may as well use our apparently referential talk, keeping on alert lest some picayune philosopher shows up.

Now as you say, natures as collections of properties are abstract objects. But notice, that's not how the Chalcedonian statement is using the word. For it speaks of Christ's human nature as composed of a rational soul and body. That's no abstract object! When classical theologians spoke of Christ's human nature, they often meant his individualized human nature, that is to say, that body/soul composite that was born of Mary, walked among the hills of Galilee, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate. In that sense, one is talking about a concrete object, not an abstract object. As such, two nature talk is unobjectionable from a Fictionalist perspective.

What the Fictionalist would deny is that there are a pair of abstract objects existing in splendid isolation beyond space and time which we refer to as "the human nature of Christ" and "the divine nature of Christ." Notice that such a denial is wholly consistent with saying that Christ, being divine, was essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and holy, that is to say, it is impossible that he could have existed without being omnipotent, omniscient, and holy. Moreover, in his incarnate state Christ's individual human nature was essentially like us: spatially limited, mortal, and having a rational soul and body. So don't think that Fictionalism leads to some sort of theological nominalism which denies that Christ had any essential properties. (Notice how in that last sentence I used the useful fiction of properties to express the idea that there are true statements of the form "Christ was essentially--".)

Now as to your specific questions:

1. How should we understand "nature"? We may understand the word in two senses. One is the sense of an individualized nature. This the sense of the word as used at Chalcedon. The other sense is the notion of an abstract object which is a collection of properties or perhaps a complex property. Chalcedon seems to use the word "substance" in this sense, for it says that Christ insofar as he is human has the same substance that we do. In this second sense, a nature is a useful fiction for expressing the idea that something is essentially a certain way. Things having the same nature share the same properties, that is to say, they are essentially alike.

2. What exactly does it mean to say Christ subsists in two natures? It means that Christ is essentially a divine person who assumed in the incarnation a rational soul and body such as are essential to human beings. He is all that one needs to be to be God and all that one needs to be to be a man.

3. What does it mean to say God "hypostasized" human nature? This is an awkward way of saying that apart from its union with the second person of the Trinity the individual human nature of Christ would not be a person. It becomes personal only in virtue of its being assumed by the Son. That's why there is no human person in addition to the divine person in the incarnation. In Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview in my chapter "Christian Doctrines II: The Incarnation" I try to make sense of this doctrine by arguing that perhaps the rational soul of Christ's individual human nature is the contribution of the divine Son, that is to say, in virtue of the Son's union with the body his human nature becomes complete and therefore "hypostatic."

I hope you can see from this discussion that Fictionalism does not threaten to undo orthodox Christian theology, which is framed in terms of talk of natures and properties. Such talk is unobjectionable and can be understood in such a way as to not involve commitment to abstract objects.

One last note: the Fictionalist approach to talk about abstract objects presupposes the typical referential semantics for names and definite descriptions (so-called singular terms). I am increasingly convinced that such a semantics is deeply flawed and that the Fictionalist concedes far too much in accepting such semantics. The fact is that we use statements all the time involving what look to be singular terms but which do not refer to anything; for example,

"The whereabouts of Osama bin Laden are unknown."
"The pilot's quick thinking prevented the worst accident in airline history."
"Next Wednesday is the day of the faculty meeting."

Surely we do not want the truth of such statements to commit us to the reality of things like "whereabouts," "the accident which was prevented," and "Wednesdays"! Yet these statements seem to be true. Why think that they are literally false? Why not instead reject the typical semantics for singular terms and hold that the truth of such statements does not require all its singular terms to refer to objects but merely that reality be such as the whole statement says it is; for example, that the statement "The whereabouts of Osama bin Laden are unknown" is true if and only if the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden are unknown?

- William Lane Craig