#930 Great-Making Properties and the Ontological Argument

Dr. craig’s response

Oh, my goodness! If there were any country in the world that I least expected to get a letter from, it would be Syria! Our hearts go out to you for all that Syria has suffered in recent years through tyranny, revolution, and war. If you are not merely from Syria, S          , but actually in Syria, then I am simply astounded that in this time of hardship you are wrestling intellectually with such recondite issues. Do write us again and tell us more of your situation. Are you living in Syria? Are you a Christian? How did you learn of Reasonable Faith?

I notice that you give St. Anselm’s version of the ontological argument. While, as you note, your question does not depend on this version of the argument, still for the sake of your own education, I want to be sure that you are aware of recent developments of the argument by people like Alvin Plantinga, whose version of the argument is superior to Anselm’s original version.

It seems to me that the objection you mention is highly implausible and ultimately irrelevant to the soundness of the ontological argument. Nonetheless, it is instructive in revealing something, I think, about those sceptics who are pressing this objection.

First, the objection is highly implausible, since some of the divine attributes are clearly great-making properties. Not all of the attributes traditionally ascribed to God are clearly great-making properties. For example, it is far from clear that timelessness as opposed to infinite temporal duration is a great-making property. So there is lively discussion among philosophical theologians about which properties are entailed by perfect being theology. But at least some of the traditional properties ascribed to God are obviously great-making. Take, for example, moral perfection. How could it be denied that it is greater to be morally perfect than morally imperfect? It seems to be true virtually by definition that it is better to be morally perfect than morally flawed. (Don’t get sidetracked by scepticism about the content of the moral Good or the objectivity of moral values; for the point remains that the property of being morally perfect is a great-making property, whether or not it is instantiated and whatever its content.) Similarly, how could it be denied that it is greater to be omnipotent than to be limited in power? I don’t know what the word “greater” means if being all-powerful is not greater than being weak. Or again, it seems obviously true that it is greater to be omniscient than to be limited in knowledge. What does it mean to be greater if being all-knowing is not greater than being partially-knowing?

Second, the objection is in any case irrelevant to the ontological argument. In Plantinga’s formulation “maximal greatness” is simply defined to mean “omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in every possible world.” “Maximal greatness” is just a label chosen to designate these properties. You could have chosen any other label or no label at all. The question before us is simply whether or not it is metaphysically possible that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being in every possible world. So, as far as the ontological argument is concerned, you can forget about great-making properties and how to identify them. All you have to do is ask whether the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being in every possible world is metaphysically possible.

Despite the irrelevance of the objection to the ontological argument, I have said that the objection is nonetheless instructive because I think it gives us some insight into the mindset of the sceptics who propound it. Under the impression that this is an important issue for the ontological argument, they dig in their heels and deny that properties like moral perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience are great-making properties, despite the fact that they are virtually by definition great-making. The objection thus reveals something of the heart of the sceptic who would rather embrace highly implausible positions than admit the existence of God.